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Essays on the Economics of Technological Change and the Environment
Eugenie Dugoua
Technological change bears the promise of addressing environmental problems without reneg-
ing on economic development. However, taping its full potential requires an understanding
of its drivers and barriers. The three chapters of this dissertation are a modest attempt
at casting light on some of the factors that can foster technological change towards more
environmental-friendly technologies. In Chapter One, I provide the first quantitative ev-
idence that the Montreal Protocol, and its following amendments to protect the ozone
layer, triggered a large increase in research and innovation on alternatives to ozone-depleting
molecules. To do this, I use the full text of patents and scientific articles and implement
a difference-in-differences strategy and a synthetic control method. To compare molecules’
chemical and industrial characteristics, I construct descriptive variables by applying ma-
chine learning techniques to the documents’ text. In Chapter Two, I investigate barriers
to adopting solar lanterns in the context of rural Indian households. I design and imple-
ment a randomized controlled trial on people’s willingness to pay for such lanterns, and find
that, despite the relative simplicity of the product, information barriers to adopting solar
lanterns remain high. Chapter Three theoretically investigates firm-level barriers to green
technological change. I outline a mechanism that explains why coordination at the industry
level might be necessary. I argue that radical innovations (such as electric cars) require com-
plementary innovations in interdependent components, and show that, when technological
change requires investment by both suppliers and producers, coordination within an industry
is needed and can be difficult to obtain.
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Technology has many implications for how societies interact with the natural environment.
On one hand, the type and scale of technological use cause damages to the planet. On
the other, changes in technologies bear the promise of addressing environmental problems
without reneging on economic development. But taping the full potential of technological
change requires to understand its drivers and barriers. My interests, therefore, lie primarily
in studying how institutions and policies influence science, innovation, and technological
change so that economic development can be sustainable for the environment and societies.
To realize this research agenda, I apply traditional methods from the economics discipline,
including theoretical modeling, econometric analysis, and field experiments. I also leverage
more recently developed tools such as machine learning techniques for text analysis. I
purposefully seeked training and practice in these different methodologies with the aim of
not being limited method-wide in the type of questions I wish to carefully examine.
My research interests can be categorized into three central themes. The first focuses on
the effect of environmental regulations and international agreements on science and inno-
vation concerning environmental-friendly technologies. In Chapter 1 of this dissertation, I
examine the particular case of the Montreal Protocol to protect the ozone layer. My interest
here was spurred by realizing that solving environmental problems such as climate change
requires both cooperation from many different countries and extensive technological change.
History provides few examples for us to understand both conceptually and practically how
such technological change can take place. The response to the threatened depletion of the
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ozone layer is regularly cited as the most environmentally successful instance and, as a result,
is frequently debated as a model for resolving the issue of climate change. These debates of-
ten center around similarities and differences of the ozone and climate cases along economic,
environmental, technological, and political dimensions. However, I took from these discus-
sion an absence of understanding of the dynamics of innovation involved in dealing with the
ozone crisis. I, consequenty, undertook to build a foundation to achieve this understanding
by collecting data and using innovative empirical methods.
The second central theme in my research interests concerns technological change in de-
veloping countries and in particular energy poverty. Throughout my graduate studies, I have
discerned overlap in thinking about the barriers to moving up the development ladder and
those to moving away from polluting technologies. Both cases involve massive technological
change. Here my primary research interests focus on how developing countries can more ef-
fectively fulfill their energy needs without requiring fossil fuels. To carry out this work, I am
studying socioeconomic barriers to electrification and the diffusion of environmental-friendly
technologies. Chapter 2 of this dissertation focuses on barriers to diffusion of solar lanterns
in rural India. Finally, the third theme central to my research interests focuses on challenges
to green technological transitions at the firm level, and Chapter 3 of this dissertation looks
at the role supply chain networks on firms’ ability to innovate.
Chapter Summaries
Chapter 1:
International Environmental Agreements and Directed
Technological Change: Evidence from the Ozone Regime
Can international environmental agreements induce innovation on green technologies? It is
possible that international negotiations succeed only once technological solutions are avail-
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able. In this case, agreements would help diffuse such technologies rather than fostering
their development. I provide the first quantitative evidence that the Montreal Protocol,
and its following amendments to protect the ozone layer, triggered a large increase in re-
search and innovation on alternatives to ozone-depleting molecules. To do this, I use the full
text of patents and scientific articles to construct new panel data of the yearly number of
published documents about these molecules. I implement a difference-in-differences strategy
(DiD) and a synthetic control method (SCM) using hazardous air pollutants as control units.
To compare molecules’ chemical and industrial characteristics, I construct descriptive vari-
ables by applying machine learning techniques to the documents’ text. The SCM estimates
that the post-Montreal regime caused a 144% increase in patents and a 189% increase in
articles mentioning substitutes to ozone-depleting substances; the DiD yields comparable
estimates. These results challenge the view that agreements foster technological diffusion
without affecting much of the dynamics of innovation. Agreements can thus encourage the
development of green technologies, which importantly suggests they should be negotiated as
early as possible if we hope to solve global environmental problems.
Chapter 2:
Passive Learning and Incentivized Communication: A
Randomized Controlled Trial in India
Joint work with Yonas Alem.
In order to understand the extent of the information barrier to adoption of a household
technology, we designed a randomized controlled trial on willingness to pay (WTP) for solar
lanterns in India. We gave high quality solar lanterns to randomly selected ‘seed’ households
in a non-electrified region of the state of Uttar Pradesh. Three friends of the seed household
were randomly assigned to one of the following three groups: control, passive learning and
incentivized communication. We elicit WTP from the control group when the seed receives
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the solar lantern. We elicit WTP from the friends in the passive learning and incentivized
communication groups thirty days after the seed receives the solar lantern. We show that
passive learning increases WTP by 90% and incentivized communication by 145% relative
to the control group. We also show that learning from others is the mechanism that drives
the observed WTP by peers.
Chapter 3:
A Theoretical Model of Technological Change in Industrial
Networks and Implications for a Green Technological Transition
Joint work with Marion Dumas.
The literature on technological change has studied several types of positive externalities
leading to sub-optimal levels of development and adoption of technologies. In this paper,
we suggest another type of positive externality: supplier network externality. In this case,
the cost to one producer of producing a new technology may depend on how many other
producers are deploying similar technologies. Specifically, production costs decrease as sev-
eral producers source similar inputs from shared suppliers, generating economies of scope.
To illustrate the mechanism, we develop a stylized model of two producers with a shared
supplier. We introduce the possibility that producers innovate in incompatible ways requir-
ing very different inputs from the supplier. This triggers a loss in economies of scope and
reduces the equilibrium level of innovation. We argue that the model has implications for
a green technological transition. In this case, lock-in situations can lead to market failures
since green innovations are socially desirable. We use supply-chain relationship data to show
that our model is of particular relevance to the car manufacturing industry and, we highlight
how our results help unify findings from several case studies.
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Future Research Directions
In the future, I intend to continue some of the work presented in this dissertation, as well as
start new projects related to the three main themes described earlier.
I intend to further the work presented in Chapter 1 by investigating to what extent
the strengthening evidence of the urgency to phase-out CFCs, mostly through the ozone
hole “discovery”, might have directly incentivized firms to develop on CFC substitutes. I
will attempt at identifying such effect by leveraging variation in the timing of regulation of
different molecules. Specifically, two molecules (carbon tetrachloride and methyl chloroform)
were recognized as strong ozone-depleting substances but were not included in the 1987
agreement. Instead, they became regulated in 1990. I intend to analyze trends in science
and innovation for substitutes to carbon tetrachloride and methyl chloroform to infer whether
the ozone hole “discovery” might have directly affected firms’ behavior. On a different note,
I also intend to further exploit the richness the patent and article data that I collected to
paint a more precise picture of the micro-dynamics of the technological change that took
place during the ozone crisis. This would imply more analysis at the level of firms and
researchers.
I also intend to continue initiated collaborations on the theme of technological change in
developing countries and in particular energy poverty. In this context, in prior joint work
with Ryan Kennedy and Johannes Urpelainen (Dugoua et al. 2017b), I explored the poten-
tial of nighttime lights data for measuring electrification progress. We showed that many
measures derived from satellite data are surprisingly accurate for measuring rural electrifica-
tion and demonstrate how they could be substantially improved by using better GIS maps,
basic geoprocessing tools, and particular aggregations of nighttime luminosity. Similarly,
in work with Johannes Urpelainen and Ruinan Liu (Dugoua et al. 2017a), I examined who
benefited from the recent progress in rural electrification in India. Our findings highlight
the importance of socioeconomic barriers to rural electricity access and alleviate concerns
that remoteness and population density are crucial obstacles to grid extension. Following on
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this strand of work, I am part of a team of researchers, including Johannes Urpelainen and
Ryan Kennedy, working on an original household survey funded through a MacArthur grant
to collect data on sustainable energy use in India. The project will leverage the penetration
of devices connected to the Internet and energy monitors to improve the quality and speed
of data collection on energy consumption. Consequently, the collected data will provide the
most detailed and large-scale mapping of energy access in India to date. This, in turns,
will be use to better understand the drivers and barriers of sustainable energy diffusion in
India, as well as to customize energy access interventions to meet the needs of different
communities.
I also intend to continue the work initiated in Chapter 3 to better understand challenges
of technological change at the firm’s level. We would like to use data on patents and buyer-
supplier relationships to empirically investigate the implications of our theory. We also plan
to generalize the model by allowing for more producers and suppliers. Finally, I project to
examine interactions between innovation and science in the context of environmental issues.
In this research, jointly pursued with Eliott Ash, I will look at whether granting patents
on green technologies could stimulate research publications on related environmental topics.
It is often argued that the patent system is beneficial since it renders information about
inventions public, which, in turn, stimulates the development of new ideas. However, little
empirical evidence supports such a theory (Ouellette 2011; Sampat et al. 2015; Walsh et al.
2007; Williams 2017). My research will use exogenous variation in the leniency of patent
examiners to identify if patenting has a positive causal effect on generating new scientific
knowledge. In this research, I will also use machine learning tools for text analysis to link









International environmental agreements, like domestic policies, attempt to mitigate environ-
mental degradation. Agreements, however, are needed when environmental problems run
across national borders. In such contexts, individual governments usually lack incentives
to create domestic policies, and international cooperation is needed. A large literature has
developed to better understand the drivers of environmental-friendly innovation, and many
studies show that domestic environmental policies can foster green innovation (Jaffe et al.
2002; Popp et al. 2010). I ask: Can international environmental agreements, like domestic
policies, foster innovation? It is possible that they don’t: noncooperative game theory sug-
gests that agreements occur when costs to the players are low. Hence, agreements might only
occur once technological solutions are readily available, and they might simply contribute
to diffusing these technologies, as opposed to fostering the development of new ones.
This paper shows that, on the contrary, agreements can induce innovation and that
agreements, therefore, are part of the process of delivering cheaper environmental-friendly
technologies. This provides a strong argument for negotiating ambitious agreements as
early as possible since technologies are too often the keystone for addressing environmental
problems. To make this argument, I provide empirical evidence from the Montreal Protocol
and its following amendments. In 1987, at Montreal, high-income countries decided to
phase-out chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) from industrial activities because CFCs were known
to destroy the protective layer of ozone molecules in the stratosphere. Technological change
unrolled rapidly: within a decade, the production and consumption of CFCs decreased by
more than 80%1. The protocol is still hailed as one the most successful environmental
international agreement and remains a point of reference in policy discussions about global
environmental problems.
Despite the large scholarly literature on the topic, the dynamics of innovation in the
ozone crisis are still debated. Richard E. Benedick, chief U.S. negotiator at Montreal, claims
1My calculations using UNEP data.
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the agreement triggered a vast effort in research to find CFC substitutes (Benedick 2009).
But others emphasize that CFC substitutes were already available at the time of negotiations
(Heal 2016; Sunstein 2007). This paper is not only the first to empirically show that Montreal
fostered innovation, but it also quantifies its effect. I do this using a novel molecule-level panel
dataset with both a difference-in-differences (DiD) strategy and a synthetic control method
(SCM). Additionally, I apply machine learning methods to semantically match documents
and measure similarity between molecules.
Successfully developing CFC substitutes did not simply mean identifying chemical struc-
tures. Mostly, the set of molecules with greatest potential to be CFC substitute was public
knowledge; I compile a list of 14 of such molecules2 and consider those molecules as treated
by the Montreal Protocol. The technological challenge, instead, lied in finding out how
such molecules could be used in the myriad of industrial processes that required CFCs,
cost-effectively and at a large scale. This meant, first, learning about thermodynamics prop-
erties, toxicity profile, and environmental acceptability; I collect scientific articles published
in journals indexed by Science Direct between 1970 and 2000 to capture such research ef-
fort. Second, new process and formula designs were needed to retrofit installed equipment
with the CFC substitutes or to altogether replace it; I collect patents granted by the United
States Patent and Trade Office (USPTO) between 1976 and 2000 to track progress on these
aspects.
Unfortunately, no preexisting classifications allow me to easily identify which documents
relate to CFC substitutes. I, therefore, search the full text of patents and articles for mentions
of any of the 14 CFC substitutes3 and construct a panel dataset where each observation is
the number of documents mentioning a given molecule at least once in a given year. Finally,
2I used the report published in 1988 by the AFEAS (Alternative Fluorocarbon Environmental Accept-
ability Study). After the agreement at Montreal, manufacturers were given authorization by anti-thrust
authorities to cooperate on some specific areas. The AFEAS publication shared what they knew about the
atmospheric characteristics of several potential CFC substitutes.
3Since molecules usually have many different names4, I develop an automatic script to collect all possible
names from SciFinder, a database of chemical information.
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I apply machine techniques to text analysis to construct variables that proxy the scientific
and industrial context of the molecules. These variables correspond to the proportion of
specific topics present in documents mentioning molecule i. Intuitively, they describe the
type of words associated with molecule i.
I begin by estimating the difference before and after the signing of Montreal in the
number of documents mentioning CFC substitutes: I find large increases, close to 600% in
patents and 200% in articles. Additionally, I find that only very few patents and articles
on CFC substitutes are published before 1987, and the trend prior to 1987 (“pre-trend”)
is remarkably flat. I argue that this is indicative of technological progress not being a key
driver of negotiations’ success, and that the agreement was little anticipated. To account for
potential underlying trends, I compare innovation on CFC substitutes with a control group: I
use 171 hazardous air pollutants (HAPs). These molecules can serve as controls because they
are unrelated to ozone or to CFCs and, just like CFC substitutes, are used in a diverse range
of industrial applications. Importantly, pre-trends in the number of documents mentioning
both sets of molecules are comparable. The main DiD estimate indicates that Montreal led
to an increase of about 546% and 95% in the number of patents and articles, respectively,
between 1987 to 2000. This corresponds to average annual increases of about 390 patents and
47 articles. The estimates are reduced but remain economically and statistically significant
when controlling for lags and topic proportions.
Since one patent or article can often mention several CFC substitutes, the observations
used in the DiD design (14 CFC substitutes) are not independent. Another approach,
therefore, consists in considering them in aggregate, as one treated molecule. To estimate
a treatment effect on such “aggregate CFC substitute”, I use an SCM (Abadie et al. 2010,
2015), a method particularly suited for estimating treatment effect of interventions affecting
aggregate quantities. To do this, the SCM constructs a control unit by using a weighted
average of control molecules. The method chooses the weights so that the synthetic control
unit reproduces most closely the log count path of the outcome variable in the pretreatment
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periods. I also use weights chosen so that the synthetic control resembles the treated unit
along topic proportions; this helps obtain a control unit that resembles CFC substitutes
along chemical and industrial dimensions.
The average treatment effect using the SCM indicates the Montreal protocol lead to an
increase of about 144% in the number of patents mentioning the CFC substitutes, corre-
sponding to about 117 additional patents per year over the study time period after 1987.
This yields a lower estimate than the DiD strategy, indicating that the control constructed
in SCM provides a more conservative comparison. For articles, on the other hand, results
are similar to the DiD. I find an average treatment effect close to a 190% increase in the
number of articles, which corresponds to about 43 additional articles per year after 1987. To
assess the statistical significance of these results, I follow the placebo tests method suggested
by Abadie et al. (2010, 2015). I find treatment effects are significant at the 99% level. In
addition, the increase in the number of documents mentioning CFC substitutes becomes
statistically significant as from 1990, three years after the agreement was signed. This lag
might correspond to the time it organizationally and professionally takes to redirect research
towards CFC substitutes and to have patents and articles published (Popp 2002).
These results indicate that the post-Montreal ozone regime caused the development of
CFC substitutes. This finding is robust to considering citation-weighted document counts;
indeed, the most cited patents and articles on CFC substitutes were published after Montreal.
Additionally, one hypothesis is that manufacturers kept their CFC substitutes secret, and
Montreal simply created a world market for them. If that were true, we would observe a
sudden increase in patents in the few months following the treaty signature. I show that
this is not the case both for all patent assignees as well as for the biggest two, Du Pont and
Dow Chemical. Additionally, I find that these results are robust to dropping patents and
articles with only few mentions of CFC substitutes (e.g. keeping documents with at least
three occurrences of a molecule name).
This paper contributes to the literature on directed technological change in the context
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of environmental issues (Acemoglu 2002; Jaffe et al. 2002; Popp 2010a). Many papers have
explored the relationship between domestic environmental regulations and innovation (e.g.,
Aghion et al. (2016), Calel et al. (2016), and Jaffe et al. (1997)). My paper is most similar to
Dekker et al. (2012) in that it investigates the causal effect of an international agreement5.
However, instead of focusing only on patenting, I also analyze trends in scientific articles.
Importantly, while scholars have thoroughly investigated the diplomatic and game theoretic
aspects of the ozone crisis (Barrett 2003; Benedick 2009; Murdoch et al. 2009; Parson 2003;
Wagner 2009), no quantitative analysis of the dynamics of innovation during the crisis has
been carried out. This is despite the economics, science, and politics of ozone serving as
an anchor point for our understanding and beliefs about the role of diplomacy, agreements,
and technologies in solving environmental issues, especially climate change (Barrett 1999;
Sunstein 2007). This paper thus complements the literature on Montreal by showing and
quantifying its effect on science and innovation. When solutions to environmental problems
are plagued with technological uncertainties or high price tags, decision-makers are incen-
tivized to adopt a “wait-and-see” strategy: wait for proven new technologies, then negotiate
an agreement. By showing that agreements can encourage the development of green tech-
nologies, this paper suggests they should be negotiated as early as possible if we hope to
solve global environmental problems.
The following section 1.2 summarizes the literature on directed technological change and
its relationship to the environment and provides further information on the ozone crisis and
the Montreal Protocol. I describe the data in section 1.3 and the empirical strategies and
main results in section 1.4. I focus on the SCM in section 1.5, and conclude in section 1.7.
5Dekker et al. (2012) focus on the signing of the Helsinki and Oslo protocol as part of the Convention
on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution
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1.2 Directed Technological Change and the Ozone
Layer
Directed Technological Change and the Environment
The relationship between technological change and the environment has been drawing more
interest, particularly since the 1990s. On the one hand, technical change affects the intensity
of environmental impacts. On the other, there is the growing recognition that environmental
policies create new types of incentives and constraints possibly affecting the direction of
technological change. The concept of directed technological change goes back to 1936: under
the “induced innovation” hypothesis, Hicks (1932) stated that innovations are biased towards
high priced factors so to make their use more efficient or to substitute them. In the past two
decades, the concept has reappeared under the phrase “directed technical change” (Acemoglu
1998) encompassing not just price effects, but also market size and regulatory effects6.
In the environmental context, the direction of innovation is particularly important. The
usual technology policy (e.g., public funding for research and development activities or in-
tellectual property regimes) attempts to deal with knowledge market failures by fostering
the rate of innovation and diffusion of new technologies. But it does so in a direction-blind
way. As a result, a large literature has developed at the intersection of environmental and
technology policy to better understand how and to what extent technical change could be
directed (Jaffe et al. 2002; Popp 2010a; Popp et al. 2010). In fact, we can think of en-
vironmental regulations as modifying the shadow prices of environmental inputs which, as
the induced innovation hypothesis suggests, induces innovation in non-polluting directions.
This is specifically discussed by Newell et al. (1999) who generalized the concept of induced
6The phrase’s popularity took off after Daron Acemoglu’s 1998 model showing that an increase in
skilled labor force can induce skill-biased technological change through a market size effect that fosters the
development of innovations complementary to the abundant factor, in that case, skills (Acemoglu 1998). In
another paper, Acemoglu (2002) presents a model where the direction of technological change is influenced
by both scarce factors (through prices) and abundant factors (through market size).
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innovation to include inducement by regulations.
The literature initially focused on the impact of environmental regulations on business
competitiveness (Ambec et al. 2013; Porter 1991; Porter et al. 1995a,b) and then later on
patenting activities and R&D spendings; scholars found strong evidence that regulations
have an important influence on environmental-friendly innovations (Brunel 2015; Brunner-
meier et al. 2003; Jaffe et al. 1997; Johnstone et al. 2010, 2012; Lanjouw et al. 1996; Nesta et
al. 2014; Popp 2005; Vollebergh 2007). For example, Popp (2006) finds significant increases
in patents pertaining to sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides emissions reduction in response to
the passage of environmental regulations in the United States, Japan, and Germany. More
recently, Calel et al. (2016) show that the European Union Emissions Trading System in-
creased patenting related to low-carbon technologies by about 10%, while not crowding out
other technologies. Although many studies investigate the effect of international environ-
mental agreements on pollution outcomes (Aichele et al. 2011; Finus et al. 2003; Kellenberg
et al. 2014), they seldom look at the impact on science and innovation. One exception is
Dekker et al. (2012) who show increased patenting activity for countries signatories of the
Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution.
A Brief History of the Ozone Crisis
The story of the ozone crisis began in 1974 when two chemists published an article in
which they laid out the theoretical possibility that ozone molecules could be broken down
in the stratosphere by chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) (Molina et al. 1974)7. Even though the
potentially harmful effects of a thinner ozone layer were not well studied, it was clear that
more UV light would cause more skin cancers, eye cataracts and a likely loss in fishery
and agriculture productivity (Miller et al. 1986). CFCs, the main molecules responsible
for depleting ozone, had become important molecules for industrial activities due to their
7In 1995, Mario J. Molina and F. Sherwood Rowland, together with Paul J. Crutzen, were awarded the
Nobel Prize in Chemistry “for their work in atmospheric chemistry, particularly concerning the formation
and decomposition of ozone”
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chemical properties: they are unusually stable, nonflammable, nontoxic and noncorrosive8.
This makes them ideal molecules for manufacturing many consumer goods. And, best of
all, they were cheap to produce. The use of CFCs spread over five different sectors: foams,
refrigeration and air-conditioning, aerosols, fire protection and solvents9.
In September 1987, industrialized countries agreed to a binding agreement regulating the
production and use of CFCs. The approach was flexible with a series of phase-out dates,
as opposed to banning altogether the molecules. These phase-out schedules were further
consolidated and extended to other molecules in the years that followed10. Atmospheric
concentrations for most CFCs peaked by 2014 and ozone layer recovery is now expected
around 2050 (Hegglin et al. 2015).
The role of the Montreal Protocol in solving the crisis has been intensely discussed (Bar-
rett 1994; Beron et al. 2003; Murdoch et al. 1997; Wagner 2009, 2016). Specifically, Barrett
(Barrett 1999) suggested that a key aspect of the protocol was to solve the enforcement prob-
lem: Montreal included trade restrictions with non-parties in ozone-depleting substances as
well as in products containing those substances. It also included the threat of banning
trade in products made using ozone-depleting substances. These trade restrictions effec-
tively acted as a mechanism for free-rider deterrence and leakage prevention. More recently,
Wagner (Wagner 2016) provided empirical evidence that these trade measures promoted full
participation in the protocol, ensuring its almost-universal ratification. My paper comple-
ments this literature by focusing on the quantitative effect of Montreal and its following
agreements on science and innovation.
8CFCs were first commercially used in 1928 as cooling fluids for refrigerators. They were designed
specifically to substitute other refrigerants that were either dangerously toxic or inflammable (Parson 2003).
9CFCs are great refrigerants because they vaporize at low temperature and are very energy-efficient
coolants. As aerosols, they were used in cosmetics, household products, pharmaceuticals, and cleaners. Fi-
nally, their nonreactive property made key products for cleaning microchips and telecommunication equip-
ment
10For example, the London amendment, signed in 1990, regulated new chemicals such as carbon tetrachlo-
ride and methyl chloroform. In 1995, the parties successfully negotiated phase-out targets for lower-income
countries, which were until then exempted from any regulation.
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The Role of Technology in the Ozone Crisis
There is no question that if emission reductions were successful, it was thanks to CFC
substitutes becoming available. Goods that contained or required CFCs for their production
continued to be commercialized, and no air capture system of CFCs was ever designed. But
the question of when these CFC substitutes were developed and whether the agreement
triggered the bulk of the effort to find them is still debated. Some works have focused
specifically on the technological story behind the Montreal Protocol (Glynn 2002; Gonzalez
et al. 2015; Le Prestre et al. 1998; Miller et al. 1986; Parson 2003; Taddonio et al. 2012) as
well as the reaction of the business community (Falkner 2005; Mulder 2005; Reinhardt et al.
1989a,b; Smith 1998). But, perspectives on the role of innovation remain mixed.
Richard Benedick, head U.S. negotiator at Montreal, argued that the agreement caused
a vast effort in research to find CFC substitutes and that qualitative evidence abounds on
the dynamics of the innovation process under the Montreal Protocol (Benedick 2009)11.
Similarly, Edward A. Parson highlights that, although some manufacturers initially started
research on potential substitutes in the late 1970s, these efforts quickly came to an end around
1981 (Parson 2003, Chap.3 p.53 and Chap.7 p.173)12. As a result, little was known about
the toxicity and environmental acceptability of the potential CFC substitutes, whether and
how they could be processed at large scale, and whether they would require a redesign of the
processes and equipment in the various industries that used CFCs as inputs. Despite both
Benedick and Parson arguing that, on the eve of the negotiations, technological uncertainties
loomed large, others have taken a different stance. One narrative claims that CFC substitutes
11Benedick (2009, Chap.8 p.104.): “It was evident (...) that the protocol was in fact moving industry in
directions that two years earlier had been considered impossible.” Benedick refers to articles published in
the New York Times and Chemical and Engineering News when he asserts that the agreement triggered a
vast research effort.
12Parson narrates the various waves of research efforts to develop CFC substitutes, both before and after
the signature of the Montreal Protocol. According to Parson, manufacturers would have stopped these R&D
programs because they had determined that CFC substitutes would cost around 2 to 5 times more than
CFCs, and it made no sense to continue developing these substitutes with little sign of regulations under
way.
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were readily available before the negotiations (Heal 2016; Sunstein 2007)13. This view is
also often expressed in media outlets14. In this paper, I empirically investigate the role
of Montreal in the development of CFC substitutes by quantitatively analyzing trends in
patents and articles related to CFC substitutes.
1.3 Data
Empirical Indicators of Technological Change
Patents. The process of technological change is often described as a sequence of distinct
activities: basic research, applied research, development, commercialization, and diffusion
(Greenhalgh et al. 2010, figure 1.1). To strengthen the incentives to generate innovations,
modern economies have adopted regimes of intellectual property rights where inventors are
granted exclusive rights through patents. The publication of a patent, as a result, is a testi-
mony to the successful process of applied research and development and can be considered as
a proxy for technological change in general, and of innovation in particular. Patent data has
been broadly used in empirical research in the past two decades (Hall et al. 2012; Henderson
et al. 1998; Kay et al. 2014; Popp 2005; Williams 2013; Williams 2017). I follow this liter-
ature by using patent counts as a proxy for innovation. I download the full-text of all U.S.
patent grants from 1976 to 2000 from the U.S.P.T.O. repository15. To construct a better
proxy for innovation, I sort patent by application date. I use the texts contained in the
13Sunstein (2007), for example, claims that “an international agreement was largely in the interest of
American manufacturers, which had already initiated a transition to safe CFC-alternatives”. In a recent
book examining the most urgent environmental issues of our time, Geoffrey Heal discusses the failure of the
Kyoto Protocol in comparison to the success of Montreal: “However, there are big differences between ozone
depletion and climate change. We have not yet seen the equivalent of DuPont’s discovery of an alternative
to CFCs, which would be the discovery by oil and coal companies of a greenhouse-gas-free energy source
capable of meeting world energy demand at current energy costs.” (Heal 2016, p68).
14Here is an excerpt from an article published in The New York Times on August 20, 2002: “The
agreement’s success occurred, in large part, because substitutes for the harmful chemicals were readily
available (...).”
15This represents a total of 2,605,925 patents.
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abstract and summary description of the invention. The cleaning procedure involves a series
of standard steps such as replacing English contractions with their non-shortened forms or
converting non-ASCII characters into their closest ASCII equivalents. More information is
provided in Appendix 3.6. Patents also contain the names and addresses of inventors and
assignees16. I also categorize patents by the type of organizations their assignee is affiliated
with (e.g., business, education, or government). More details about how the meta-data is
cleaned, matched and classified by type are provided in Appendix 3.6.
Articles. The phases of basic and applied research focus more specifically on the produc-
tion and dissemination of knowledge. Through the publication of articles, researchers render
their contribution public and allow other researchers and potential inventors to build upon
it. A large literature was born out of Derek J. de Solla Price’s contributions to a quanti-
tative understanding of the growth of science (Dasgupta et al. 1994; De Solla Price 1965;
De Solla Price 1986). More recently, scholars have analyzed the distribution of citations to
understand differences between papers with low or high citations (Iaria et al. 2015; Redner
2004; Thompson et al. 2005; Wang et al. 2013). Part of the literature has also focused on the
links between science and innovation by relating patents and scientific articles (Trajtenberg
et al. 1997). Using Elsevier’s web interface17, I download the full-text of scholarly articles
published between 1970 and 2000 in journals indexed by ScienceDirect18. First, I collect the
ISSN number of each journal19, and use the ScienceDirect API to obtain the DOIs of all the
16To associate patents to specific countries, I use the country of the assignee. When patents have no
assignee but only inventors, I use the country of the inventor.
17http://dev.elsevier.com/
18I select journals in the following disciplines: chemistry, chemical engineering, engineering, environmental
science, materials science, and physics and astronomy.
19I do this using Elsevier’s website (https://www.elsevier.com/solutions/sciencedirect/content/
journal-title-lists.
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articles for each ISSN20. Then, I query the full text of articles for the DOIs returned21. After
a series of cleaning procedures, I obtain a total number of articles of 1,811,301. I detect ev-
ery document’s language and drop non-English articles. Because the translation of English
articles in other language is often contained in the full text, I drop any sentence containing
less than 80% of tokens recognized by a standard English dictionary22. More details on
the cleaning procedure are provided in Appendix 3.6. For data on affiliations and citation
counts, I query the Scopus search API23. Additionally, I use the Global Research Identifier
Database24 (GRID) to classify authors’ affiliations (e.g., education, company, etc...).
Molecule Groups
I primarily focus on a group of molecules that were known to be potential CFC substitutes.
Since there is no preexisting categories or classification of such molecules, I construct a list
using historical records. After Montreal, manufacturers from the US, Europe, and Japan
received authorization from antitrust officials to organize cooperation, at least on the science
for which patenting was not possible. They launched two working groups to study the fea-
sibility of various alternatives. The PAFT (Program for Alternative Fluorocarbon Toxicity
Testing), created in January 1988, worked on assessing the toxicity of five possible alterna-
tives. The AFEAS (Alternative Fluorocarbon Environmental Acceptability Study), created
in December 1988, investigated the atmospheric dynamics of twelve potential CFC substi-
tutes. I use these twelve molecules to form a first group. I also include in this group two
20A DOI, or Digital Object Identifier, is a sequence of digits and letters that uniquely identifies an
academic article.
21Full text data was successfully downloaded for 1,843,684 articles, out of a total of 2,307,345 DOIs
initially returned by the API. This implies that Elsevier listed 463,661 DOIs for which the full text was
not available. This might be due, for example, to entire journals dropping out of Elsevier Science Direct’s
collection.
22I use SpaCy’s English dictionary in Python.
23Because of quota limitations, I queried meta-data only for articles mentioning only CFC substitutes,
Annex A or B compounds.
24https://www.grid.ac/
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other possible CFC substitutes mentioned in Benedick (2009) and Parson (2003)25. Table
A2 in Appendix 3.6 shows the name and additional information about these molecules.
I search through every patent and article to identify which mention any of these molecules.
Being able to search the full text of the documents is an advantage here since relying on
abstracts only could lead to many false negatives. Chemical compounds, however, are often
given several names; for example, HCFC-22 has 39 other possible names such as chlorodifluo-
romethane or algeon 22. To capture all the occurrences of a mention of a molecule, I develop
an automatic script to collect all possible names for a given molecule through SciFinder,
a database of chemical information maintained by the American Chemical Society. I then
search through all patents and articles to identify which documents mention any of these
molecule names. When a document contains the name of only one of the molecules, the
document is assigned to that molecule. When it mentions several molecules, it is assigned
to each of these molecules26. I develop alternative rules as robustness checks. I proceed
similarly to identify the patents and articles that mention any of the 171 Hazardous Air
Pollutants (HAPs). I explain in the next section how these molecules are useful for my
methodology27.
To illustrate the kind of patents present in the data, Table 1.1 lists the ten most common
patent codes for patents mentioning CFC substitutes. Most codes belong to the C class
(“Chemistry, Metallurgy”). The subclasses “C07” and “C08” refer in particular to the
purification, separation or stabilization of organic compounds possibly containing carbon
and halogens with or without hydrogen28.
25HFC-245fa and HFC-365mfc are mentioned as possible substitutes in foams.
26This is what I refer to as the weak rule.
27The full list of HAP molecules that I consider is available in the supplemental online material.
28For example, C07C 19/00: Acyclic saturated compounds containing halogen atoms.
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Topic Proportions
I use topic modeling, a machine learning method for text analysis (Blei 2012; Blei et al.
2006, 2009; Roberts et al. 2014; Roberts et al. 2016), to generate covariates that describe
the semantics surrounding molecules. These covariates help describe and measure molecules’
chemical and industrial characteristics. The procedure outputs document-level topic propor-
tions, that is a variable from 0 to 1 indicating to what extend topic i is present in a particular
document. I then aggregate topic proportions at the molecule level by calculating unweighted
and weighted means with weights proportional to the number of times an article mentions
a molecule. Figure 1.1 summarizes these various steps with a simple example of three doc-
uments, two molecules, and two topics. Appendix 3.6 provides a more detailed description
of the procedure and the obtained topics.
1.4 Methodology and Results
A Sharp Post-1987 Increase
A simple approach to study patterns in patents and articles is to observe the yearly count of
documents about CFC substitutes and test whether there is a change of patterns before and
after the date of the signature of the agreement. Figure 1.2 plots the yearly number of articles
or patents mentioning the names of any of the 14 CFC substitutes29. We note a clear increase
after 1987, the year Montreal was signed. The hypothesis is that the signature of Montreal
acted as a strong signal to the business community that prices were going to change and
modified expectations regarding where future profits lay, i.e., in CFC substitutes. We shall
add that the response to an international agreement should be greater if many countries
participate in that agreement(Dekker et al. 2012). A global market means more profit-
making opportunities for firms about to incur the sunk costs of research and development.
29Figure A3 in Appendix 3.6 displays similar trends for each of the 14 molecules.
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For researchers publishing in peer-reviewed journals, the Montreal Protocol likely acted as a
strong signal that a technological transition was underway inducing researchers to redirect
their work towards CFC substitutes. Additionally, the choice of which scientific research
to conduct can also be heavily influenced by organizations funding research, such as the
National Science Foundation. Likely, research grants were directed on ozone depletion and
alternatives to CFCs. These mechanisms can help explain why we observe a strong increase
in patents and articles on CFC substitutes after 1987.
Innovation as a Driver of Montreal and Anticipation
An interesting question is whether R&D activities before 1987 eventually led to the success
of the negotiations at Montreal. On Figure 1.2, the trend in patenting and publishing before
1987 looks not just astonishingly flat but also very small in terms of actual number of patents
and articles published each year. This is indicative that, in fact, little was going on before
Montreal on the science and innovation on CFC substitutes. The ozone crisis literature
often mentions the existence of domestic regulations before 1987 as potential pre-Montreal
drivers of innovation. For example, in August 1977, the U.S. Congress amended the Clean
Air Act with the Stratospheric Ozone Protection amendment writing into law a CFC ban
on aerosols by 197830. In fact, even before any domestic regulation, some manufacturers
unilaterally decided to remove CFCs from their spray products because they worried about
their public image. Hence, consumer pressure possible acted as an incentive for firms to
innovate. However, these pre-Montreal domestic regulations and unilateral actions on behalf
of manufacturers only targeted aerosols, one very specific industrial application of CFCs for
which substitutes31 could easily and cheaply be implemented32. These product changes
unlikely required a significant research effort. The low levels in patent and article count
30Similarly, in 1978, Canada, Switzerland and Scandinavian countries all banned CFC aerosols. On
continental Europe, Germany called for a European Community-wide ban without success.
31Physical substitutes included roll-on devices; chemical substitutes included alkanes.
32In 1980, the EPA proposed to freeze other uses beyond aerosols but U.S. industry blocked the initiative.
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between 1970 and 1987 on Figure 1.2 indicates that neither consumer pressure nor aerosol
regulations seemed to have stimulated science and innovation on the 14 CFC substitutes I
consider33.
The flat trend in patenting and publishing before 1987 on Figure 1.2, additionally, in-
dicates little anticipation of the negotiations’ success. This is also supportive of the nego-
tiations being little influenced by the research output on CFC substitutes. Indeed, if R&D
output were key drivers to the negotiations’ success, firms should have been able to antici-
pate the negotiations’ outcome. Firms have strong incentives to be forward-looking because
anticipating can confer a first mover advantage. By undertaking early-on research activities,
they can develop cleaner technologies before competitors and build a strategic advantage
when regulations are passed34. As a result, if the signature of Montreal had been antici-
pated, we would observe a gradual increase in patent and article counts starting before or
at least close to 198735. Instead, it seems firms believed the likelihood of regulations to be
low and therefore had little incentive to invest in R&D.
This is, in fact, consistent with Benedick’s accounts of the events (Benedick 2009): when
the issue took prominence in the media and regulators’ minds in the late 1970s, firms initiated
some R&D projects regarding CFC substitutes. However, those projects were canceled by
the early 1980s when the probability of regulation rapidly converged to zero. At that time,
uncertainties in the science of atmospheric ozone seemed irreducible, and the year 1981
saw the election of a strongly anti-regulatory American administration. In Europe, many
33These 14 CFC substitutes were targeting foams, refrigeration and solvent applications of CFC.
34Firms with such competitive advantage could even decide to lobby in favor of environmental regulations
for that reason (Puller 2006).
35It is difficult to pinpoint precisely optimal patenting timing. On the one hand, firms have an incentive
to delay patenting right until production and commercialization begin because patents expire after ten
years. This phenomenon is particularly salient for technologies with little risk of a competitor developing
a comparable product. Patenting renders the output of a firm’s R&D public knowledge, allowing potential
competitors to effectively learn from it and come up with even better technologies. On the other hand, when
competitors work on closely related projects, delaying patenting sharply increases the risk that competition
patents first. This mechanism was likely salient in the case of CFC substitutes. Hence, overall, we should
not expect CFC manufacturers to delay much of their patenting activity.
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governments persisted in refusing to harm their domestic manufacturers with any regulation.
Benedick emphasizes the complexity of the negotiations and the great uncertainty, until the
last minute, of the negotiations’ outcome. He further argues that some exceptional turns of
events unlocked the situation. Unexpectedly, Reagan overruled his own administration and
approved the agreement36. On the European side, the biggest opponent to the regulation of
CFCs, the U.K., left the European Community Presidency, leaving Germany, Denmark, and
Belgium, firm proponents, as the head negotiators. This account of the negotiations’ success
does indeed indicate that the agreement largely occurred independently from the state of
R&D activities on CFC substitutes.
Consequently, it looks unlikely that science and innovation on CFC substitutes were
strong drivers of the diplomatic efforts to regulate CFCs in Montreal. At this stage, I can
not rule out that firms might have kept their CFC substitutes secret and discretely lobbied
for the success of the agreement. I will investigate this possibility in Section 1.6.
First Differences
To quantitatively investigate the temporal patterns and detect a change happening in 1987
onwards, I implement the following econometric specifications: a first difference specification
with a mean shift (Equation 1.1) and a first difference specification with a trend-break
(Equation 1.2). LogCountm,t is the log number of documents in year t about molecule m;
λpost1987 is a dummy variable that equals one when t > 1987; λm are molecule fixed effects;
Y ears is a continuous variable indicating the number of years relative to 1987. Here, I
suggest to use counts in log, instead of level, as the outcome variable since it will provide
a better linear fit over time. Indeed standard models suggest we can think of scientific
production as exponentially growing over time. The sample here consists of 14 different
36The U.S. President had a skin cancer removed twice in the past, and Benedick hints that Reagan’s life
experiences weighed heavily on his decision.
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CFC substitutes of which I track the number of patents and articles throughout the years.
LogCountmt = α + β0 ∗ λpost1987 + λm + mt (1.1)
LogCountmt = α + β1 ∗ Y ears ∗ λpost1987 + β2 ∗ Y ears+ λm + mt (1.2)
The main hypothesis is that β0 and β1 are both positive for CFC substitutes, implying a
significant increase in research and patenting activities relating to CFC substitutes after
1987 once Montreal passed. Table 1.2 displays the regression tables for the simple first
time differences. Model 1 confirms that there is a significant and positive mean shift after
1987 in the number of patents and articles mentioning CFC substitutes. The coefficients
corresponds to about 630% more patents and 190% more articles on CFC substitutes after
1987 (compared to before). Model 2 shows that the change can also be modeled as a trend
break. The coefficient for “Years” indicates that there is a small positive underlying trend
for both patents and articles. Figure A2 in Appendix illustrates that patent codes that the
most frequent before 1987 tend to be the most frequent after 1987 as well. At the same time,
some codes with low frequency before 1987 become important after 1987 (e.g., C08G, C10M,
C23G or C11D). Figure A4 in Appendix illustrates that the increase in patenting activity
applies to all countries; we note a particularly strong increase for Japan and the UK.
Because this is only a simple temporal difference, such an increase could also be due to
other underlying trends not specific to ozone negotiations. For example, it might be possible
that some other reforms or the economic context fostered more academic and industrial
research in the 1990s. Hence, we need to find a group of molecules that could serve as a
control group; the challenge consists in finding molecules that are very similar to the treated
molecules, while, at the same time, remaining different enough to ensure that they are not
affected by the treatment. Specifically, a good control group should contain molecules which
undergo similar influences as CFC substitutes apart from the one of the Montreal Protocol.
One way of choosing such molecules is such that they present similar pretreatment trend in
the outcome variable LogCount but also such that they are as close as possible to the treated
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molecules chemically, physically and regarding industrial applications. Such molecules can
potentially be found in the pool of HAPs.
HAPs as a Comparison Group
HAPs have no connection to ozone but they are often related to industrial activities. They
became monitored under the Clean Air Act due to human health concerns including cancer,
asthma, birth defects, reproductive effects, and neurodevelopmental effects, as well as ad-
verse ecological impacts. Examples include benzene, chromium or formaldehyde37. Figure
1.3 illustrates why HAPs are a good choice as control molecules: overall patents about CFC
substitutes and HAPs fall into similar top-level codes. Additionally, Figure A5 shows that
they also display similar second-level patent codes. Table A3 in Appendix 3.6 displays sum-
mary statistics about countries and affiliations of patent assignees and authors of articles38.
The two groups have similar profiles: more than 96% of patents are granted to for-profit
organizations. The rest is shared among organizations coming from the educational and gov-
ernmental sector. Furthermore, the majority of patents are granted to assignee domiciliated
in the United States. European assignees tend to represent around 20 to 30% of patents;
Japanese around 10 to 20%.
On Figure 1.4, I plot the yearly mean counts of documents mentioning CFC substitutes
and HAPs to check similarity in the pre-trends. When using the whole sample of HAPS
(that is 171 HAPs molecules), pre-trends look similar. However, a close observation reveals
that, in patents, pre-trends for CFC substitutes are slightly up, while the one for HAPs
goes slightly down. In articles, HAPs have a clear upward trend before 1987 while CFC
substitutes seem somewhat flatter. Similarity in pre-trends can be improved by selecting a
subset of HAPs with pre-trend closest, in terms of log count, to the average CFC substitutes.
37The full list of the molecules included in the different treatment groups is displayed in the supporting
online material.
38Data collection for HAPs in articles is still undergoing due to quota limitation on the Elsevier API.
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Specifically, I construct the control group such that it contains the 42 HAPs whose pre-trend
is closest to the average trend of CFC substitutes39.
Difference-in-Differences
I estimate the DiD model with a mean shift specification (Equation 1.3) and a trend-break
specification (Equation 1.4). LogCountm,g,t is the log number of documents with molecule
m belonging to molecule group g, in year t; Postt equals one when t > 1987; Dm equals one
if the molecule belongs to the treated group; λm are molecule fixed effects; λt are year fixed
effects; Xmt is a vector of covariates; Y is a continuous variable indicating the number of
years relative to 1987. β0 identifies the DiD estimate.
LogCountmt = α + β0 ·Dm · Postt + λt + λm + γt ·Xmt + mt (1.3)
LogCountmt = α+β1 ·Y ·Postt ·Dm+β2 ·Y ·Postt+β3 ·Y +λt+λm+γt ·Xmt+ mt (1.4)
The primary hypothesis is that β0 and β1 are positive. Significant coefficients would
imply that the research and development activities underwent important changes after 1987
relative to the counterfactual. If there is no significance, this might suggest that the research
effort was redirected towards CFC substitutes already before the signature of the treaty.
Table 1.3 displays the DiD results. Model 1 corresponds to the main differences-in-
differences specification. It includes year and molecule fixed effects. The binary variable
“Post 1987 x Substitutes” equals 1 for observations belonging to the group CFC substitutes
and after 1987. For patents, the coefficient is smaller than the coefficient in the simple
difference, but remains significant and large, corresponding to more than a 500% increase.
This estimate corresponds to an additional 28 documents per year for the average substi-
tute. Since there are 14 CFC substitutes in my sample, this implies 390 additional patents
a year for CFC substitutes in aggregate. For articles, the coefficient is smaller than the
39I construct the control group such that it is three times larger than the treated group. There are 14
molecules in the treated group, hence I use 42 units in the control group (3× 14).
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coefficient in the simple difference, but remains significant and large, corresponding to more
than a 95% increase. This corresponds to an additional three documents a year for the
average substitute; hence, aggregating the 14 CFC substitutes, this corresponds to about
47 additional articles per year. Model 2 presents a trend-break specification. It shows that
the log number of patents mentioning CFC substitutes increases with the years after 1987
by 0.22 more than the control group. Similarly, the log number of articles mentioning CFC
substitutes increases with the years after 1987 by 0.10 more than the control group.
Figure 1.5 display the DiD coefficients plots. We note that, in patents, the treatment
effect is small, yet statistically significant, as early as 1988. For articles, the treatment effect
is first statistically significant in 1990. Two mechanisms can account for a delay between the
moment firms decide to redirect their R&D efforts towards CFC substitutes and the granting
of a patent. First is the time required to obtain any technology worth patentable, which
can broadly vary. Second, to be granted a patent, firms must submit an application which
is then reviewed by patent examiners. The average delay between application and granting
for patents on CFC substitutes is 22 months (with a standard deviation of 12 months). It
is very similar for patents on HAPs40,41.
Accounting for a two-year delay on average indicates that the increase in patenting on
CFC substitutes happened soon after the signature Montreal. It is difficult to assert how
long it takes firms to develop new technologies in response to a change in incentives. We can
expect such delay to vary from technology to technology even within the same technological
sector. In the context of energy patenting, (Popp 2002) estimates that the mean lag occurs
in 3.71 years and the median lag in 4.86 years. This implies that over one-half of the full
effect of an energy price increase on patenting is experienced after just 5 years. These
estimates are somewhat consistent with the shape of the yearly treatment effects obtained
40The average delay for patents on HAPs is about 23 months (with standard deviation of 12 months).
41Figure A6 in the appendix graphically shows the differences between application and granting date.
Overall, plotting the number of patents based on granting dates simply shifts the entire curve two years
forward. Importantly, the pretreatment periods look very similar.
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here. One possibility is that firms developed technologies prior to 1987 keeping them secret.
Once Montreal is agreed, it becomes worthwhile to patent as firms know they will eventually
commercialize them. It is possible, therefore, that some patents granted soon after 1987
results from R&D effort incurred prior to Montreal. I will further investigate this question
in section 1.6.
Table 1.4 compares the mean numbers of documents and topic proportions for patents
and articles across CFC substitutes and HAPs. The two groups have very different average
counts. Mean topic proportions are also statistically different across the two groups. For
this reason, I run additional DiD specifications controlling for lags of log count and for topic
proportions. Table 1.5 indicates that the treatment effects remain robust to those control
variables. The magnitude of the treatment effects, however, is reduced.
1.5 Synthetic Control Method
SCM and DiD
DiD strategies are designed to estimate average effects over a population from which we sam-
ple a large enough number of units exposed and units non-exposed to treatment. Considering
the overall population of potential CFC substitutes, I have sampled 14 of them; however,
those 14 observations are not independent because several molecules are often mentioned
in the same documents. Additionally, the reported standard errors in the DiD regressions
reflect uncertainties about the aggregate data. This is problematic because the greatest
uncertainty lies in the choice of the control group, and not in the aggregate quantities. In
fact, here, the aggregate quantity can be thought of as observed: adding up the observed
counts of the 14 CFC substitutes, and considering them as one single treated unit. Figure
1.6 plots the number of patents (in log) mentioning CFC substitutes. The thick line called
“Substitutes (aggregated)” corresponds to the number of patents mentioning any of the 14
CFC substitutes. I implement the SCM on this aggregated substitute and I am interested
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in examining whether the aggregate count of these 14 substitutes has gone up compared to
a control group. SCM was specifically developed to evaluate the effects of large aggregate
interventions when the treatment affects an aggregate quantity (Abadie et al. 2003, 2010,
2015; Athey et al. 2016). Many interventions are in fact implemented at an aggregate level
and have an impact on a small number of large entities, such as cities, school districts, or
states. I enlarge the application of SCM to a new kind of aggregate entity: field of scientific
and engineering inquiry.
The magnitude of the treatment effects estimated with the DiD strategy inherently relies
on the choice of the control group. It is possible to improve those estimates by choosing the
molecules that are included in the control group more precisely. Figure 1.7 in the appendix
shows patent counts in log for each HAP and for the aggregated CFC substitutes. The
graph illustrates the high heterogeneity within the group of HAPs, and in particular that
many HAPs have log counts much higher than the aggregated CFC substitutes. Some of
the HAPs might also be very different chemically, physically and from an industrial point
of view. An improvement on using all HAPs in the control group is therefore to use only
the HAPs whose yearly number of patents and articles are driven by structural processes
most similar to those driving those of CFC substitutes. The selection of comparison units
is crucial in such study: if too different from the treated unit, any deviation in the outcome
after the treatment can be attributed to initial differences and the resulting estimate would
be biased. The SCM offers a data-driven way to construct comparison units using only the
HAPs most similar to CFC substitutes. Figure 1.8 illustrates why topic proportions are
useful in this case. We see that some HAPs have values of topic proportions that stand
out as outliers, indicating that those HAPs present a semantic context that is likely very
different from the one of CFC substitutes. Using topic proportions together with the SCM
ensures that such HAPs are not used in constructing a synthetic control.
The key idea of SCM consists in using a weighted average of a set of control units with
the weights chosen so that the weighted average is similar to the treated unit regarding
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covariates and outcome in the pretreatment periods. For example, suppose we had 3 HAPs
as control units with weights µa for asbestos, µb for benzene, and µc for catechol. Then the
weights are chosen such that µa × Yat + µb × Ybt + µc × Yct is close to YSt (where S stands
for substitutes) for periods t before the treatment takes place. Here, Y is the log count of
articles mentioning the molecule, but additional covariates can be used. The advantages of
SCM relies on the opportunity to create a synthetic unit that shares as much as possible the
characteristics of the treated unit. In my case, I would hope to construct a synthetic unit
that not only reproduces the path of counts in pretreatment periods, but that also resembles
the treated molecules regarding chemical, physical and possibly industrial characteristics.
To this aim, I attempt to proxy such characteristics with topic proportions derived from
topic modeling of the documents’ text. I explain this further in details in the next section.
Implementing SCM
I implement the SCM using log count as the main outcome variable considering the 14 CFC
substitutes as one treated molecule. The outcome variable is therefore the log number of
patents or articles that mention any of the 14 molecules. The synthetic control is constructed
by fitting the values of log counts in the pretreatment periods and the topic proportions. I run
specifications using the weighted means and the non-weighted means of topic proportions.
It is critical to ensure that the synthetic control closely matches the treated unit in the
pretreatment periods. If that was not the case, the synthetic control unlikely provides a
good proxy of a counterfactual since it is not even a good proxy of the treated unit before
treatment. Following Abadie et al. (2010), I examine the Root Mean Square Prediction Error
for periods before treatment (pre-RMSPE)42 to verify whether the discrepancies between the
synthetic control and the treated unit are large and thus whether the SCM is appropriately
42The pre-RMSPE measures lack of fit between the path of the outcome variable for any particular unit








T0 is the number of pretreatment periods. A post-RMSPE can be similarly defined for periods going from
T0 + 1 to the end of time-series available.
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implemented.
Finally, I use the 171 HAPs as units in the donor pool. However, as explained by Abadie
et al. (2015), reducing the size of the donor pool can limit the risk of over-fitting as well as
the risk of interpolation biases. Following their advice, I use a smaller donor pool containing
only the HAPs that are close to the treated unit in the space of covariates and outcome. I
choose the twenty HAPs with lowest pre-RMPSE, that is the twenty HAPs that are closest
to the treated unit in terms of topic proportions and count. In what follows, I call this
group of HAPs the “smaller” donor pool. I refer to the “whole sample” of HAPs when the
donor pool includes the 171 HAPs. In all the SCM specifications, the treatment year is the
first year in which the treatment becomes active: this is defined as 1988 since Montreal was
agreed in 1987. To be conservative, I use data from 1970 until 1985 only to fit the synthetic
control.
For inference, I follow the method suggested by Abadie et al. (2010) and Abadie et al.
(2015). The exercise consists in applying the SCM procedure to every potential control
in my sample. This allows me to assess whether the effect estimated for the unit treated
is large relative to the effect estimated for a molecule chosen at random. This is akin
to implementing placebo tests wherein each unit in the control group is assumed to have
received the treatment at the year 1987. A synthetic control is then constructed for each
placebo, and we observe what would have been the hypothetical treatment effect for this
“falsely” treated unit. This creates a distribution of placebo effects, and we can evaluate
the effect for the “true” treated unit vis-a-vis to where it falls in this distribution. A p-value
is calculated as the fraction of placebo effects that are greater than or equal to the effect
estimated for the “true” treated unit.
As suggested by Abadie et al. (2010), it is useful to compute the ratios of post-RMSPE
over pre-RMSPE and examine where in the distribution of those ratios, the treated unit lies.
For example, if the treated unit is second largest ratio among a donor pool of 50 units, then
the p-value can be computed as 2
50
= 0.04, and the treatment effect would be significant at
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the 5% level43. The p-value can be interpreted as the probability of obtaining an estimate at
least as large as the one obtained for the “true” treated unit. Hence the inference is mostly
limited to assessing whether the treated effect is large compared to the distribution of the
placebos. To illustrate, how p-values are calculated, Figure 1.9 displays the distribution of
post-RMPSE over pre-RMPSE for the case of log count, weighted means of topic proportions
and the whole sample of HAPs, for the corpus of patents. The figure shows that the ratio
for CFC substitutes is greater than all of the 168 other units. Hence the p-value, in this
case, is 1/168.
Finally, when choosing weights for the donor units to create the synthetic control, the
SCM algorithm imposes that the weights sum to 1 and that they be nonnegative. These
constraints avoid any risk of extrapolation. However, when the treated unit presents values
for covariates that are either the smallest or the largest in the distribution of the donors, it
becomes difficult to approximate it. To verify that the donor pool remains adequate, Table
A4 presents summary statistics for CFC substitutes and the small pool of HAPs in the case
of counts derived from the weak rule. It is reassuring to see that the range of values displayed
by the HAPs always contains the value for CFC substitutes. Hence, here, the constraints
that weights must sum to 1 and be non-negative does not seem to be an issue.
SCM Results
Before examining results, I want to illustrate the benefits of the SCM. Table A6 compares
the mean value over the years 1970 to 1985 of log count and topic proportions for CFC
substitutes, the observed treated unit (“real S” in the table), for the comparison unit con-
structed through the SCM (“Synthetic S”) and for the average of HAPs44. We see that







pre−RMSPEj and subscript 1 refers to the treated unit.
44Specifically, the HAPs used in calculating the average are only those from the small pool. The synthetic
control, here, was constructed based on similarity with the variables “Log count” and the weighted means
of the five topic proportions.
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the synthetic control matches the “real” CFC substitutes group better than the average of
HAPs in terms of log count. This is the core idea motivating the use of the SCM45. Table
A5 illustrates that topic proportions contribute around 15% in constructing the synthetic
control46.
Table 1.6a summarizes the performance of the main SCM implementations for CFC
substitutes in the corpus of patents. I ranked the table according to the magnitude of the
pre-RMPSE with smaller pre-RMPSE at the top of the table. The lower the pre-RMPSE, the
better the fit between the synthetic control and the treated unit over pretreatment years,
and therefore the more credible it is that the synthetic control appropriately proxies the
counterfactual. Furthermore, recall that procedures using the small pool are more trustwor-
thy because they limit the risk of interpolation biases and overfitting. Hence the preferred
specifications here uses the small pool and the weak rule and weighted means of topic pro-
portions. The p-values smaller than 0.01 indicate significance at the 99% level. Table 1.6a
also reports the year in which the treatment begins to be significant at the 10% level. This is
determined by calculating p-values for each year separately. We see here that the treatment
effect becomes significant in most cases only starting in 1990 or 1992. The ATE for the
preferred specification equals 0.89; this corresponds to a 144% increase in patents compared
to the synthetic control; this gives a treatment effect close to 117 patents per year.
Similarly, Table 1.6b provides performance summary for the main SCM procedures for
CFC substitutes in the corpus of articles. Here, the preferred procedure to report the ATE
uses the small pool of HAPs and weighted means of topic proportions. The ATE for this
preferred specification equals 1.06 and is significant at the 99% level. This estimate translates
to a 189% increase, and corresponds to about 43 additional articles per year.
Figure 1.10 graphically displays the results of the SCM for CFC substitutes. The graphs
45The topic proportions are very similar, but this could be expected since the pool of HAPs used is the
small one, and the means of topic proportions within that pool are very concentrated.
46In the Stata synth package, these weights are determined according to the amount of predictive power
that each variable has over the outcome. Hence, in the case of patent counts with weighted means of topic
proportions, the outcome variable, log count, is the variable assigned greatest weights.
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correspond to SCM implementation for the preferred specification, that is when the SCM
is implemented with log counts, using the small pool of HAPs and weighted means of topic
proportions. The graphs on the left-hand side represent the raw effect, that is the observed
time series of the treated group along with the time series of the constructed control. On
the right-hand sides are shown the placebo tests, the non-parametric tests to evaluate the
significance of the results; black lines show the effect on the treated group relative to the
control group, while each gray line is a placebo test performed on a unit drawn from the
donor pool.
The figure illustrates what we concluded from Table 1.6b and 1.6a: the treatment effect
on CFC substitutes appears significant for both patents and articles. We note that the black
line rises above most other lines mostly as from 1990. This indicates that, similarly as in
the DiD, the treatment effect is statistically significant only after 1990.
Verifying SCM Assumptions
Anticipation. An important assumption supporting the SCM is that the intervention does
not affect the outcome before the implementation period. In reality, anticipation effects
often violated this assumption; part of the treatment effect would become embedded in
the control, and the SCM would lead to understating the treatment effect. A workaround
consists in redefining the treatment year as the first period in which the outcome may react
to the intervention. I have already discussed that anticipation seems unlikely. However, I
nonetheless replicate the SCM using 1985 as the beginning of the treatment since it was in
March of that year that the Vienna Convention was adopted. The meeting in Vienna can
be considered as the start of the ozone layer’s diplomatic life. Figure 1.11 displays the SCM
graphs for the preferred specification: it uses the small pool and weighted means of topic
proportions for both patents and articles. Here, the earliest possible take-off would be in
1983 since I fit the synthetic control using data up to 1982. We observe that there does seem
to be no takeoff before 1987 and results are very similar to fitting the synthetic control up
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to 1986.
Interferences A second assumption supporting the SCM requires that there be no inter-
ferences between units, meaning that HAP molecules should not be affected by the Montreal
Protocol. This is unlikely to be the case since HAPs have been under the regulatory radar
for very different reasons than ozone depletion. However possibly the redirection of research
efforts towards CFC substitutes could crowd out financing towards the control molecules.
This is also unlikely since HAPs are used in different types of industrial activities. However I
still proceed to a careful examination of the firms patenting both on CFC substitutes and the
top HAPs contributing to the synthetic control. Table 1.7a and 1.7b provide a description
of the top 4 HAPs entering the synthetic control for patents and articles, respectively. We
note that many of the industrial applications are not directly related to those of CFC sub-
stitutes which indicate a crowding out is unlikely. I investigate to what extend the assignees
of patents on CFC substitutes and on those top 4 HAPs are similar. Unfortunately, assignee
names in patent records are not standardized and the same firm can appear under different
variations of the same name. I therefore use a fuzzy matching algorithm in order to match
assignee names. I find that about 60% of patents mentioning CFC substitutes after 1987
are issued to assignees that never patented on any of the top 4 HAPs47. Examples of such
assignees are firms like 3M, Allied Chemical, BASF, Dow Chemical and Procter & Gamble.
Robustness Checks
Molecule Frequency Figure 1.12 illustrates that focusing on patents and articles that
contain more than just one occurrence of molecule would change little of the analysis. Indeed
the trend of the average HAPs remain very similar; only the levels decrease as we increase
the threshold of occurrence. For CFC substitutes, focusing only on patents with greater
number of occurrences in fact seems to exacerbate the differential between the pre and post
47There are a total of 535 different assignees patenting on CFC substitutes after 1987, and 125 of those
assignees about 25% also detain patents on one of the top 4 HAPs.
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trends. Figure 1.13 shows results are robust to using patent counts weighted by molecule
occurrences.
Counts in Level I replicate the SCM procedures using counts, in level and not in log, as
the outcome variable. Table A7a and Table A7b display the results for patents and articles,
respectively. Under the weak rule of assigning documents, I find an ATE that equals about
111 additional patents every year from 1988 to 2000, significant at the 99% level. This
estimate is very close to the treated effect obtained using logged counts, which was about
100 patents per year. For articles, the ATE for the preferred specification equals about 44
additional articles every year from 1988 to 2000, significant at the 99% level. Like in the
case of patents, this estimate is very close to the treated effect obtained using logged counts,
which was about 40 articles per year.
Other Assignment Rules I consider a different rule for assigning document to molecules
to test the robustness of my main results. Under the basic rule, which i call the weak rule, a
document was assigned to group X if a molecule of group X is mentioned in the document,
regardless of whether molecules from other groups are also mentioned. Now, under the
new rule, which I call the intermediate rule, a document is assigned to group X if the
molecule with the greater number of mentions is from group X. Figure A7 in the appendix
shows the number of patents and articles every year for each molecule group according to
the three assignment rules. We note that, as expected, the weak rule displays a greater
number of documents, except for HAPs for which the weak and intermediate rules overlap
almost completely. Table in the appendix A8 displays the performance results of the SCM
procedures for patents and articles, respectively. We see results are very similar to the main
specifications. The estimated treatment effects are somewhat larger than those with the
weak rule. The pre-RMSPE values for patents however indicate that the synthetic control
using the weak rule provided a better fit.
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Other Robustness Checks I increase the number of topics generated by the LDA topic
model from five to ten. I, therefore, use ten different topic proportions as covariates in the
SCM procedure. Results are displayed in Table A9 in the appendix. I find similar treatment
effects. Finally, since I implemented a DiD design using the particular subset of HAPs, I also
implement the SCM using that subset as the donor pool. I find results that are comparable
to the main specification. Details are reported in the supplemental online material. For
patents, the treatment effect found approximates 0.9, while for articles it is lower than 0.80.
We note that the values of pre-RMSPE are higher than the ones for similar procedures using
the small pool. This implies that the procedure to select the subset based on similar slope
excluded some molecules which ended up being useful contributions to the synthetic control.
1.6 Further Results
Influential Patents and Articles
In this section, I show that the most influential patents and articles were published after
Montreal. Indeed, a possible alternative explanation is that despite most patents and articles
being published after Montreal, the most influential ones happened before the signature of
the treaty. Figure 1.14 indicates that, on the contrary, highly cited patents and articles
concentrate after 198748. I also implement an SCM using patent counts weighted by the
number of citations each patent received and find strong treatment effects (see Figure 1.15).
Similarly, Figure 1.13 shows results are robust to using patent counts weighted by patent
citations. Table 1.8 displays the titles of the most cited articles mentioning CFC substitutes.
Only articles with three molecule occurrences in the text were kept in the sample. We note
that these articles, as expected, seem to focus on chemical and physical characteristics of
CFC substitutes (“boiling”, “evaporation”, “pressure” etc...).
48Graphs 1.14a and 1.14c include patents and articles, respectively, that mention at least one occurrence
of a molecule. To test the robustness of this findings, I plot similar graphs but for patents and articles that
mention at least 3 occurrences in Figure 1.14b and 1.14d.
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Secret CFC Substitutes?
Is it possible that firms initiated the transition to CFC substitutes before the Montreal
Protocol, without patenting but instead keeping their technologies as trade secrets? Indeed,
some firms announced at the end of the 1970s that they started R&D into CFC substitutes.
Although the same firms soon after announced they terminated those R&D programs, it
has been suggested that they might have developed key technologies that they kept secret.
Figure 1.16 indicates that the post-Montreal burst of innovations on CFC substitutes is not
driven by a few firms that would have been historically patenting on CFC substitutes since
the 1970s. This finding cast the first doubt on the secret substitutes hypothesis. Specifically,
Figure 1.16a shows that after Montreal there are many more firms with patents mentioning
CFC substitutes and HAPs. It indicates the likely presence of new entrants in the post-1987
period. Figure 1.16b confirms this phenomenon by plotting the yearly number of assignees
that are “new”, meaning it is the first time they appear in the data with a patent mentioning
CFC substitutes and HAPs. The figure shows that, after 1987, many firms with no prior
experience on CFC substitutes begin patenting.
Additionally, if secret CFC substitutes existed, we would expect a one-time increase in
patent counts in the immediate aftermaths of Montreal. Figure 1.17 plots the number of
patents mentioning CFC substitutes by month in the two years that followed Montreal.
We see in the first graph that there is no patenting peak. Furthermore, if the extent of
R&D efforts provided before Montreal was the key driver to the post-Montreal increase
in patenting, we should observe major differences in the patenting trends of old and new
entrants. On the second graph, I present trends for assignees that never obtained any patent
mentioning CFC substitutes before 1987 and those who did. Although a gap seems to build
up over time, trends look mostly similar.
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Zooming in on Key Manufacturers
Figure 1.18 illustrates the possible key role of a few manufacturers: the scatter plot shows,
for each firm in the sample, the number of patents between 1975 and 1986 on the x-axis and
the number of patents in the two years that followed Montreal on the y-axis. We see that a
positive trend is mostly driven by three firms: Du Pont, Allied, and Dow. Excluding those,
there are no clear correlations between patenting before 1987 and patenting in the immediate
aftermaths of Montreal. This plot, however, motivates a more detailed investigation in the
behavior of Du Pont and Dow. Figure 1.19a shows that most patents granted to Du Pont and
Allied were applied for after 1989. Figure 1.19b shows that there is no sudden peak patenting
right after Montreal. Instead, we observe a gradual ramping up of patenting activity. Figure
1.19c illustrates that the patents granted to Du Pont and Allied which received the greatest
number of citations mostly originate from 1989 to 1991. Figure 1.19d indicates, however,
that, in the weeks that followed Montreal, both Du Pont and Allied applied for patents that
would go on receiving a high number of citations. This seems to indicate that Du Pont and
Dow likely had a first mover advantage on some technologies. However, the magnitude of
the ramping up in patenting activity that follows from 1990 onwards allows concluding that
most of the innovative activity started after Montreal.
Annex A and Annex B Compounds
In this section, I investigate the effect of Montreal on patents and articles mentioning CFCs,
that is the molecules which were being phased out of industrial activities. These molecules
are referred to as Annex A compounds because they are listed in the Annex A of the legal
text. These molecules include five chlorofluorocarbons and three halons. For chlorofluoro-
carbons, the agreement imposed a freeze by 1989 and a 50% decrease by 1998 relative to
1986; for halons, only a freeze by 1992 was decided. In 1990, during the London revisions,
twelve additional compounds became regulated. They are listed in the Annex B of the
agreement and consist of 10 other CFCs plus carbon tetrachloride and methyl chloroform.
40
The negotiated reduction targets for each compound is shown in the Appendix. In what
follows, I refer to these two groups of molecules as Annex A and Annex B.
It is difficult to make strong hypotheses about the effect of Montreal for Annex A and
Annex B compounds. On one hand, Montreal can be thought of an inventive to no longer
pursue any research or innovation that would make use of these molecules in new industrial
contexts. But the agreement might also have spurred research efforts to help reduce the
ongoing effect of such molecules on the environment as well as innovations to help recycle
such components or use them more efficiently. This second effect is particularly likely as the
phase-out of such molecules was scheduled to be progressive. As a result, firms were given
some time to adapt and could continue using CFCs in their production.
The graphs in Figure A8 plot the yearly number of articles or patents mentioning the
names of given molecules included in Annex A and B. We note that most trends are flat,
except maybe for Annex A in articles which seem to increase and then decrease. Table A10
presents results from first differences specifications. Results indicate statistically significant
mean shifts between before and after 1987, except for Annex B in patents; however these
are small in magnitude. In figure A11, the DiD specifications indicate that a positive and
statistically significant treatment effect for Annex A in patents and a negative one for Annex
B in articles. The magnitudes however are small. For Annex A in patents, the coefficient
corresponds to a 18% increase in the number of patents mentioning Annex A compounds.
For Annex B in articles, the estimate corresponds to a 28% decrease in the number of articles
mentioning Annex B compounds.
Table A12 displays the summary performance of the SCM implementations for Annex
A and B in patents and articles. Almost none of the implementations find a significant
treatment effect, except for Annex B in articles where a negative treatment effect with 10%
significant is found when the whole sample of HAPs is used. These results indicate that
Montreal did not trigger a large decrease nor a large increase in the number of patents
and articles mentioning Annex A and B compounds. Figure A9 and A10 illustrate these
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results by displaying the graphs generated by the SCM procedures using the small pool, and
unweighted or weighted topic proportions (which ever gave lowest pre-RMPSE). The graphs
show that indeed the estimated treatment effect estimated falls well within the distribution
of placebo effects, at least for Annex A compounds. For Annex B compounds, the treatment
effect tends to be as one of the lowest curves among all the placebos. We note that, in the
case of articles, the synthetic control fails to provide a good fit, and so results cannot be
trusted.
1.7 Conclusion
Tackling environmental problems often relies on developing and diffusing new technologies.
It is, therefore, important to better understand the drivers of technological change. In
this paper, I document that the Montreal Protocol, and its following amendments, led to
the development of CFCs substitutes. This empirical evidence goes against the often-heard
narrative that alternatives technologies were readily available before the treaty. In fact, soci-
ologist Reiner Grundmann dubbed this idea “the most pervasive and most widespread myth
surrounding the Montreal Protocol” (Grundmann 1998). He traced its origin to the fierce
opposition between Americans and Europeans: the British and the French believed that envi-
ronmental issues were a disguise for commercial interests, and that American manufacturers
would use international regulations to gain market shares thanks to their secret substitutes49.
Instead, the treatment effect that I estimate in this paper tells a story where almost all of
the science and innovation on CFC substitutes was triggered by the post-Montreal regime.
The magnitude of the effect is even consistent with what has been described as a “burst of
industrial creativity” (Meadows et al. 1992).
49An element that helps better understand this accusation is the Concorde controversy from 1974
(Benedick 2009, p. 33). When the French and the British had hoped to conquer the world with super-
sonic jets, Americans denied them the authorization to land the aircraft on U.S. soil, protesting that the
pollution emitted by the plane’s engine was a serious threat to the ozone layer. These claims were dismissed
later on as it was shown that the atmospheric reactions would not occur at the Concorde flying altitudes.
This incident certainly left an aftertaste of distrust for Europeans.
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The signature of Montreal triggered a series of mechanisms that provided firms and re-
searchers clear incentives to orient their R&D effort towards CFC substitutes. In particular,
it had the immediate effect of modifying expectations about future prices and created a
worldwide demand for substitutes. Hence, it incentivized profit-seeking firms to bring CFC
substitutes to market. Researchers publishing in peer-reviewed journals also redirected their
work towards CFC substitutes either incentivized by grants focusing on ozone depletion or
due to a shift in their personal research priorities. The science of ozone at the time was also
evolving. Particularly, in 1985, scientists detected a large depletion of ozone over Antarctica
(called the ozone “hole”) and causally attributed it to CFCs in March 1988. This discovery
certainly increased the perceived benefits of phasing-out CFCs and contributed to the deep-
ening and widening of the ozone regime in London in 1990 and Copenhagen in 199250. In
future work, I aim at investigating to what extent the strengthening evidence of the urgency
to phase-out CFCs might have directly incentivized firms to develop on CFC substitutes.
Firms as profit-seeking entities are unlikely to react strongly. In a world without the Montreal
agreement, firms would be weakly incentivized to incur R&D costs without the guarantee
of their competitors doing the same and without the guarantee of a worldwide market, even
with a large ozone hole over Antarctica and strong consumer pressure. Nonetheless, I intend
to tease out the possible effect of the ozone hole “discovery” by leveraging variation in the
timing of regulation of different molecules. Specifically, two molecules (carbon tetrachloride
and methyl chloroform) were recognized as strong ozone-depleting substances but were not
included in the 1987 agreement. Instead, they became regulated in 1990. I intend to an-
alyze trends in science and innovation for substitutes to carbon tetrachloride and methyl
chloroform to infer whether the ozone hole “discovery” might have directly affected firms’
behavior.
50By deepening, I mean that more ambitious reduction targets were agreed. Widening refers to adding
new molecules to the list of regulated compounds.
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Table 1.1: Ten most common patent codes for patents mentioning CFC substitutes
ICL Count Description
C07C 501 Acyclic or carbocyclic compounds
C08G 351 Compounds of unknown constitution
C08J 269 General processes of compounding
C09K 183 Materials for applications not otherwise provided for
A61K 156 Preparations for medical, dental, or toilet purposes
C10M 106 Lubricating compositions
F25B 90
Refrigeration machines, plants, or systems; heat pump
systems
C08F 67
Macromolecular compounds obtained by reactions only
involving carbon-to-carbon unsaturated bonds
C11D 64 Detergent compositions
C07D 63 Heterocyclic compounds
Note: The table displays the most frequent codes associated to patents mentioning CFC substitutes
throughout the period 1976 to 2000. Most codes belong to the C class (”Chemistry, Metallurgy”).
The subclasses ”C07” and ”C08” refer in particular to the preparation (e.g., purification, separation
or stabilisation) of organic compounds, and as such they are associated to any patent related to
compounds containing carbon and halogens with or without hydrogen (e.g., C07C 19/00: Acyclic
saturated compounds containing halogen atoms). Subclass ’C08G’ is used to classify any prepa-
ration that uses fermentation or enzyme-using processes. Only patents with at least 3 molecule
occurrences are kept in the sample.
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Figure 1.1: Schematic explanation of the methodology
Note: Suppose there are three documents: document 1 and 2 mention molecule ‘a’ while
document 2 and 3 mention molecule ‘b’. In step 1, I aggregate documents according to their
molecule group. I follow a basic rule that assign any document with at least one mention of a
molecule to that molecule’s group. In step 2, I use topic modeling to obtain the proportions of
topics in each document. ti, j stands for the proportion of topic j in document i. Finally, in step
3, I create a topic proportion at the molecule level by averaging over all the documents that
mention the molecule of interest.
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Figure 1.2: Counts of patents and articles on CFC substitutes
Note: The graph plot the yearly number of articles or patents mentioning the names of any of the
14 CFC substitutes. This is not the average count of the 14 different CFC substitutes but the
total count of documents mentioning any one of the 14 CFC substitutes. We note a clear increase
for both patents and articles after 1987, the year Montreal was signed. For patents, the graph
shows any patent granted (as opposed to patent applications) between 1976 and 1999. The year
on the x-axis, however, corresponds to the application date. There is on average a two-year delay
between patent application and grant. For articles, the year on the x-axis corresponds to the year
the article was published in the academic journal.
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Table 1.2: First differences for CFC substitutes
(a) Patents
(1) (2)
Post 1987 1.840∗∗∗ 1.268∗∗∗
(0.077) (0.165)




Molecule FE Yes Yes
R-squared 0.789 0.809
Observations 322 322
Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent variable: Log count of patents
Years are relative to 1987.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(b) Articles
(1) (2)
Post 1987 1.053∗∗∗ 0.344∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.119)




Molecule FE Yes Yes
R-squared 0.649 0.693
Observations 420 420
Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent variable: Log count of articles
Years are relative to 1987.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The tables present regression results for first difference specifications. Model 1 confirms
that there is a significant and positive mean shift after 1987 in the number of patents and articles
mentioning CFC substitutes. Model 2 indicates that the change can also be modeled as a trend
break. The coefficient for ‘Years’ indicates that there is a small but statistically significant positive
underlying trend for both articles and patents.
Figure 1.3: Top level patent codes for CFC substitutes and HAPs
Note: The figure shows that, overall, patents mentioning CFC substitutes and HAPs fall into
similar top-level codes. HAPs are a group of 171 molecules that have no relationship to ozone and
that are used for diverse industrial applications. The figure indicates the two groups of molecules
present important similarities which motivates the use of HAPs as control molecules to estimate





Figure 1.4: Pre-trends in log counts of documents mentioning CFC substitutes and HAPs
Note: The graphs display the pre-trends for the treated group (CFC substitutes) and two possible
control groups. The first uses the whole sample of HAPs (that is 171 molecules). In this case,
pre-trends look somewhat similar. Pre-trends are, however, closer when using a smaller subset.
Specifically, the second control group, shown as ”subset” on the graphs, uses a smaller number of
HAPs: the 40 HAPs with pre-trends closest to the average CFC substitutes.
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Table 1.3: Difference-in-differences for CFC substitutes
(a) Patents
(1) (2)
Post 1987 x Substitutes 1.858∗∗∗ 1.078∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.169)
Post 1987 x Substitutes x Years 0.095∗∗∗
(0.026)






Year FE Yes No
Molecule FE Yes Yes
R-squared 0.974 0.967
Observations 1288 1288
Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent variable: Log count of patents
Years are relative to 1987.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(b) Articles
(1) (2)
Post 1987 x Substitutes 0.727∗∗∗ 0.291∗∗
(0.068) (0.126)








Year FE Yes No
Molecule FE Yes Yes
R-squared 0.947 0.947
Observations 1680 1680
Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent variable: Log count of articles
Years are relative to 1987.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The tables present regression results for the difference-in-differences specifications. Model 1
corresponds to the main DiD specification. It includes year and molecule fixed effects. The binary
variable ‘Post 1987 x Substitutes’ equals 1 for observations belonging to the group CFC substitutes
and after 1987. For patents, the coefficient is smaller than the coefficient in the simple difference,
but remains significant and large, corresponding to close to a 550% increase. For articles, the
coefficient is smaller than the coefficient in the simple difference, but remains significant and large,
corresponding to more than a 95% increase. Model 2 presents a trend-break specification. It shows
that the log number of patents mentioning CFC substitutes increases with the years after 1987 by
0.22 more than the control group. Similarly, the log number of articles mentioning CFC substitutes




Figure 1.5: Difference-in-differences treatment effects by year
Note: The graphs display the DiD coefficients for each year. We note that, in patents, the
treatment effect is statistically significant, yet small, as early as 1988. For articles, the treatment
effect is first statistically significant in 1990.
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Table 1.4: Balance table between CFC substitutes and HAPs
(a) Patents
HAPs CFC substitutes Difference T-stat
Number of patents 465.70 16.37 449.34∗∗∗ (13.12)
Log number of patents 4.91 1.93 2.98∗∗∗ (24.19)
Weighted mean proportion of topic 1 0.19 0.16 0.04∗∗∗ (9.24)
Weighted mean proportion of topic 2 0.10 0.09 0.02∗∗∗ (7.14)
Weighted mean proportion of topic 3 0.41 0.33 0.08∗∗∗ (10.22)
Weighted mean proportion of topic 4 0.18 0.13 0.04∗∗∗ (11.59)
Weighted mean proportion of topic 5 0.07 0.07 0.00 (1.67)
(b) Articles
HAPs CFC substitutes Difference T-stat
Number of articles 159.92 3.28 156.64∗∗∗ (6.46)
Log number of articles 3.23 0.78 2.46∗∗∗ (26.21)
Weighted mean proportion of topic 1 0.19 0.11 0.09∗∗∗ (21.10)
Weighted mean proportion of topic 2 0.30 0.15 0.15∗∗∗ (26.70)
Weighted mean proportion of topic 3 0.12 0.05 0.06∗∗∗ (24.54)
Weighted mean proportion of topic 4 0.19 0.09 0.09∗∗∗ (24.76)
Weighted mean proportion of topic 5 0.16 0.07 0.10∗∗∗ (28.34)
Note: The table shows the mean of the outcome variable (in log and in level) and the topic
proportions for patents and articles on CFC substitutes and HAPs. We see that the two groups
have very different average counts. Mean topic proportions are also statistically different across
the two groups.
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Table 1.5: Robustness checks difference-in-differences
(a) Patents
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Unweighted Weighted
Post 1987 x Substitutes 1.865∗∗∗ 0.904∗∗∗ 0.845∗∗∗ 1.583∗∗∗ 1.210∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.092) (0.092) (0.076) (0.096)
Log Count (lag 1) 0.559∗∗∗ 0.371∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.049)
Log Count (lag 2) 0.270∗∗∗
(0.047)
Mean proportion of topic 1 2.088∗∗∗ 1.128∗
(0.779) (0.619)
Mean proportion of topic 2 -0.199 0.124
(0.584) (0.554)
Mean proportion of topic 3 1.194∗∗∗ 1.212∗∗∗
(0.391) (0.342)
Mean proportion of topic 4 0.321 0.868
(0.610) (0.552)
Mean proportion of topic 5 -0.424 0.495
(1.132) (0.789)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Molecule FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.976 0.985 0.986 0.981 0.984
Observations 1288 1232 1176 1285 914
(b) Articles
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Unweighted Weighted
Post 1987 x Substitutes 0.727∗∗∗ 0.508∗∗∗ 0.421∗∗∗ 0.266∗∗∗ 0.274∗∗∗
(0.068) (0.063) (0.060) (0.058) (0.058)
Log Count (lag 1) 0.348∗∗∗ 0.245∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.030)
Log Count (lag 2) 0.297∗∗∗
(0.031)
Mean proportion of topic 1 1.513∗∗∗ 1.018∗∗∗
(0.432) (0.363)
Mean proportion of topic 2 0.833∗∗ 1.096∗∗∗
(0.346) (0.278)
Mean proportion of topic 3 1.108∗∗ 1.040∗∗
(0.481) (0.409)
Mean proportion of topic 4 1.168∗∗∗ 1.172∗∗∗
(0.443) (0.354)
Mean proportion of topic 5 0.939∗∗∗ 1.094∗∗∗
(0.359) (0.296)
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Molecule FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.947 0.953 0.956 0.961 0.961
Observations 1680 1624 1568 1680 1680
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Figure 1.6: Patent counts in log for CFC substitute, individually and aggregated
Note: The graph illustrates the difference between considering the 14 molecules independently
and considering them as one treated molecule. The thick line called ”Substitutes (aggregated)”
corresponds to the number of patents mentioning any of the 14 CFC substitutes. It is equivalent
to considering the 14 compounds as one and only one molecule. I implement the synthetic control
method on this ”aggregated CFC substitute” because my objective is to estimate the effect of
Montreal on research and innovation on any of the CFC subsitutes as opposed to any one in
particular. It should be noted here that since the names of different CFC substitutes often appear
simultaneously in the same documents, the individual time series of each CFC substitute are not
independant from each other.
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Figure 1.7: Patent counts in log for each HAP and for the aggregated CFC substitutes
Note: The graph illustrates the heterogeneity of HAP molecules. The thin lines correspond to the
trends for each individual HAP while the thick HAP line corresponds to the mean counts for
HAPs. We see that HAPs are a diverse group of molecules. In particular, some of them have log
counts much higher than the aggregated CFC substitutes. The synthetic control method will




Figure 1.8: Scatterplot of topics proportion and log count.
Note: The graphs illustrate the usefulness of topic proportions in the SCM. The scatter plots
indicate that there are some clear outlier molecules: molecules with semantic contexts far from
CFC substitutes. Implementing the SCM with topic proportions therefore provides a way of
avoiding such molecules contribute to constructing a comparison unit. I implement the SCM in
two different ways. First, I use the entire sample of HAPs as donor pool (168 units). Second, I
create a ”small” donor pool containing only the 20 HAPs that are closest to the aggregated CFC
substitutes in terms of log counts and topic proportions. Implementing the SCM on a smaller
donor pool allows for reducing the risk of overfitting and interpolation bias.
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Figure 1.9: Distribution of post / pre RMSPE ratios for placebos for CFC substitutes
Note: The figure illustrates the ifnerence procedure for the SCM. The graph displays the distri-
bution of post-RMPSE over pre-RMPSE for all placebo units. The figure shows that the ratio for
CFC substitutes is clearly greater than all of the 168 other units. Hence the p-value in this case is
1/168.
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Table 1.6: SCM results for CFC substitutes
(a) Patents
Topic Means Donor Pool Pre RMSPE p-value ATE Year
unweighted whole sample 0.12 < 0.01 0.64 1990
weighted whole sample 0.14 < 0.01 0.83 1990
unweighted small pool 0.18 < 0.01 0.89 1990
weighted small pool 0.32 0.11 0.99 1990
(b) Articles
Topic Means Donor Pool Pre RMSPE p-value ATE Year
weighted small pool 0.21 < 0.01 1.06 1990
unweighted small pool 0.24 < 0.01 1.01 1992
weighted whole sample 0.34 0.02 1.03 1990
unweighted whole sample 0.35 < 0.01 1.19 1990
Note: The tables present the results of the main SCM specifications for patents and articles using
either weighted or unweighted means of topic proportions and using either the whole sample and
small pool of HAPs. The prefered specification to report the average treatment effect (ATE) uses
the small pool of HAPs because it minimizes the risk of interpolation biaises and overfitting. It also
uses weighted means of topic proportions because it yields a lower pre-RMSPE (pretreatment root
mean squared prediction error) indicating that it provides a better counterfactual. For patents, the
ATE of the prefered specification is 0.89, that is a 140% increase in patents compared to synthetic
control. This corresponds to about 120 patents per year from 1988 to 2000. For articles, the ATE is
1.06, that is a 190% increase in patents compared to synthetic control. This corresponds to about
40 patents per year from 1988 to 2000. ”Topic Means” indicates the procedure for aggregating
the topic proportions at the molecule level. If ”weighted”, the calculated proportion of topic j for
molecule i is the mean proportion of topic j across all documents mentioning molecule i, weighted
by the number of times the molecule appears in the document. ”Donor Pool” indicates what sample
of HAPs is used in the SCM procedure. For ”small pool”, the sample of HAPs used corresponds to
the twenty HAPs most similar to the treated unit in terms of counts and topic proportions before
1987. ”Year” indicates the first year when the treatment effect is significant at the 10% level.
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(a) Patents: raw effect (left) and placebo tests (right)
(b) Articles: raw effect (left) and placebo tests (right)
Figure 1.10: SCM graphs for CFC substitutes
Note: The graphs correspond to SCM implementation for the prefered specification, that is when
the SCM is implemented with log counts using the small pool of HAPs and weighted means of
topic proportions. The graphs on the left-hand side show the raw effect, that is the observed time
series of the treated group along with the time series of the constructed control. On the
right-hand sides are shown the placebo tests, the non-parametric tests to evaluate the significance
of the results; black lines show the relative effect on the treated group relative to the control
group, while each gray line is a placebo test performed on an unit drawn from the donor pool.
The effect on CFC substitutes appears large and significant for both patents and articles. Placebo
tests confirm that the effect is significant starting a few years after 1987; indeed the black line
rises above most other lines as from 1990. This might correspond to a natural lag time between
the redirection of research activities towards CFC substitutes and the publication or patenting of
such work.
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(a) Patents: raw effect (left) and placebo tests (right)
(b) Articles: raw effect (left) and placebo tests (right)
Figure 1.11: SCM graphs for CFC substitutes assuming anticipation
Note: The graphs display the results of the synthetic control method for substitutes for patents
and articles assuming anticipation. For these experiments, the treatment year is redefined as 1985
and the synthetic control constructed using data up to 1982. Results are similar to previous SCM
experiments. Specifically, there are no take-offs before 1990. The graphs corresponds to SCM
implementations that yielded the lowest pre-RMSPE. That is, for both patents and articles, the
SCM uses log count and weighted means of topic proportions. The graphs on the left-hand side
represent the raw effect, that is the observed time series of the treated group along with the time
series of the constructed control. On the right-hand sides are shown the placebo tests, the non-
parametric tests to evaluate the significance of the results; black lines show the effect on the treated
group relative to the control group, while each gray line is a placebo test performed on an unit
drawn from the donor pool.
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Used as a wood preservative; Used for the formulation
of fungicidal and insecticidal solutions and for incorpo-
ration into other pesticide products.
p-Xylenes 0.20
Used in the production of styrene. and as solvents in
products such as paints and coatings, and are blended
into gasoline.
Ethyl chloride 0.12
Used production of ethyl cellulose, use as a solvent, re-
frigerant, and topical anesthetic, in the manufacture of
dyes, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals. As an anti-knock
additive to leaded gasoline
3,3-Dimethoxybenzidine 0.11





Used in the manufacture of water-based latex paints
and adhesives, textile and paper coatings, leather fin-
ish resins, and in the production of acrylic fibers
beta-Propiolactone 0.26
Used for vaccines, tissue grafts, surgical instruments,
and enzymes, as a sterilant of blood plasma, water, milk,
and nutrient broth, and as a vapor-phase disinfectant in
enclosed spaces.
Dimethyl phthalate 0.24
Used in solid rocket propellants, lacquers, plastics,
safety glasses, rubber coating agents, molding powders,
insect repellants, and pesticides
1,1,2,2-Tetrachloroethane 0.01
Used as a solvent, in cleaning and degreasing metals, in
paint removers, varnishes and lacquers, in photographic
films, as an extractant for oils and fats, and in pesticides.
Note: The tables describe the top four HAPs entering the synthetic control for the prefered SCM
specifications (small pool, weighted means of topic proportions). The information displayed in the
”Description” column was collected from the EPA website.
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(a) Patents - CFC substitutes (aggregate) (b) Patents - HAPs (average)
(c) Articles - CFC substitutes (aggregate) (d) Articles - HAPs (average)
Figure 1.12: Robustness check: counts with several thresholds of molecule occurrences
Note: The graphs illustrate that focusing on patents and articles that contain more than just one
occurrence of molecule would change little to the main analysis. As we increase the occurrence
threshold, the trend for the average HAPs remain very similar; only levels decrease. For CFC
substitutes, focusing only on patents with greater number of occurrences exarcerbates the
differential between the pre and post trends.
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(a) Occurrence weighted
(b) Occurrence and citation weighted
Figure 1.13: Robustness check: SCM with counts weighted by occurrences and citations
Note: These figures show that implementing the SCM using patent counts weighted by molecule
occurences and patent citation does not alter the main conclusions.
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(a) Patents - one occurrence (b) Patents - three occurrences
(c) Articles - one occurrence (d) Articles - three occurrences
Figure 1.14: Time series of citation weighted counts
Note: The graphs illustrate that the most cited articles and patents were published after 1987.
The graphs on the left-hand side include any document that mention at least one occurence of a
molecule. To test the robustness of this findings, I plot similar graphs but for patents and articles
that mention at least three occurences on the figures on the right-hand side. I find that highly
cited patents and articles are even more so concentrated after 1987. Collecting citation data for
HAPs is undergoing and limited by quotas on the Elsevier API.
63
Figure 1.15: SCM graphs using citation weighted patent counts
Note: The graphs illustrate the robustness of the main results using citation weighted patent
counts.
(a) Unique assignees (b) New entrants
Figure 1.16: Number of unique and ”new entrant” patent assignees
Note: Figure 1.16a displays the yearly number of unique assignees with patents mentioning CFC
substitutes and HAPs. It indicates that the likely presence of new entrants in the post 1987
period. Figure 1.16b displays the yearly number of assignees that are ”new”, meaning it is the
first time they appear in the data with a patent mentioning CFC substitutes and HAPs. The
figure confirms that, after 1987, many firms with no prior experience on CFC substitutes begin
patenting. In both figures, only patents with at least 3 molecule occurrences are kept in the
sample.
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Table 1.8: Titles of the 10 most cited articles mentioning CFC substitutes
Title Year Cited By
Methods for the synthesis of gem-difluoromethylene com-
pounds
1996 333
A new, efficient and environmentally benign system for
car air-conditioning
1993 255
High-pressure fluid-phase equilibria: Experimental meth-
ods and systems investigated (1988-1993)
1995 227
Evaporation heat transfer and pressure drop of refriger-
ant R-134a in a small pipe
1998 211
Gas and vapor transport properties of amor-




Boiling of new refrigerants: A state-of-the-art review 1996 144
Condensation heat transfer and pressure drop of refrig-
erant R-134a in a plate heat exchanger
1999 142
Thermochemical and chemical kinetic data for fluori-
nated hydrocarbons
1995 130
Supercritical fluid extraction in environmental analysis 1993 121
A kinetic study of the reaction of chlorine atoms
with CF3CHCl2, CF3CH2F, CFCl2CH3, CF2ClCH3,
CHF2CH3, CH3D, CH2D2, CHD3, CD4, and CD3Cl at
2952 K
1992 113
Note: The table displays the titles of the most cited articles mentioning CFC substitutes. Only
articles with three molecule occurrences in the text were kept in the sample. We note that these
articles, as expected, seem to focus on chemical and physical characteristics of CFC substitutes
(”boiling”, ”evaporation”, ”pressure” etc...).
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(a) All assignees
(b) Old vs. new entrants
Figure 1.17: Monthly counts for patents mentioning CFC substitutes
Note: The graphs show the monthly trends in count of patents mentioning CFC substitutes. It is
possible that some firms started working on CFC substitutes before Montreal without seeking
patent protection. If those firms has achieved significant advnaces in developping CFC
substitutes, we would expect a one-time increase in patent counts in the immediate aftermaths of
Montreal. We see on the first graph that this is not the case. Furthermore, if the extent of R&D
efforts provided before Montreal was the key driver to the post-Montreal increase in patenting, we
should observe major differences in the patenting trends of old and new entrants. On the second
graph, I present trends for assignees that never obtained any patent mentioning CFC substitutes
before 1987 and those who did. Although a gap seem to build up over time, trends look mostly
similar. Only patents with at least 3 molecule occurrences are kept in the sample. The year used
is the application year. The period ”Before 1987” includes the year 1987.
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Figure 1.18: Scatterplot of patenting activity before and after 1987
Note: The figure shows that, on average, firms with more patents before 1986 tend to also have
more patents in the immediat aftermaths of Montreal (1988 and 1989). But, the graph illustrates
that this effect is largely driven by three outliers: Du Pont, Allied and Dow. Excluding these
three firms, there is no clear correlations between patenting prior to 1987 and patenting in the
immediat aftermaths of Montreal. The size of the dot is proportional to the number of firms.
Only patents with at least 3 molecule occurrences are kept in the sample. The year used is the
application year.
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(a) Yearly Counts (b) Monthly Counts
(c) Yearly Citation Weighted Counts (d) Monthly Citation Weighted Counts
Figure 1.19: Patent counts for Du Pont and Allied
Note: Figure 1.19a shows that most patents granted to Du Pont and Allied were applied for after
1989. Figure 1.19b shows that there is no sudden peak patenting right after Montreal. Instead we
observe a gradual ramping up of patenting activity. Figure 1.19c illustrates that the patents
granted to Du Pont and Allied which received the greatest number of citations mostly originate
from 1989 to 1991. Figure 1.19d indicates, however, that, in the weeks that followed Montreal,
both Du Pont and Allied applied for patents that would go on receiving a high number of
citations. Only patents with at least 3 occurrences of a molecule are retained in the sample.
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Chapter 2
Passive Learning and Incentivized
Communication: A Randomized
Controlled Trial in India
Yonas Alem and Eugenie Dugoua
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2.1 Introduction
Economic growth theories portray technological progress as the engine of economic devel-
opment and prosperity. The recent version of this theory uses endogenous growth models
to highlight the important role of social learning in technology diffusion (Acemoglu 2009;
Aghion et al. 1997; Barro et al. 2004; Lucas 1988; Romer 1986). Economic growth in this
set-up is characterized as endogenously driven through investment in human capital, knowl-
edge and innovation. Profit maximizing firms invest, learn by doing and learn from each
other through knowledge spillovers; these processes induce smooth technological diffusion
in the economy. The theory was later applied to understand technological innovation and
diffusion in agriculture in developing countries (Bandiera et al. 2006; Bardhan et al. 1999;
Conley et al. 2010; Foster et al. 1995). Using state-of-the-art empirical strategies, this strand
of literature identifies the role of social networks in promoting social learning, adoption and
diffusion of new agricultural technologies.
One feature of earlier studies on the role of social networks is the assumption of “passive
learning”, a situation in which peers learn about new technologies from their peers without
cost. However, in recent research, BenYishay et al. (2014) show that the power of social
networks in diffusion of new technologies could be enhanced by incentivizing information
communication. In this paper, we attempt to shed light on the role of incentivizing infor-
mation communication by one’s network members or peers on willingness to pay (WTP) for
new technology using a randomized controlled trial (RCT) in India. Motivated by theories
of intra-household decision-making, we also investigate the role of gender in information
communication and willingness to pay for the new technology.
We collaborated with a local organization and distributed a new solar-powered lantern
to households in Gonda district, in the Uttar Pradesh state of India. The solar lanterns are
durable, multipurpose, and convenient to use. They sold for 1,200 rupees (USD 18.5) in Luc-
know, the capital of Uttar Pradesh state at the time of the fieldwork (Fall, 2015). Notably,
the lanterns have a mobile-charging feature which allows the user to charge a mobile phone.
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The study area is still non-electrified and households did not have knowledge about the solar
lanterns prior to the study. We randomly selected 200 “seed” individuals, half of them male
and half of them female, to whom we offered the solar lantern for participating in the study.
Each seed household gave three names of peers (friends or relatives), and these were ran-
domly assigned into a “network treatment”, a “communication treatment” and a “control
group”. We elicited willingness to pay for the solar lanterns from the control group imme-
diately after interviewing the seed household, using the Becker-Degroot-Marschak (BDM)
method (Becker et al. 1964). In the network group, the subjects, who were designated as
friends by the seed, were interviewed 30 days after the seed received the solar lantern to
elicit their willingness to pay. We refer to the learning captured through this process as
“passive learning”. In the communication group, the 30-day delay was followed by a tea
meeting at which the seed presented the solar lantern and shared his or her experience with
the friend, in return for a payment of 100 rupees (USD 1.54).1 We refer to the learning
captured through this process as “incentivized communication”.
The results show that peers who very likely learned about the solar lantern through
their relationship with the seed household are on average willing to pay 120 rupees more
than the control group a month after the lanterns were distributed. Peers who were invited
to a demonstration tea meeting by the seed households a month after the lanterns were
distributed, on the other hand, are willing to pay 190 rupees more than the control group.
With a mean WTP of 134 in the control group, the proportional treatment effects are 90%
and 145%, respectively. Both treatment effects appear to be large. It is notable that the
passive learning treatment effect almost doubled WTP, whereas incentivized communication
added another 55 percentage points increase in the treatment effect.
This paper is broadly related to a body of research in economics on the impact of peers
on outcomes. This strand of literature, focusing mostly on developed countries, investigates
the impact of peers or friends on several outcome variables of interest, including educational
1At the time of the survey, 1 USD = 65 rupees.
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achievement (e.g., Angrist et al. 2002; Figlio 2005; Hoxby 2000; Sacerdote 2001; Zimmerman
2003), market and health outcomes (e.g., Kling et al. 2007; Munshi 2003), labor productivity
and consumption (e.g., Mas et al. 2009; Mobius et al. 2005) and adoption of technology (Oster
et al. 2012). The extent of peer effects has also been examined in the development economics
literature, largely to explain agricultural technology adoption (Bandiera et al. 2006; Bardhan
et al. 1999; Conley et al. 2010; Foster et al. 1995). A particularly important observation
in this literature is that modern agricultural technologies significantly promote yield, but
their adoption or uptake rate has been disappointingly low. These studies show that, when
farmers consider adopting new technologies, they are likely to trust recommendations from
their peers, friends, or members of their social network who have experienced the technology,
rather than from others external to their community.
BenYishay et al. 2014 investigate social learning further by designing a randomized con-
trolled trial in rural Malawi to vary the method of dissemination of information about two
agricultural technologies that promote yield - pit planting and Chinese composting. These
authors specifically investigate whether provision of performance-based rewards to those who
communicate about the new technologies results in increased diffusion of the technologies.
Among the three types of information communicators they chose - government-employed ex-
tension workers, lead farmers, and peer farmers - adoption of the technologies by others was
much more likely in response to the information provided by peer farmers. Our paper adds
to this literature by disentangling the magnitudes of “passive learning”, i.e., learning from
others without cost, and “incentivized communication”, i.e., learning from others through
improved quality of information, on willingness to adopt and pay for the new technology.
Unlike agricultural technologies which involve uncertainty and take time to capture their
payoff, the solar lantern we consider is easy to use and multi-purpose, and it is easy to assess
its payoffs with greater certainty in a short time. Our design also allows us to aggregate
revealed WTP, a figure important for policymakers and other stakeholders to design optimal
subsidy and cost reduction strategies to encourage diffusion of the technology in cases when
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average WTP is lower than average cost.
The major challenge in identifying the impact of peers on adoption of new technologies,
even after tackling endogeneity through a randomized assignment, is understanding the
mechanisms that drive the observed results. It may be that peers imitate each other rather
than learning from each other about the benefits of the new technology or learning how to
operate the technology (Oster et al. 2012). In order to shed light on the possible mechanisms,
we collected detailed information on familiarity with solar lanterns, perception about their
benefit, estimated market value, etc. As expected, we find that both the network and
the communication groups are likely to have seen a solar lantern before the date of the
WTP experiment, and they are much more likely to know someone who owns a lantern,
compared to the control group. We also find that, compared to the control group, subjects
in both treatment groups believe that the solar lantern needs proper maintenance in order
to function properly and they estimate its market price to be higher. We also observe that
subjects initially don’t think solar lanterns are worth more than kerosene lamps, which are
the most common sources of lighting in the study area. However, as they see a friend taking
care of the solar panel through which the lantern is powered, the power of the light coming
out the lantern, and the mobile phone charging function, they estimate the market price of
the lantern to be higher. Consequently they are willing to pay more for the lantern. These
results suggest that learning both how to operate the technology and the benefits provided
by the technology drive the high WTP the treatment groups reveal, notably to a larger
extent that of the communications group’s.
The paper also speaks to the emerging literature on electrification in developing countries
(Dinkelman 2011; Dugoua et al. 2014; Furukawa 2014; Grimm et al. 2014; Lee et al. 2016a,b),
an area of research that overlaps with development and energy economics. The current
level of electrification in developing regions such as Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and
Latin America remains low (International Energy Agency 2014). Extending the grid to
the most rural regions requires high levels of investment that are often difficult to secure by
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governments. Solar power serves as a decentralized solution to the problem of energy poverty,
and is slowly diffusing throughout rural Africa and rural South Asia (Sandwell et al. 2017).
However, tight household budget constraints, poor product quality and little local expertise
in photovoltaic technologies have been hindering faster adoption.2 In addition, given the
increased need to reduce greenhouse gas emission from the energy sector, exploring the role
of solar-powered lighting equipment, which emits no greenhouse gas would have large benefits
to society at large. From a public policy point of view, the findings from this paper will
provide useful information on willingness to uptake such technologies and the factors that
drive their quick diffusion.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relationship of the
current paper to existing literature. Section 3 lays out our key hypotheses about willingness
to pay for solar lanterns. Section 4 describes the design and procedure of the randomized
controlled trial, with results of the randomization checks. Section 5 presents the key empirical
results. Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Relationship to Existing Literature
This paper contributes to a large and growing literature on the role of peers - co-workers,
friends and acquaintances - on behavior and outcomes that builds off the work of Sacerdote
2001, Hoxby 2000, Munshi 2003, and Mobius et al. 2005. Friends and members of social net-
works influence one’s beliefs and consequently decisions. These studies, almost exclusively
focused in developed countries, document the impact of peers on one’s educational achieve-
ments, labor productivity, and consumption behavior. Roommates affect one’s freshman
GPA and the decision to join social organizations, and classmates influence reading scores in
elementary schools in the United States (Hoxby 2000; Sacerdote 2001). Peers and networks
members help Mexican migrants in the United States find higher-paying jobs (Munshi 2003)
2See Karakaya et al. 2015 for a recent systematic review of the literature on barriers to the adoption of
photovoltaic technologies in developing countries.
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and have as large an effect as advertising on consumer demand (Mobius et al. 2005). Other
studies in similar settings (e.g., Angrist et al. 2002; Figlio 2005; Kling et al. 2007; Mas et al.
2009; Zimmerman 2003) further document the role of peers in influencing one’s behavior
and decisions.
There are studies (e.g., Bandiera et al. 2006; Conley et al. 2010; Foster et al. 1995)
investigating the role of peers in social networks in adoption and diffusion of productivity-
enhancing modern agricultural technologies in developing countries. These studies were
mainly motivated by the fact that modern agricultural technologies significantly promote
yield and improve welfare, but their adoption and diffusion rates have been sub-optimally
slow. Adoption of a new agricultural technology by a farmer is a social process because
it generates knowledge to all her peers and increases their expected yield (Bardhan et al.
1999). This strand of literature implies that farmers in developing countries are likely to
trust recommendations by fellow farmers more than by those from other people external to
their community. In view of this, social networks play a significant role in diffusion of new
technologies. Outside an agricultural set-up, more recently Oster et al. (2012) investigate
the role of peer effects in adoption of menstrual cups by school girls in Nepal and document
a strong effect on learning how to use the technology.
There are methodological challenges in identifying the impact of social networks on tech-
nology adoption using observational data. First, when two friends are both adopting a
certain technology, it is difficult to distinguish whether it is because the two friends learn
from each other or because individuals who are open to trying out a new technology also
have friends with similar characteristics that are unobservable (Manski 1993). Second, it is
difficult to precisely define the social network of an adopter of a new technology and even
so, it may be that individuals are just imitating each other rather than learning from each
other (Conley et al. 2010). Recent studies used the method of randomization to tackle these
identification problems (Duflo et al. 2003, 2011; Godlonton et al. 2012; Kremer et al. 2007,
2008; Miguel et al. 2004; Oster et al. 2012; Rao et al. 2007; Sacerdote 2001).
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A key feature of previous studies on the role of peers on adoption of new technologies
(Bandiera et al. 2006; Conley et al. 2010; Oster et al. 2012) is the implicit assumption of
learning from peers without a cost, i.e., “passive learning” (BenYishay et al. 2014). New
technologies could be adopted and diffused faster if peers who communicate information
about the new technology are rewarded. This is the key argument by BenYishay et al.
(ibid.) who design a randomized controlled trial to vary the method of dissemination for
two agricultural technologies - pit planting and Chinese composting - which are believed to
improve maize yield in rural Malawi. These authors confirm the importance of social net-
works in diffusion of agricultural technologies, but argue that their power can be significantly
improved by remunerating the peer who adopts the technology and makes a conscious effort
to communicate and convince other farmers.
Our paper contributes to this literature in three main ways. First, this paper is the first
to examine the impact of rewarding communication about a new technology on willingness to
pay - as opposed to a binary measure of adoption. We clearly identify the impact and mag-
nitude on WTP of both passive networks and incentivized communication by peers about a
new solar lantern technology, using a randomized controlled trial. This distinction is impor-
tant because estimating average willingness to pay allows policymakers to estimate whether
new technologies could be distributed profitably and the amount of resources required to
speed up adoption and diffusion in case revealed WTP is lower than the cost of the new
technology. Second, unlike agricultural technologies, which take time to observe their benefit
and involve substantial uncertainty, solar lanterns are easy technologies to learn about in
a short period of time. As a result, biophysical and climatic factors, which seem to differ
markedly even between closely located farms, would not be confounded with the decision
to adopt and WTP for the technology. Third, we consider a technology which is not only
quick to learn about, but also has a significant welfare effect on all members of households.
The current rate of electrification in developing regions of the world is very low and house-
holds very often use kerosene lamps for lighting. Kerosene lamps have been documented
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to generate indoor air pollution and adversely affect health outcomes of members, pose a
risk of burns and fires, emit hazardous greenhouse gases, and require rural households to
regularly travel long distance to buy kerosene (Lam et al. 2012). The solar lanterns that we
randomly distributed are, among other things, multi-purpose, affordable, and reasonably-
priced, with a significant potential to enhance health outcomes of all household members,
reduce greenhouse gas emissions and help children allocate more time to studying.
2.3 Conceptual Framework
Drawing on Bandiera et al. 2006; Bardhan et al. 1999; BenYishay et al. 2014; Conley et al.
2010; Foster et al. 1995, we now lay out a brief motivating framework for interpreting the
main results. We begin by defining the following treatments:
• In the network treatment group, subjects observe the use of a new technology by others
without incentivized communication. Thus, learning from others is passive.
• In the communication treatment group, subjects both observe the use of new technology
by others and receive direct communication about the properties of the new technology
just before WTP is elicited. Thus, learning from others is considered to be ‘active’.
To test the presence of social learning – that is, learning from others – in agriculture, these
studies make use of the “target-input” model proposed by Wilson (1975) and Jovanovic et al.
(1994). According to this model, the farmer knows the basic form of the new technology
(e.g., an improved seed) with certainty, but does not know the target level, which is assumed
to be random. Farm profit is inversely related to the difference between the actual level of
input applied and the target level. The farmer realizes what the actual level of input should
have been only after the input has been applied and output has been realized. As a result,
the farmer learns about the new technology over time through learning-by-doing.
In the target-input model, individuals can also learn from each other’s experience when
they share similar distribution of the input target. Assume that two farmers belong to
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a certain social network and share information with each other or costlessly observe each
other’s input choice. In each period, farmers use Bayes’ rule to update their prior belief on
the variance of the optimal input level, making use of information from their own experience
and the experience of their network members. Thus, adoption of a new technology in this
model is a social process because its adoption by an individual generates information spillover
to all her peers, which increases their expected welfare in the future (Bardhan et al. 1999).
Diffusion of solar lanterns can be modelled using the social learning framework because
peers of seed households observe (without any cost) the service provided by the lanterns
and immediately update their belief about the quality of the lanterns. Consequently, these
individuals would be willing to pay more than those who did not have prior information
about the lanterns.
Hypothesis 1. The network treatment increases willingness to pay.
An important extension of the ‘target-input” model by BenYishay et al. (2014) is that
the member of the social network who communicates information about the new technology,
i.e., the “communicator” knows the optimal level of the technology. However, it would be
costly to transfer her knowledge about the new technology to other farmers. If there is
an intervention that rewards the information communicator based on what proportion of
farmers adopted the new technology as a result of the communicator’s efforts, diffusion of
the technology may occur much faster. Such incentives induce the communicator to make
a conscious effort and bear the cost of communication and transmitting information about
the new technology to others (ibid.). As a result, others will learn about the new technology
and adopt it much more quickly than the case of unincentivized communication through
ordinary social networks. In our case, rewarding seed households to invite one of their
randomly selected peers for a tea meeting after the seed household used the solar lanterns
for a month is expected to result in transmission of more accurate information. As a result,
peers who have been provided detailed information about the attributes of the solar lanterns
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in such a way are likely to pay more for the lanterns than peers who were not invited for the
tea meeting (the network treatment group).
Hypothesis 2. The communication treatment increases willingness to pay more than the
network treatment.
Another aim of our RCT is testing the role of gender in communication about a new tech-
nology. Early studies (Bourguignon et al. 2009; Browning et al. 1998; Chiappori 1992; Chi-
appori et al. 2002) from industrialized countries show that, although members of a household
(most importantly, couples) often have different preferences and intra-household bargaining
power, they still achieve Pareto-efficient outcomes in household decision-making. However,
studies in developing countries document rejection of Pareto-efficiency in household decision-
making, most importantly because of differences in preferences and intra-household bargain-
ing power between husbands and wives. Udry (1996) documents that total yield by farm
households in Burkina Faso could be improved by relocating inputs from male-cultivated
plots to female-cultivated plots.3 Schaner (2015) provides evidence indicating that house-
holds in Kenya make sub-optimal saving decisions as a result of differences in discount rates
of couples. More recent studies (Alem et al. 2017; Miller et al. 2013) show that improved
cookstoves, which enhance the quality of life of all household members, are valued at sig-
nificantly higher levels by women than men, but could not be adopted optimally because
women have low decision-making power (autonomy).
Drawing on these studies, we test the hypothesis that female social networks are less
effective in promoting technology adoption. If female members of a household have less
bargaining power than male members, then female social networks, compared to male social
networks, are channels of information transmission that focus on a less-influential decision-
maker. Because the female member who learns information through her social network
3A related study, Robinson (2012), documents that the response in private consumption to an exogenous
shock is significantly different between wives and husbands in western Kenya, implying that informal risk-
sharing mechanisms within households are not Pareto-efficient.
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lacks the autonomy to make the purchase, we expect the information to be less relevant
than in the case of male social networks. Thus, when either passive learning or incentivized
communication occurs through female networks, women’s lack of decision-making power
impedes learning by the relevant decision-maker, and thus the effect of the treatment on
WTP in the household should be of lesser magnitude.
Hypothesis 3. Learning through male social networks increases willingness to pay by a
greater amount than learning through female social networks.
2.4 Experimental Design
To test our hypotheses, we conducted a WTP experiment in 200 unelectrified habitations of
Gonda district in the state of Uttar Pradesh, India.4 Habitations (also called sub-villages or
hamlets) are the lowest administrative units in India. The subjects were given an opportunity
to purchase a solar lantern in a BDM game. We compared the effects of a network treatment
and a communication treatment using randomly assigned male and female contacts. The
experiment was conducted in two rounds between the end of July and the beginning of
October 2015. The study area was chosen because it had a low electricity access rate,
with many unelectrified habitations close to Gonda City, the district capital. To avoid data
mining and bias from multiple comparisons, a detailed pre-analysis plan (PAP) listing all
research hypotheses and our key empirical specifications was registered with Evidence in the
Governance and Politics website.5
The primary specification equation can be written as follows:
WTPij = α + β1Ni + β2NiFi + γ1NiCi + γ2NiCiFi + µj + ij, (2.1)
4Before implementation, the experiment was reviewed and approved by the internal review board (IRB)
of Columbia University.
5The PAP is publicly available at http://egap.org/registration/1420.
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where WTPi is the willingness to pay for a solar lantern by household i within habitation
j; Ni is a dummy variable coding for whether household i knows a lantern user through its
social network (either through the social network of the head or that of the spouse); Fi is
a dummy variable coding for whether the lantern user is known through the social network
of the female spouse; Ci is a dummy variable coding for whether the household engaged in
active communication with the lantern user of his network; µj is a vector of habitation fixed
effects (N = 200); ij is a random error term. Our objective is to estimate β1, β2, γ1, γ2.
Throughout, we cluster standard errors by habitations. In this empirical framework, the
hypotheses can be expressed as follows. Hypothesis 1 is equivalent to β1 > 0 and β1 +β2 > 0;
Hypothesis 2 to γ1 > 0 and γ1 + γ2 > 0; Hypothesis 3 to β2 < 0 and γ2 < 0.
Outcome Variable
In the experiment, subjects were given the opportunity to purchase a solar lantern. Photos
of the lantern can be found in the appendix. At the time of the experiment, the retail price
of the lantern was 1,200 rupees (USD 18.5). The product features included a 3-watt solar
panel, a 6V 4.5Ah battery, a 3-watt, 24-piece surface-mounted-device LED, and a mobile
charging socket. We chose the product based on a review of solar lanterns available among
Uttar Pradesh distributors. We confirmed the performance of the lanterns - in terms of the
quality and duration of the lighting, and the charging power - by using them with the survey
team for about a week.
The outcome variable is the subject’s WTP measured in the BDM game. As Becker et al.
(1964) show, the BDM game recovers the subject’s true preference by removing incentives
to misrepresent WTP for strategic reasons. In the game, the subject is requested to provide
his or her highest WTP for an item, and the price of the item is then drawn from a random
distribution. If the price is below the stated WTP, the subject pays the randomly drawn
price, not the stated WTP. Therefore, the subject has no incentive to understate WTP to
obtain a better bargain. This method has been widely applied in development economics
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to measure WTP (e.g., Guiteras et al. 2013; Hoffmann 2009; Levine et al. 2012) because
it is incentive-compatible and provides a continuous demand curve, as opposed to demand
estimates for a discrete number of price points (as is the case in a typical randomized-price
WTP measurement).
The game was played in the field as follows. Each household is requested to announce
their maximal willingness to pay on a 0-1,200 rupee scale, and the actual price is determined
by a random draw from a bag which contains 21 balls, each one of them with a number
written on it. The number goes from 0 to 1,200 rupees in increments of 100 rupees. The
respondent first makes a bid and then randomly draws a ball. If the price on the ball the
respondent draws is higher than the bid, the respondent is not allowed to purchase the
lantern. If the price on the ball is lower than the bid, the respondent must purchase the
lantern at the price that was drawn. As a result, when the respondent makes a bid, he must
make sure he has access to the funds. The respondent has only one chance to play, and he
cannot change his bid after drawing a ball. Before the respondent played for ‘real’, the game
was played with a bar of soap to make sure the respondent fully understood the rules.
Figure 2.1 displays the distribution of the bids: we see that most subjects made a positive
bid, but no subject offered the non-subsidized market price of the lantern. We also note that
the willingness to pay displays important variation across individuals, spanning from 0 to
1200, with mean 239 and standard deviation 266.
In measuring WTP, we paid particular attention to training the enumerators so that
they explained the procedure to the subjects carefully enough and always conducted the
practice round with soap. Based on our observation of the WTP measurement, the subjects
understood the rules of the game. No subject complained afterwards or refused to pay in
case she or he won the solar lantern. The subjects were sometimes disappointed if they did
not win the lantern, but in that case they also did not have to give any money.
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Figure 2.1: Histogram of bids for the solar lantern.
Note: Summary statistics are as follows: minimum = 0; maximum = 1200; mean = 239; standard
deviation = 266.
Sampling and Treatments
The data collection began with a mapping of 200 primary habitations and 25 replacement
habitations around Gonda City. The enumerators approached the habitations in expanding
circles, with habitations near Gonda City visited first and those further away visited later.
If a habitation was excluded because of safety concerns or because it had access to grid
electricity, a randomly drawn replacement habitation was used instead. Overall, we had to
exclude and replace five habitations. The map of the study area and habitations is shown
in Figure 2.2.
Within each habitation, the enumerators approached a randomly chosen “seed” house-
hold and, depending on the treatment, interviewed either an adult male or female member.
The seed was requested to provide names of three friends with whom he or she interacts on
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Figure 2.2: Map of study area around Gonda City.
Note: The green dots indicate the study habitations.
a regular basis, and the three friends were then randomly assigned to three groups: control,
network, and communication. The control group was interviewed on the same day and the
network and communication groups approximately 30 days after the initial interview. If the
chosen friend was not the household head, we interviewed the head of the household to which
that friend belongs. Households in the three groups were offered the possibility of buying a
solar lantern through a BDM game.
The timeline of the experiment is summarized in Figure 2.3. The experiment began with
sampling and the interviews of the control group in July-August 2015. In each habitation,












About a month 
Figure 2.3: Timeline of the experiment.
sampling. We surveyed the network group at the same time as the communication group
to avoid treatment spillovers. Table 2.1 summarizes the size of the different treatment
groups. We visited a total of 197 habitations, 98 assigned to the male seed treatment and
99 to the female seed treatment. Three habitations were dropped because the network and
communications friends were no longer living in the surroundings, and hence could not be
surveyed.
The male-female treatment was randomized at the habitation level. One of the re-
searchers drew a random number for each habitation and assigned the highest 100 numbers
to the female treatment. All seed households were given a free solar lantern in exchange
for taking part in the survey. They were also paid 100 rupees conditional on inviting one
of the three friends for a tea meeting to introduce the solar lanterns and discuss their user
experience. Our survey team, consisting of enumerators who speak the local dialect, at-
tended all tea meetings. They specifically told the seed households that their goal was not
to convince their friend to buy a lantern but only to share stories about their experience and
the performance of the lanterns.
Within each habitation, the three friends named by the seed were randomly assigned
to the control or to the network or communication treatment. The household of the friend
in the control group was visited and asked for WTP immediately after the seed household
provided the name of three friends. The procedure for the households of those in the network
and communication groups was similar, except for the two following differences. First, the
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Table 2.1: Size of treatment groups.
Total number of habitations
Control Network Communication
Male Seed 98 98 98
Female Seed 99 99 99
Note: In all treatments, the sample household’s head is interviewed. The gender treatment is
randomized across habitations; the information treatment is randomized within habitations.
visit to the network and communication households took place about a month later. A
one-month lag is a way to ensure that knowledge about the lantern can naturally diffuse
from the seed household to peer households. Second, before playing the BDM game with
the communication household, the seed invited his/her communication friend over to discuss
his/her experience of the lantern.
Covariate Balance and Power Analysis
The balance table for the information treatment is shown in Table 2.2. As the table shows,
the treatment groups are balanced across most covariates, with a few exceptions: gender of
the respondent, savings and indebtedness. The control group has significantly more female
heads of household and about 450 rupees less in savings compared to the network and
communication groups. This is a potential source for concern given households with more
savings would be in a better position to bid higher prices. For this reason, as a robustness
check, we include these variables in additional regression analysis.
The balance table across the seed gender treatments is shown in Table 2.3. As could be
expected, within each information treatment group the households referred by the female
seeds are more likely to be headed by a female, while the households referred by the male
seeds are usually headed by a male. It follows that the different groups display significant
differences for variables such as education, consumption expenses or literacy.
Standard power analysis shows that the experiment can identify plausible treatment
effects. Using the control group’s mean and standard deviation (134 and 181 respectively),
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Table 2.2: Balance table across treatments and associated t-tests.
Cont Net DIFF Cont Comm DIFF Net Comm DIFF
1) Individual:
Female respondent 0.355 0.198 0.157∗∗∗ 0.355 0.254 0.102∗∗ 0.198 0.254 -0.0558
(0.480) (0.399) (3.54) (0.480) (0.436) (2.20) (0.399) (0.436) (-1.32)
Year of birth 1972.1 1971.8 0.239 1972.1 1970.7 1.345 1971.8 1970.7 1.107
(14.76) (14.24) (0.16) (14.76) (12.91) (0.96) (14.24) (12.91) (0.81)
Education 1.944 2.041 -0.0964 1.944 1.893 0.0508 2.041 1.893 0.147
(1.352) (1.435) (-0.69) (1.352) (1.255) (0.39) (1.435) (1.255) (1.08)
Reads Hindi 0.477 0.487 -0.0102 0.477 0.482 -0.00508 0.487 0.482 0.00508
(0.501) (0.501) (-0.20) (0.501) (0.501) (-0.10) (0.501) (0.501) (0.10)
2) Household:
Number of children 3.693 3.918 -0.225 3.693 4.015 -0.323 3.918 4.015 -0.0979
(2.106) (2.032) (-1.07) (2.106) (2.085) (-1.51) (2.032) (2.085) (-0.47)
Number of children in school 1.370 1.412 -0.0426 1.370 1.649 -0.280∗ 1.412 1.649 -0.237
(1.550) (1.562) (-0.27) (1.550) (1.657) (-1.71) (1.562) (1.657) (-1.45)
Household size 7.310 7.183 0.127 7.310 7.289 0.0203 7.183 7.289 -0.107
(3.916) (3.379) (0.34) (3.916) (3.375) (0.06) (3.379) (3.375) (-0.31)
3) Wealth:
Monthly Expenses 4176.6 4376.6 -200 4176.6 4530.5 -353.8 4376.6 4530.5 -153.8
(2334.3) (3412.5) (-0.68) (2334.3) (2810.7) (-1.36) (3412.5) (2810.7) (-0.49)
Amount of Savings 223.4 682.2 -458.9∗∗∗ 223.4 661.4 -438.1∗∗∗ 682.2 661.4 20.81
(673.8) (884.1) (-5.79) (673.8) (1038.3) (-4.97) (884.1) (1038.3) (0.21)
In debt 0.467 0.609 -0.142∗∗∗ 0.467 0.477 -0.0102 0.609 0.477 0.132∗∗∗
(0.500) (0.489) (-2.85) (0.500) (0.501) (-0.20) (0.489) (0.501) (2.65)
Owns a business 0.0355 0.0660 -0.0305 0.0355 0.0711 -0.0355 0.0660 0.0711 -0.00508
(0.186) (0.249) (-1.38) (0.186) (0.258) (-1.57) (0.249) (0.258) (-0.20)
Amount of land (acres) 1.310 1.443 -0.134 1.310 1.415 -0.106 1.443 1.415 0.0278
(1.888) (1.936) (-0.69) (1.888) (1.426) (-0.63) (1.936) (1.426) (0.16)
Owns cattle 0.873 0.873 0 0.873 0.929 -0.0558∗ 0.873 0.929 -0.0558∗
(0.334) (0.334) (0.00) (0.334) (0.258) (-1.86) (0.334) (0.258) (-1.86)
Owns a phone 0.853 0.838 0.0152 0.853 0.868 -0.0152 0.838 0.868 -0.0305
(0.355) (0.370) (0.42) (0.355) (0.339) (-0.44) (0.370) (0.339) (-0.85)
4) Lighting:
Number of kerosene lamps 2.376 2.421 -0.0457 2.376 2.401 -0.0254 2.421 2.401 0.0203
(1.266) (1.229) (-0.36) (1.266) (1.043) (-0.22) (1.229) (1.043) (0.18)
Hours of lighting 5.178 4.782 0.396∗ 5.178 5.033 0.145 4.782 5.033 -0.251
(2.368) (1.814) (1.86) (2.368) (1.766) (0.69) (1.814) (1.766) (-1.39)
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: A rank-sum test (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney) was also performed for the variables that do
not approximate a normal distribution. The only difference with the t-tests are as follows: 1) The
difference between control and communication for the number of children that go to school is
significant at the 10% level, 2) The difference between network and communication for hours of
lighting is now significant at the 10% level.
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Table 2.3: Balance table across treatments and seed gender and associated t-tests.
Cont M Cont F DIFF Net M Net F DIFF Comm M Comm F DIFF
1) Individual:
Female respondent 0.153 0.556 -0.402∗∗∗ 0.102 0.293 -0.191∗∗∗ 0.153 0.354 -0.200∗∗∗
(0.362) (0.499) (-6.47) (0.304) (0.457) (-3.45) (0.362) (0.480) (-3.31)
Year of birth 1971.3 1972.8 1.532 1971.6 1972.1 -0.529 1969.7 1971.8 -2.043
(15.89) (13.58) (-0.73) (15.06) (13.44) (-0.26) (12.82) (12.97) (-1.11)
Education 2.051 1.838 .213 2.265 1.818 0.447∗∗ 1.980 1.808 0.172
(1.357) (1.345) (1.10) (1.544) (1.289) (2.21) (1.284) (1.226) (0.96)
Reads Hindi 0.541 0.414 0.127∗ 0.592 0.384 0.208∗∗∗ 0.490 0.475 0.0150
(0.501) (0.495) (1.79) (0.494) (0.489) (2.97) (0.502) (0.502) (0.21)
2) Household:
Number of children 3.543 3.837 -0.294 3.823 4.010 -0.187 3.918 4.113 -0.196
(2.077) (2.133) (-0.97) (2.026) (2.043) (-0.64) (2.045) (2.131) (-0.65)
Number of children in school 1.223 1.510 -0.287 1.417 1.408 0.00850 1.526 1.773 -0.247
(1.489) (1.601) (-1.28) (1.499) (1.630) (0.04) (1.690) (1.623) (-1.04)
Household size 7.357 7.263 0.0945 7.765 6.606 1.159∗∗ 7.939 6.646 1.292∗∗∗
(3.946) (3.906) (0.17) (3.705) (2.927) (2.44) (3.472) (3.163) (2.73)
3) Wealth:
Monthly Expenses 3899.0 4451.5 -552.5∗ 4844.9 3913.1 931.8∗ 4940.8 4124.2 816.6∗∗
(2240.9) (2403.0) (-1.67) (4403.4) (1913.7) (1.93) (3206.4) (2299.6) (2.06)
Amount of Savings 278.6 168.7 109.9 717.3 647.5 69.87 672.4 650.5 21.94
(776.2) (552.7) (1.15) (914.5) (856.1) (0.55) (740.3) (1270.3) (0.15)
In debt 0.480 0.455 0.0250 0.582 0.636 -0.0547 0.480 0.475 0.00484
(0.502) (0.500) (0.35) (0.496) (0.483) (-0.78) (0.502) (0.502) (0.07)
Owns a business 0.0510 0.0202 0.0308 0.0816 0.0505 0.0311 0.0612 0.0808 -0.0196
(0.221) (0.141) (1.17) (0.275) (0.220) (0.88) (0.241) (0.274) (-0.53)
Amount of land (acres) 1.196 1.422 -0.226 1.431 1.455 -0.0248 1.604 1.228 0.375∗
(1.157) (2.404) (-0.84) (1.678) (2.170) (-0.09) (1.638) (1.158) (1.86)
Owns cattle 0.827 0.919 -0.0927∗ 0.867 0.879 -0.0114 0.918 0.939 -0.0210
(0.381) (0.274) (-1.96) (0.341) (0.328) (-0.24) (0.275) (0.240) (-0.57)
Owns a phone 0.816 0.889 -0.0726 0.806 0.869 -0.0626 0.908 0.828 0.0799∗
(0.389) (0.316) (-1.44) (0.397) (0.339) (-1.19) (0.290) (0.379) (1.66)
4) Lighting:
Number of kerosene lamps 2.235 2.515 -0.280 2.439 2.404 0.0347 2.541 2.263 0.278∗
(1.250) (1.273) (-1.56) (1.332) (1.124) (0.20) (1.141) (0.921) (1.88)
Hours of lighting 5.082 5.273 -0.191 4.806 4.758 0.0485 5.005 5.061 -0.0555
(2.218) (2.515) (-0.57) (1.892) (1.743) (0.19) (1.709) (1.828) (-0.22)
t statistics in parentheses. ∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: A rank-sum test (Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney) was also performed for the variables that do
not approximate a normal distribution. The only difference with the t tests are as follows: 1) The
difference in education level is significant at 10% in the control group, 2) The difference in
household expenses is not significant in the network group, 3) The difference in savings of the
seeds is significant at 10% in the communication group, 4) The difference in irrigated land is not
significant in the communication group, 5) The difference in the number of kerosene lamps is not
significant in the communication group.
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a standard deviation’s uniform increase (to 315, with a standard deviation of 362) would be
detected with an α = 0.95 probability if the control and treatment group each had at least
65 participants. In our setting, each group has 200 subjects, and, we cluster standard errors
at the habitation level (N = 200). We also control for habitation fixed effects, which enables
us to estimate the treatment effects more precisely.
2.5 Results
Main Estimates
Figure 2.4 shows the distribution of bids across treatment groups. There is a noticeable
change in the distribution between the control group and the network group, and between the
network group and the communication group: the distribution becomes flatter and displays
a much fatter left tail. This likely indicates that our treatments have positive effects on
WTP. We hardly notice important differences, however, when comparing the distribution
across gender of the seed; this indicates that our gender treatment is not likely to have any
effect.
We display box plots of WTP for the different treatment groups in Figure 2.5. We also
show the value of the mean WTP across treatments in Table 2.4. Formal test results on
whether or not the differences between these various means are significant are reported in
Table 2.5 and Table 2.66. We find that the mean WTP in the network and communication
treatments is significantly higher than in the control. Table 2.5 reveals that there is also a
significant difference between the network and communication treatments when the sample
is not split by gender. However, when looking only at the sample with female seeds, there is
no significant difference between the means of the network and communication treatments.
Finally, box plots on Figure 2.5 seem to indicate that there is a difference between Male and
Female in the control group, but less so in the treatment groups. This is confirmed in Table
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Figure 2.4: Faceted histogram of bids for the solar lantern.
Table 2.4: Means across treatments.
Control Network Communication
WTP - All seeds 133.5 254.9 330.2
(180.6) (267.0) (300.4)
WTP - Male Seed 107.1 245.4 334.2
(141.6) (278.9) (308.1)
WTP - Female Seed 159.6 264.4 326.3
(209.8) (255.8) (294.5)
Variable: Willingness to Pay. Means and standard deviations.
2.6: the difference in the control group is significant at the 5%. However, we note that the
difference is not significant any longer when using the rank-sum test.
Mean comparisons, however, do not control for unobserved heterogeneity across habi-
tations and for correlation between observations within the same habitation. We therefore
proceed to using regression analysis with fixed effects and clustered standard errors at the
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Table 2.5: Tests for means across treatments.
Differences
Control - Network Control - Communication Network - Communication
WTP - All seeds -121.4∗∗∗ -196.7∗∗∗ -75.26∗∗∗
(-5.27) (-7.86) (-2.61)
WTP - Male Seed -138.2∗∗∗ -227.1∗∗∗ -88.85∗∗
(-4.37) (-6.61) (-2.10)
WTP - Female Seed -104.8∗∗∗ -166.7∗∗∗ -61.83
(-3.14) (-4.59) (-1.57)
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: Chi-square tests for whether the mean WTP is the same in all treatment groups always
yield that the three coefficients are different at the 1% level in the whole sample as well as in the
subsample of female seeds and the subsample of male seeds. Rank-sum tests were also performed
for each of the t-tests and p-values were found identical. The χ2 test statistic for identical mean
WTP across treatment groups is 94.17; with 34 degrees of freedom, the associated p-value equals
0. The χ2 test statistic for the WTP to be equal in all treatment groups within the subsample of
male seed is 60.99; with 30 degrees of freedom, the associated p-value equals 0.001. The χ2 test
statistic for the WTP to be equal in all treatment groups within the subsample of female seed is
55.69; with 32 degrees of freedom, the associated p-value equals 0.006. The z statistics for the
rank-sum tests are as follows. First row: -5.5; -7.9; -2.8. Second row: -4.2; -6.2; -2.4. Third row:
-3.6; -5.0; -1.5.
Table 2.6: Tests for means across seed gender.
Differences
Male - Female
WTP - Control -52.45∗∗
(-2.05)
WTP - Network -19.07
(-0.50)
WTP - Communication 7.948
(0.18)
t statistics in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: Rank-sum tests are as follows. Control group: z = -1.463, Prob ¿ —z— = 0.1435. Network:



































Figure 2.5: Boxplots of bids for the solar lantern.
habitation level. The main results from regression analysis are shown in Table 2.7. In all
regressions, the standard errors are clustered at the habitation level. Habitation fixed ef-
fects are not included in the second column because the gender treatment was randomized
across habitations. Results show that the network treatment increased WTP by almost 120
Rupees compared to the control group. Given the mean WTP of the control group was 134
Rupees,7 this corresponds to a 90% increase. Furthermore, compared to the control group,
the communication treatment increased WTP by 195 Rupees which corresponds to a 145%
increase. The gender treatment, however, does not appear to have a statistically significant
effect. The inclusion of habitation fixed effects in column 4 further reduces the coefficient
for the interaction of the gender treatment with the information treatment in the negative
values.
7Similarly, the value of the intercept in model 1 of Table 2.7 is 134.5 Rupees.
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Table 2.7: Main results for experimental treatments.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
WTP WTP WTP WTP
Network 119.883∗∗∗ 116.383∗∗∗ 136.988∗∗∗
(22.115) (30.297) (30.847)




Network x Female Seed 9.080 -34.067
(38.292) (44.229)
Communication x Female Seed -16.890 -57.749
(42.631) (45.745)
Habitation fixed effects Yes No No Yes
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.157 0.002 0.161
Observations 585 585 585 585
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: In column 1, the coefficients for Network and Communication are different at the 1% level.
Robustness Checks
In Table 2.8, we include controls for monthly savings, one of the imbalanced covariates.
We see that the treatment effects coefficients slightly decrease from 120 to 108 Rupees in
the network group and from 195 to 184 Rupees in the communication group. Yet, the
effects remain robust. The coefficient for monthly savings is significant at the 5% level but
the magnitude is small: every additional Rupee in savings correlates with a WTP increase
of 0.026 Rupees. Given the imbalance of savings across treatment groups, this represents
an average contribution to the WTP of about 6 Rupees in the control group and 17 to
18 Rupees in the network and communication groups. The contribution of savings to the
WTP is therefore an order of magnitude lower than the contribution of our information
treatments. In fact, the raw correlation coefficient between WTP and savings is only 0.15.
This can be visualized on the scatter plot of WTP for the entire sample, with amount of
savings shown in the Appendix: those who had the highest amount of savings are not those
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who bid the highest WTP. In regression 2, we interact monthly savings with the treatment
dummies. The coefficient for the interaction term is negative and significant at the 10%
level, indicating that savings and WTP correlate even in this treatment group. We also
re-run the regression using monthly savings in logs instead of levels and find similar results.
Specifically, we note that the estimated treatment effects decreases slightly, from 120 to 103
Rupees in the network group and from 195 to 177 Rupees in the communication group,
but, overall, the effects remain large and significant at the 1% level. Finally, regression 5
estimates the treatment effects for the sub-sample of respondents who declared having zero
savings. This regression therefore includes only about half of the observations. We see that
the treatment effects found within this subsample are very similar to those found for the
whole sample. This confirms that monthly savings are not the main driver of our treatment
effects.
In Table 2.9, we add other control variables. In column 1, we control for whether the
household head is female because this was the other unbalanced variable. Treatment effects
for both the network and communication groups change little. In column 2, we control for
both whether the household head is female and for the amount of monthly savings. The main
treatment effects are slightly reduced but remain large and significant at the 1% level. In
column 3, we control for the date when the household was surveyed. Harvesting of maize and
rice in the study area started at the end of September and early October respectively. This
timing partly coincided with our survey of the network and communication groups: about
20% of our treated households were interviewed after September 258. If those sampled
households began selling their harvest, they would likely have been able to afford greater
8Rice Knowledge Management Portal, maintained by the Indian Council of Agricultural Research
(http://www.rkmp.co.in/content/rice-growing-seasons-of-uttar-pradesh) indicates that in Uttar Pradesh
summer rice is harvested in April-May and Kharif rice in November-December. On the other hand, wheat
is harvested around March-April in the eastern part of Uttar Pradesh, and around mid-April in the western
part (see http://www.archive.india.gov.in/citizen/agriculture/index.php?id=11). Our local team, however,
indicated that a reasonable estimate for the first day of harvest in the region around Gonda City was
September 25 for Maize and October 5 for rice, and we use these more conservative dates for our robustness
check.
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Table 2.8: Main results for experimental treatments controlling for amount of savings.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Network 107.560∗∗∗ 114.829∗∗∗ 103.161∗∗∗ 119.744∗∗∗ 117.944∗∗∗
(22.727) (28.718) (25.966) (33.841) (36.070)
Communication 183.525∗∗∗ 201.240∗∗∗ 177.301∗∗∗ 229.662∗∗∗ 214.382∗∗∗
(23.902) (25.510) (27.383) (39.679) (43.535)
Amount of Savings 0.026∗∗ 0.066∗∗
(0.013) (0.033)
Network x Savings -0.037
(0.039)
Communication x Savings -0.053∗
(0.031)
Savings (log) 5.689 19.353∗∗
(4.340) (7.478)
Network x log Savings -14.007
(8.860)
Communication x log Savings -22.412∗∗
(9.470)
Habitation fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.165 0.170 0.162 0.173 0.180
Observations 585 585 585 585 315
Standard errors in parentheses
Model57 is for the sub-sample of respondents that declare zero savings.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: We also tested a specification with logarithmic savings, but the coefficient on savings was
found insignificant (p-value=0.19).
expenditures, and consequently have a higher WTP for the solar lanterns. We therefore
investigate the robustness of our treatment effect to this possible “wealth effect”.
In order to investigate the possible role of a wealth effect, we control in our regression for
the date of interview. Specifically, the variable “Date” is the month and day of the month
on which the respondent was interviewed. If there is a wealth effect due to the sale of crops,
respondents interviewed toward the end of the experiment are more likely to have access
to cash and bid a higher price. The coefficient on ‘Date’ then should be positive. Results
show that the coefficient is not significant and leans toward negative values.9 This shows
9Standard errors and coefficients are very large in this case due to the collinearity between our treatment
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that respondents interviewed last were no more likely to bid higher amounts, which provides
supporting evidence against a wealth effect from the harvest season. In column 4, our main
results remain robust to the inclusion of seven additional control variables. Most variables,
such as the level of education, expenditures, whether or not the respondent is in debt, and
household size, display small and insignificant coefficients. The number of children going to
school shows a slightly larger coefficient; the variable is statistically insignificant. Only the
number of kerosene lamps displays a coefficient that is significant at the 10% level: households
owning many kerosene lamps also bid slightly higher WTP. Intuitively, households with a
greater number of kerosene lamps are likely to be households with a greater need for lighting
products, which should translate into higher WTP.
Mechanisms
In this section, we investigate the possible mechanisms to explain why our treatments are
effective. Table 2.10 displays the mean response to various survey questions for each treat-
ment group. The exact phrasing of the questions can be found in the appendix. We note
that, compared to the control group, respondents in the network and communication groups
are much more likely to have seen a solar lantern before and they are much more likely to
know someone who owns a lantern. This is fully consistent with our experimental design
and provides evidence that our treatments were properly implemented. Furthermore, close
to 90% of the respondents in the network and communication group stated that they had
conversations with that person more than three times a week. Hence, the major factor ex-
plaining the difference between the network and the communication groups is unlikely to
be the level of interactions with a friend who owns a solar lantern. The third and fourth
variables in the table provide some insights as to why WTP has increased. Contrary to the
control group, most people in the network and communication groups now believe that, to
function properly, a solar lantern needs proper maintenance. They also estimate the cost of
dummies and the date variable.
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Table 2.9: Main results for experimental treatments with control variables included.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Network 115.107∗∗∗ 103.683∗∗∗ 388.290∗∗ 107.520∗∗∗
(22.469) (22.937) (180.316) (23.925)
Communication 191.915∗∗∗ 181.072∗∗∗ 470.514∗∗∗ 180.476∗∗∗
(23.112) (24.064) (180.690) (25.348)
Female Head -31.046 -27.911 -29.942 -23.510
(27.096) (26.594) (26.485) (29.275)












Number of children to school 11.893
(7.433)
Number of kerosene lamps 19.780∗
(11.547)
Hours of lighting 1.415
(6.504)
Habitation fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.160 0.167 0.176 0.181
Observations 585 585 584 574
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2.10: Summary statistics for some key solar lantern related variables highlighting
possible mechanisms.
Cont. Net. DIFF Cont. Comm. DIFF Net. Comm. DIFF
Seen lantern before 0.244 0.934 -0.690∗∗∗ 0.244 0.949 -0.706∗∗∗ 0.934 0.949 -0.0152
(0.430) (0.249) (-19.49) (0.430) (0.220) (-20.49) (0.249) (0.220) (-0.64)
Know someone with lantern 0.132 0.924 -0.792∗∗∗ 0.132 0.944 -0.812∗∗∗ 0.924 0.944 -0.0203
(0.339) (0.266) (-25.78) (0.339) (0.230) (-27.80) (0.266) (0.230) (-0.81)
Can function properly 0.533 0.0508 0.482∗∗∗ 0.533 0.0914 0.442∗∗∗ 0.0508 0.0914 -0.0406
(0.500) (0.220) (12.39) (0.500) (0.289) (10.73) (0.220) (0.289) (-1.57)
Cost estimate 627.1 838.7 -211.6∗∗∗ 627.1 736.6 -109.5∗∗ 838.7 736.6 102.1∗
(558.7) (647.9) (-3.47) (558.7) (538.9) (-1.98) (647.9) (538.9) (1.70)
Innovative product 4.939 4.980 -0.0405 4.939 4.970 -0.0305 4.980 4.970 0.0100
(0.373) (0.226) (-1.30) (0.373) (0.200) (-1.01) (0.226) (0.200) (0.47)
Superior to kerosene lamps 4.995 4.980 0.0152 4.995 4.985 0.0101 4.980 4.985 -0.00508
(0.0714) (0.174) (1.13) (0.0714) (0.123) (1.00) (0.174) (0.123) (-0.33)
Will recommend to others 4.995 4.975 0.0203 4.995 4.949 0.0457∗ 4.975 4.949 0.0254
(0.0712) (0.187) (1.42) (0.0712) (0.346) (1.81) (0.187) (0.346) (0.91)
such a product at a higher level than the control group. This indicates that a key lesson
learned from their friend’s experience relates to the technical quality of the lantern. At
first, villagers might expect that solar lanterns are nothing more sophisticated than kerosene
lanterns. They then observe their friend taking care of it; they note the photovoltaic panel
that is connected to the lamp, which allows the battery to be charged. As a result, they per-
ceive the product as a sophisticated item that requires careful maintenance and are therefore
willing to pay a higher price. Interestingly, we note that respondents perceive solar lanterns
positively. Almost everyone answered “Definitely” to the questions of whether the lantern
was innovative, whether it was superior to a kerosene lamp, and whether they would rec-
ommend it to a friend over a kerosene lamp. This is despite the fact that most of those
in the control group confirm they had never seen a solar lantern before and did not know
anybody who owned one. It is also despite the fact that most people in the treated groups
now recognize that a solar lantern can not function without proper maintenance.
In one of the survey questions, we asked respondents how much they thought the lantern
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Table 2.11: Results with cost estimate of solar lanterns as dependent variable.
(1) (2)







Habitation fixed effects No Yes
Clustered SE Yes Yes
R-squared 0.031 0.036
Observations 585 591
Standard errors in parentheses
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
cost. The mean estimate approximates 730 Rupees with a standard deviation of about 500.
Interestingly, the correlation between cost estimates and the willingness to pay is small in
magnitude. Regression 1 in Table 2.11 shows that every 100 extra Rupees in cost estimate
correlates with an increase in willingness to pay of only about 8 Rupees. In column 2 of
the same table, we investigate the treatment effects on the estimated cost. We note that
both the network and communication groups display higher estimated costs compared to the
control group. In particular, respondents in the network group estimated the lantern at a
higher cost than did respondents in the communication group. Yet, they bid lower prices in
the BDM game on average. This indicates that the main mechanism through which the tea
meetings affect willingness to pay is not through increasing respondents’ perception of the
product’s cost. It is rather through improving knowledge about the attributes of the solar
lantern technology.
Why Didn’t Gender Affect Willingness to Pay?
In order to shed light on why gender did not affect WTP, we present the covariates of the
friends chosen by the male and female seeds, including formal statistical tests of differences
in Table 2.12. Consistent with existing gender inequalities in India, we observe that female
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seeds are less likely to be educated and literate. We also note that female seeds have a
weaker connection to the village’s social life: not only are they less likely to participate
in village meetings or religious and political events, but have also somewhat less trust in
other villagers, and say that they have fewer friends and spend less time with these friends,
compared to male seeds. Notably, they are much more likely to be born outside the village,
which might play a role in explaining these findings. One question in the survey asked seeds
who they thought would mostly be using the lanterns. It is interesting to see that 70% of
female seeds declared that they would be the one using the lantern. Furthermore, 30% of
male seeds answered that their spouse would mostly use the product. Hence it appears that
both genders agree that the lantern is a product useful to women.
Given these important differences between the two seed groups, we can expect that they
choose friends who are different in several characteristics. Table 2.13 reports characteristics
of the household heads of the female seeds’ friends and the male seeds’ friends. We observe
that household heads in the female seed group are less likely to be educated and literate,
and have fewer savings. But, very importantly, we note that they are also more likely to be
female. In other words, female seeds are more likely to choose a friend who is herself the
head of her household, and it is likely that the differences in education, literacy and savings
follow from that fact.
Our hypothesis about the gender treatment relies on the assumption that a male house-
hold head discounts information carried through a female network. Here, the sample of
friends named by the female seeds are in fact composed of a greater number of female house-
hold heads. These respondents, being female, are less likely to discount information received
through their direct social network. As a result, it is possible that the absence of a treat-
ment effect results from such a composition effect. To investigate this further, we test the
sensitivity of our results by dividing the sample according to the gender of the household
head. Table 2.14 displays summary statistics for the two subsamples. We note that, overall,
female household heads are younger, have more children, are less educated and less likely to
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Table 2.12: Summary statistics for the two seed groups
Male Seeds Female Seeds Difference
Born in village 0.970 0.140 0.830∗∗∗
(0.171) (0.349) (11.78)
Number of children 3.714 4.530 -0.816∗∗
(2.021) (2.418) (-2.11)
Education 2.090 1.480 0.610∗∗∗
(1.296) (0.990) (3.86)
Education of spouse 1.265 2.360 -1.095∗∗∗
(0.807) (1.345) (-7.10)
Reads Hindi 0.530 0.310 0.220∗∗∗
(0.502) (0.465) (3.15)
Amount of savings 387 228 159∗∗
(1197.5) (1076.1) (2.18)
Children use lighting for studying 0.560 0.700 -0.140∗∗
(0.499) (0.461) (-2.05)
Current lighting bad 4.175 4.544 -0.369∗∗
(1.315) (0.876) (-1.77)
Mostly be using: myself 0.490 0.700 -0.210∗∗∗
(0.502) (0.461) (-3.02)
Mostly be using: my spouse 0.300 0.0500 0.250∗∗∗
(0.461) (0.219) (4.64)
Discuss how to spend money 1.600 -0.180∗∗
(0.684) (0.603) (-1.96)
Women should work outside 3.690 4.470 -0.780∗∗∗
(1.733) (1.132) (-3.10)
Participation in village meetings 0.280 0.140 0.140∗∗
(0.570) (0.377) (1.77)
Participation in farmers’ cooperative meetings 0.140 0.0200 0.120∗∗∗
(0.377) (0.200) (3.28)
Participation in religious group events 1.050 0.800 0.250∗∗
(0.702) (0.739) (2.46)
Participation in political events 0.370 0.100 0.270∗∗∗
(0.630) (0.333) (3.66)
Trust other villagers 3.830 3.280 0.550∗∗
(1.436) (1.694) (2.14)
Spend time with friends (dummy) 0.380 0.240 0.140∗∗
(0.488) (0.429) (2.14)
Number of friends 10.02 6.390 3.630∗∗∗
(11.52) (4.722) (3.05)
Note: Only variables with significant differences are reported. The corresponding z statistics of
the rank-sum test is reported.
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Table 2.13: Social network analysi
Male Seed Friends Female Seed Friends Difference
Female respondent 0.136 0.401 -0.265∗∗∗
(0.343) (0.491) (-7.25)
Education 2.099 1.822 0.277∗∗∗
(1.400) (1.283) (2.95)
Reads Hindi 0.541 0.424 0.117∗∗∗
(0.499) (0.495) (2.83)
Amount of savings 556.1 488.9 67.23∗∗
(834.7) (964.1) (2.12)
Household size 7.687 6.838 0.849∗∗∗
(3.708) (3.360) (2.90)
Can function properly 0.255 0.195 0.0598∗
(0.437) (0.397) (1.74)
Would feel safer if more light 4.990 4.959 0.0303∗
(0.130) (0.270) (1.90)
Was victim of kerosene fire 0.184 0.108 0.0759∗∗∗
(0.388) (0.311) (2.62)
Knows a victim of a kerosene fire 0.323 0.249 0.0740∗∗
(0.468) (0.433) (1.99)
Mostly be using: myself 0.257 0.332 -0.0755∗∗
(0.438) (0.472) (-2.02)
Mostly be using: spouse 0.436 0.322 0.114∗∗∗
(0.497) (0.468) (2.85)
Note: Characteristics of the friends chosen by the male seeds and the female seeds, with the
corresponding z-statistics of the rank-sum test. Only variables with significant differences are
reported.
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be literate, have less savings, and are less likely to own a business. In Table 2.15, we run our
main specification for the whole sample, the sub-sample of male household heads, and the
sub-sample of female household heads. It is more difficult to precisely estimate the treatment
effects for the female sub-sample because of the lower number of observations. However, we
note that the effects of the network and communication treatments are comparable in both
sub-samples. Regressions in columns 4, 5 and 6 investigate the effect of the gender treatment
in each sub-sample separately. We note that in the male sub-sample (column 5), our gender
treatment still has little effect. This excludes the possibility that the absence of a strong
effect of the gender treatment results from a composition effect. Instead, it indicates that
the mechanism we hypothesised and discussed earlier might not be in place.
In an attempt to explain why men did not discount female seeds in our setting, Table
2.16 looks at indicators of women’s status. Our survey included a series of questions about
gender norms in the villages. In the first set of questions, we asked respondents whether
they believed a woman should ask permission from her husband or a family member before
going out. Almost all household heads said that women should ask for permission to go to
the health center, to visit a friend or to go to the market. On the other hand, answers to
other questions reflect more egalitarian views. Only about 5% of the sample said that they
never talked with their spouse about what to spend income on, and about two-thirds of the
sample said they often had such discussions. In addition, virtually all households thought
that women should have a say in how income is spent. Most respondents thought that it was
definitively important that girls go to school. They further expressed the view that beating
a woman was rarely justified. Finally, most respondents thought that women were as able
as men to use new technologies. It appears that gender norms here give women some say in
purchasing decisions, as well as when it comes to using new products. This might therefore
explain why our gender treatment had little effect on willingness to pay.
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Table 2.14: Summary statistics by gender of respondent.
Male Female Difference
Year of birth 1970.1 1975.5 -5.414∗∗∗
(14.74) (10.73) (-4.24)
Number of children 3.787 4.114 -0.327∗
(2.086) (2.032) (-1.69)
Education 2.194 1.321 0.874∗∗∗
(1.411) (0.895) (7.29)
Expenses 4384.3 4298.7 85.52
(3073.8) (2303.3) (0.32)
Savings 574.8 379.9 194.9∗∗
(965.0) (684.9) (2.34)
Owns a business 0.0741 0.0126 0.0615∗∗∗
(0.262) (0.112) (2.86)
Household size 7.449 6.748 0.701∗∗
(3.578) (3.471) (2.13)
Number of children to school 1.410 1.658 -0.248∗
(1.616) (1.518) (-1.67)
Read hindi 0.590 0.189 0.402∗∗∗
(0.492) (0.392) (9.26)
In debt 0.514 0.528 -0.0144
(0.500) (0.501) (-0.31)
Land 1.456 1.207 0.249
(1.668) (1.993) (1.53)
Irrigated land 1.406 1.158 0.247
(1.603) (1.981) (1.56)
Owns cattle 0.903 0.862 0.0411
(0.297) (0.346) (1.43)
Has a phone 0.856 0.843 0.0137
(0.351) (0.365) (0.42)
Number of kerosene lamps 2.451 2.258 0.194∗
(1.189) (1.154) (1.77)
Hours of lighting 4.906 5.245 -0.339∗
(1.884) (2.288) (-1.83)
Note: 159 observations for female and 432 for male.
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Table 2.15: Heterogeneity analysis by gender of the respondent.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All Male Female All Male Female
Network 119.883∗∗∗ 132.505∗∗∗ 131.282∗ 136.988∗∗∗ 134.586∗∗∗ 183.333
(22.115) (28.906) (72.932) (30.847) (35.014) (205.317)
Communication 195.078∗∗∗ 201.245∗∗∗ 173.572∗∗∗ 224.416∗∗∗ 224.802∗∗∗ -58.333
(22.925) (30.216) (64.552) (32.086) (36.442) (207.667)
Network x Female Seed -34.067 -10.586 -74.003
(44.229) (62.968) (216.857)
Communication x Female Seed -57.749 -63.893 261.340
(45.745) (65.971) (217.925)
Habitation fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered SE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.157 0.161 0.144 0.161 0.165 0.191
Observations 585 426 159 585 426 159
Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent variable: Willingness to Pay.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
2.6 Conclusion
Adoption and diffusion of new technologies is crucial to improve the livelihood of poor com-
munities. One important factor that promotes this process is information sharing through
social networks. Adoption of a new technology is a social process because its adoption by an
individual creates positive information externality to peers and this increases their expected
welfare (Bardhan et al. 1999). Does rewarding individuals who make a conscious effort
to communicate information about new technologies increase willingness to pay (WTP) by
members of a social network? Whose social network in the household matters for the flow of
information about new technologies? In this paper, we attempted to answer these questions
by crafting a randomized controlled trial which involves distribution of multi-purpose solar
lanterns under different treatments.
We collaborated with a local institution in rural India and assigned three peers of ran-
domly recruited seed individuals (half of them male and half female) into a “network treat-
ment”, a “communication treatment” and a “control group”. We elicited WTP for the solar
lanterns from the control group right after interviewing the seed household, using the Becker-
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Table 2.16: Descriptive statistics on women’s status.
Control Network Communication
1. Should ask permission to go the health center 0.975 0.959 0.954
(0.158) (0.198) (0.209)
2. Should ask permission to go visit a friend 0.995 0.949 0.985
(0.0712) (0.220) (0.123)
3. Should ask permission to go to the market 0.990 0.964 0.990
(0.101) (0.186) (0.101)
4. Talk with spouse about what to spend money on 1.660 1.645 1.492
(0.545) (0.576) (0.636)
5. Women should have a say on how to spend income 0.995 0.990 0.929
(0.124) (0.101) (0.277)
6. It is important that girls go to school 4.985 4.980 4.959
(0.214) (0.141) (0.222)
7. Women should work outside home or own a business 4.223 3.086 3.685
(1.415) (1.786) (1.756)
8. Beating justified if she goes out without telling 0.594 0.497 0.497
(0.492) (0.501) (0.501)
9. Beating justified if she argues with husband 0.589 0.624 0.680
(0.493) (0.486) (0.468)
10. Beating justified if suspected of adultery 0.706 0.741 0.822
(0.457) (0.439) (0.383)
11. Men are better able to use new technologies than women 3.452 3.264 2.924
(1.712) (1.657) (1.738)
Note: Most variables are binary variables where 0 codes for no, and 1 for yes. Answers to
question 4 are coded as follows: 0 for “Never”, 1 for “Sometimes”, 2 for “Often”. Answers to
questions 6, 7, and 11 are as follows: 1 for “Definitely not”, 2 for “Not really”, 3 for “Neutral”, 4
for “Somewhat” and 5 for “Definitely”.
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Degroot-Marschak (BDM) method (Becker et al. 1964). We elicited WTP for the lanterns
from the “network” group one month after the seed households had acquired the lantern.
We also asked the seed households to invite one of the peers (the communication group) for
a tea meeting to demonstrate and share their experience in using the lantern after a month,
in return for an incentive payment of 100 rupees. We elicited WTP of the communication
group after the tea meetings have taken place. The study area is non-electrified and house-
holds did not have previous knowledge about the solar lanterns. These facts allowed us to
explore the flow of information and the value households place on technologies that have
large potential to improve quality of life of all members of the household.
Our results show that households, who most likely learned about the solar lantern technol-
ogy through their network (passive network), are willing to pay 120 Rupees more compared
to the control group. Given the control group is willing to pay 134 Rupees on average,
this corresponds to a 90% increase in WTP. On the other hand, households who attended
a demonstration session by their peers (the communication treatment) are willing to pay
195 Rupees (145%) more than the control group. We do not find a statistically significant
difference in WTP between male and female networks in either treatment. In order to shed
light on the possible mechanisms that explain the observed outcome (WTP for the solar
lanterns), we collected detailed information on peers’ previous knowledge of solar lanterns,
perception about their benefit, estimated market price, etc. Our results suggest that learn-
ing how to operate the technology and observing its benefits, which appeared to be superior
to the kerosene lamp that households in the study area use as a source of lighting, are the
important factors that drive WTP of both treatment groups.
Our findings have significant implications for policies that aim at promoting adoption and
diffusion of new technologies in developing countries. If rewarding information communicator
peers promotes information spill-over and willingness to pay, this implies that reducing the
cost of the technology and allocating resources to communication will have significant welfare
impacts on society. The results also highlight the potential role solar technologies could play
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in electrification. A significant proportion of households in developing countries do not have
access to electricity and governments lack the required resources to extend the grid. Solar
power has a large potential to tackle energy poverty by serving as a decentralized solution.
In this regard, identifying the impact of incentivizing communication in inducing adoption
and diffusion of such low-cost and environmentally-friendly technologies in rural settings
provides useful information to policymakers and stakeholders who aim at improving the
living conditions of poor households while protecting the environment.
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Chapter 3
A Theoretical Model of Technological
Change in Industrial Networks and
Implications for a Green
Technological Transition
Eugenie Dugoua and Marion Dumas
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3.1 Introduction and Background
Various positive externalities impede the process of technological change at both the inno-
vation and diffusion stages (Jaffe et al. 2003; Jaffe et al. 2005). These externalities usually
justify using technology-push policies even though the precise type of policy is often debated
(Steinmueller 2010). The market failure most commonly discussed in technology policy re-
lates to the public good aspect of knowledge, and the early literature on this topic has
demonstrated the need for subsidizing basic research efforts (Rockett 2010; Stephan 2010).
Attention has also focused on issues faced by adopters such as dynamic increasing returns
in learning-by-using and user network effects (Farrell et al. 2007; Liebowitz et al. 1994)1.
Beyond issues of adoption by end-users is the growing recognition that manufacturing
is a critical locus in the innovation process. Proofs of concept are not sufficient to guar-
antee success in manufacturing; product development through pilot and large-scale testings
provide opportunities for valuable learning and adjustment that are critical to innovation
(Bonvillian 2013). Learning and adjustments seem particularly important as products most
often constitute complex combinations of components supplied by different firms (Fuchs
2014). Manufacturing is a time where all suppliers and producers make essential invest-
ments towards developing a new product. However, the most commonly discussed positive
externality faced by producers, learning-by-doing, is a type of dynamic increasing returns
that is internal to the firm (Thompson 2010); it remains blind to relationships between final
producers and suppliers.
The importance of relationships between a final producer and its suppliers for innovation
is widely acknowledged. Jorde et al. (1990), for example, argue that low levels of cooperation
between firms result in low levels of innovation. Additionally, a large part of contract theory
studies how the ability to contract between suppliers and buyers affects investment, and
therefore innovation (Blanchard et al. 1997; Chen et al. 2011; Gilson et al. 2009). But
1Notable papers in this literature include (Besen et al. 1994; David 1997; Farrell et al. 1985, 1986; Katz
et al. 1985, 1986, 1994).
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this literature has focused on producer-supplier relationships within a linear vertical supply
chain. It has yet to investigate the role that more complex industrial networks2 can play in
fostering or hindering technological change.
The importance of such networks for various economic phenomena, aggregate output and
trade in particular, is gradually being recognized, and researchers are increasingly describing
them theoretically and empirically (Acemoglu et al. 2012; Atalay et al. 2011; Carvalho 2014;
Oberfield 2012). A 2008 Senate hearing testimony illustrates the critical role of shared
suppliers: Ford’s CEO advocated for the bailout of General Motors and Chrysler, Ford’s
principal competitors to protect their shared suppliers3 (Carvalho 2014).
This paper investigates how supply-chain network characteristics impact firms’ ambition
to innovate. We develop a theoretical model to illustrate and examine a new type of positive
externality where the cost of producing a new technology to one producer may depend on how
many other producers are deploying similar technologies. We call such externalities supplier
network externalities, and they can be thought of as a distant cousin to the typical user
network externalities discussed in the technology adoption literature. For example, David
(1985) discusses the factors that led QWERTY to become “locked in” as the dominant
keyboard arrangement.
David (ibid.) argues that three factors played a key role: compatibility issues between
a given keyboard and the typist’s training, economies of scale, and quasi-irreversibility of
investment. Those factors induced QWERTY’s user costs to decrease as it gained accep-
tance relative to other systems. Eventually this led to the quasi-universal adoption of the
keyboard. Importantly, network effects create multiple equilibria: users’ expectations are
often crucial in determining which network succeeds, and early preferences and information
are likely to play an excessive role in determining long-term outcomes. For these reasons,
2More complex than just a linear node between a producer and a supplier; for example when two
competitors share suppliers
3Mulally (2008): “In addition, the collapse of one of our competitors would have a severe impact on
Ford and our transformation plan because the domestic auto industry is highly interdependent. It would
also have devastating ripple effects across the entire U.S. economy”.
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the QWERTY example has sometimes been regarded as the ‘founding myth’ of the path
dependence literature (Ruttan 1997).
We build our model on two main assumptions. First, we assume economies of scope in
the supplier’s technology. Consequently, the cost of producing intermediate inputs decreases
with the number of producers sourcing similar inputs. Second, we assume that economies of
scope may be lost when innovations require complementary investments from producers and
suppliers. This is because producers might innovate in ways that are incompatible for the
supplier. In what follows, we define radical innovations as innovations requiring investments
from producers and suppliers (complementary investments).
The supplier network externality, hence, produces a positive externality leading to in-
creasing returns in the numbers of producers deploying radical innovations: producer 1 has
more returns from deploying radical innovations if producer 2 does as well and they can
coordinate. In other words, unless all incumbent buyers switch to similar competing tech-
nologies and, therefore, buy the same new intermediate input, the supplier will lose part
or all of its economies of scope. Our model, therefore, shows that shared suppliers can be
reluctant to engage in radical innovations. But coordinating producers’ innovation strategies
would encourage shared suppliers to innovate.
A further implication of network externalities is that lock-in situations may arise, es-
pecially if barriers to moving to alternative competing technologies are high. In that case,
producers would display excess inertia by waiting too long before switching. Absent coordi-
nation, such lock-in situations would lead to market failures when it is socially desirable to
adopt a technological path different from the one that has been chosen by the market.
We argue this may be the case for green innovations, where the primary policy instru-
ment to encourage innovation has been market instruments, which are not designed to solve
coordination problems. First, we argue that many of the technologies needed to decarbonize
the economy qualify as radical, particularly in the car manufacturing sector. Second, we ar-











Figure 3.1: Supplier Network for Ten Car Manufacturers
Note: Each green bond denotes a buyer-supplier relationship. Nodes in the center are shared
among two or more producers. The color gradient indicates nodes’ number of links and the size of
the nodes indicates their eigenvector centrality: we see that a large number of suppliers in the
center are highly central.
suppliers. To do this, we use a database of buyer-supplier relationships, FactSet. Figure
3.1 illustrates the centrality of many suppliers. Finally, we show how our result helps unify
several findings from case studies on the automotive industry.
The following section describes our theoretical framework, and Section 3.3 summarizes
the main results. In Section 3.4, we discuss implications for a green technological transition.
3.2 Theoretical Framework
The model consists of two producers with one common supplier. Each producer manufactures
a good using inputs from the supplier. Subscript S refers to the supplier, while subscript j
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refers to producers. Since there are two producers, we also use subscripts 1 and 2 to refer
to producer 1 and 2, respectively. To make our model as simple as possible, we focus on the
case of symmetric producers. Additionally, we assume that each producer share revenues
ex-post with the supplier; we denote sj the share of revenues accruing to producer j.
We are interested in modeling demand in industries such as car manufacturing where
products are differentiated (no two products are exactly alike) and consumers choose only
one of the competing products (discrete choice). As a result we use a model of discrete-choice
demand (Anderson et al. 1992) building on a random utility model of consumer behavior
(McFadden 1973)4. We use a multinomial logit model (a random utility model where the
idiosyncratic preference of consumer is assumed to be distributed i.i.d. type I extreme value)
since a convenient expression for the demand for good j can be derived. In a market with
two producers where each produces one good (good 1 and good 2), the aggregate demand
for product 1 take the following form:










aj stands for the quality of product j, and pj its price. M is the number of consumers
(the size of the market). U0 is the utility derived from the outside option and µ is the scale
parameter of the i.i.d. type 1 extreme values distribution of {kj} where kj represents the
idiosyncratic preference of consumer k for good j.
Since products 1 and 2 result from collaborations between producers and their supplier,
we assume that improving the quality aj can be done by either of the firms on its own
or jointly with complementary investments. We build on the observation that some in-
novations require little change to the components of the previous product. For example,
commercializing a car with increased fuel-efficiency requires changes within the engine, but
all other components roughly remain the same. Producing a fuel-cell electric car, on the
other hand, requires changes to many components (Zapata et al. 2010) produced by differ-
4For an example of empirical estimation of such demand functions in the case of the US car sector, see
Berry et al. (1995).
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ent firms. Following this example, we think of radical innovations as product changes that
require investments from multiple firms because the skills, knowledge, and/or inputs needed
to deploy the innovation are not present within the firm5.
In the model, firms choose the degree of radicalness for a new product. We can also
think of radicalness as the degree of “common effort” required to develop the new product
between one producer and the supplier. The more common effort required, the more radical
the technology. We denote zj the degree of “radicalness” that firm j chooses for a particular
innovation, where z ∈ [0; 1]. If zj equals zero, firm j chooses not to develop innovations
requiring investments from other firms in the supply chain. The firm makes unilateral
investments to innovate on the final product “on its own”, and we can think of the innovation
as being marginal.
In contrast, when zj > 0, the innovation can be thought of as radical in the sense that it
requires investments from multiple actors of the supply chain. As zj increases, the ambition
regarding how radical the innovation is, also increases.
We assume incomplete contracts between suppliers and producers. Hence, the producers
and supplier choose their degree of radicalness independently. As already explained, what
makes an innovation radical here is that it requires common effort. We formalize this idea by
assuming that only the lowest degree of “radicalness” wished by a producer j and its supplier
can be implemented. In other words, the levels of radicalness are perfect complements within
each supply-chain6. We denote zˆ1 and zˆ2 the effective degrees of “radicalness” in the supply
chain of producer 1 and 2, respectively:
zˆ1 = min{z1, zS} and zˆ2 = min{z2, zS} (3.2)
We assume that innovations with more ambitious common effort bear the promise of
5In that sense, a technology might be radical only in relation to a particular organization (Soskice 1997;
Teece 1986) and the knowledge and skills for the technology exist in another firm or research laboratory.
6By supply chain, we mean a producer and the supplier. Since we have two producers in the model,
there are also two supply chains.
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higher quality aj and, ceteris paribus, higher profits:
aj(zˆj) = βzˆj, (3.3)
As shown in Equation 3.3, aj linearly increases with zˆj according to a positive constant β.
We impose that β > 0 to capture the idea that more ambitious innovations, while requiring
more concerted efforts, also yield higher quality.
Deploying an innovation also requires paying for the actual investments. All firms, pro-
ducers and supplier will face variable and fixed costs. We assume that the variable cost of the
supplier takes the form of a CES function. One reason for which suppliers are often shared
amongst competing producers is that the supplier enjoys economies of scale and scope. We
use a CES function to formalize this idea:







In the supplier’s cost function, k ∈ [0; 1] is a parameter governing the returns to scale;
and ρ > 0 is a parameter governing the extent to which the inputs produced by the supplier
are substitutable in the cost function. ρ > 1 corresponds to economies of scope from pro-
ducing multiple products, ρ = 1 corresponds to purely substitutable products, and ρ < 1
corresponds to diseconomies of scope from producing multiple products.
We introduce the possibility that producers innovate in different technological directions.
In other words, whatever the degrees of radicalness chosen by the producers and the supplier
(for example, it could be e.g. z1 = z2 = zS), there is a probability, θ, that the producers
innovate in different directions, and this imposes on the supplier the need for producing very
different inputs. This is what we call miscoordination. For example, the two producers could
decide to launch radically innovative cars, but producer 1 chooses to invest in plug-in electric
cars, while producer 2 in hydrogen cars. For the supplier, such directions are not compatible
because they require different inputs. To formalize this, we assume that the realization of θ
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impacts the supplier’s economies of scope through the parameter ρ:
ρ =

ρ0 if Coordination (Prob = 1− θ)
ρ0 − σ.max{zˆ1, zˆ2} if Miscoordination (Prob = θ)
(3.5)
The move of nature regarding the coordination of the producers impacts ρ such that,
under coordination, the supplier benefits form economies of scope (ρ0 > 1). Under misco-
ordination, the supplier loses more economies of scope as the level of radicalness increases.
Since we focus on symmetric producers, here zˆ1 = zˆ2 = zˆj. We can reformulate the cost
function under miscoordination with ρ = 1− σzˆj.
The variable cost for producers is a function of the quantity demanded and is denoted
Cj(qj), where qj is a function of p1, p2, zˆ1 and zˆ2. We impose
∂2Cj
∂q2j
≤ 0 (e.g., Cj = c∗qj where
c is a positive constant). Additionally, all firms also incur fixed costs that increase with the
degree of effort: 
Rjzj is the fixed cost for producer j
RSzS is the fixed cost for the supplier
(3.6)
We assume that those fixed cost are incurred
Figure 3.2 summarizes the model’s building blocks. The sequence of the game is as
follows: 1) all players choose radicalness z: they incur their respective fixed cost (Rjzj and
RSzS) and the quality is determined aj = β ∗ min{zj, zS} for each product; 2) a move of
nature determines whether the producers coordinate or miscoordinate on the direction of
innovation, which then affects the marginal costs of production of the shared supplier; 3)
producers choose the price of their product; 4) revenues are divided between producers and
suppliers according to the shares sj.
Since we define zˆj as the minimum of the level of radicalness chosen by a producer and the
supplier, we can derive the Nash Equilibria of the three-player game by solving separately
for the optimal z∗1 and z
∗
2 on one hand, and for the optimal z
∗
S on the other. To solve for the



































































Figure 3.2: Model summary diagram
Note: qj refers to the quantity produced by producer j; aj to the quality; pj the price; zj to the
level of radicalness chosen by producer j, and zS the one chosen by the supplier. zˆ1 corresponds
to the effective level of radicalness for the producer 1 and its supplier. sj refers to the share of
revenues accruing to producer j.
the supplier always innovates at the same level as each of the producers7. In that game, the
supplier makes no decision and has no influence on the variable z. It is akin to assuming
there is no supplier, except that revenues remains split. To solve for the optimal zˆ∗S, we
consider a game where the supplier alone determines the zˆ8. This is almost akin to assuming
the supplier produces two goods without the two producers, but with revenues still being
split.
7This means: zˆj = zj
8This means zˆj = zS
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3.3 Results
Best Responses in the Two-Producer Game
Here, we consider the game between the two competing producers, assuming that the supplier
always innovates at the same level as each of the producers. We still assume that producer j
accrues only a share sj of the total revenues. Remark 1 below establishes the best response
of producer 1 to the radicalness level of producer 2, and vice versa. Πj denotes the profit of
firm j.
Remark 1. If R1 < βs1M , then ∃ z1 s.t. ∀z1 ≥ z1, Π1(z1, z2) ≥ Π1(0, z2) and dΠ1(z1,z2)dz1 >
0,∀z2. In this case, the best response is zBR1 (z2) = 1.
We show in appendix 3.6 that if Rj > βsjM , it is never profitable to innovate with
positive levels of zj. Since we want our benchmark situation to be two producers that would
indeed choose to radically innovate, we assume Rj < βsjM . Figure 3.3 illustrates Remark 1
with one specific set of parameter values. Panel 3.3a shows how the profit surfaces Π1(z1, z2)
and Π2(z1, z2) vary with z1 and z2. For example, Π1(z1, z2) initially decreases and then
increases with z1. It becomes positive above some threshold value z1(z2) (which depends on
z2).
Panel 3.3b plots these threshold functions z1(z2) and z2(z1) in the (z1, z2) plane to identify
regions where each producer can profit from radical innovations. Specifically, the blue curve
z1(z2) delimits an area to the right where profits for producer 1 are higher than the profits
when z1 = 0. We also know that Π1 keeps increasing with z1 to the right of z1(z2), and
therefore producer 1’s best response is z1 = 1 for any value of z2. The best responses of each
actor are shown in bold lines (for producer 1, it is the bold blue line). Since producers here
are symmetric, it follows that the Nash Equilibrium is unique and located at (z1 = 1, z2 = 1).
It is shown as a large black dot on the Figure 3.3b. However, depending on the parameters,
the two curves z1(z2) and z2(z1) may or not cross, and, as a result, there may be one or more
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(a) Example of profit surfaces as a func-
tion of the radicalness of innovations.
The blue surface corresponds to Π1; the
green surface to Π2. The beige sur-
face corresponds to profits when z1 or
z2 is 0. Π1(z1, z2) initially decreases and
then increases with z1. It becomes pos-
itive above some threshold value z1(z2)
(which depends on z2).
(b) The functions z1(z2) and z2(z1) de-
limit the areas where profits are larger
than when choosing z = 0. The thick
lines represents the best response val-
ues for each player. The large black
dots represent the resulting Nash Equi-
librium.
Figure 3.3: The profit functions and best response functions.
NE. We investigate all possible cases in the following section.
Nash Equilibria in the Two-Producer Game
Figure 3.4 illustrates several possible cases for the profile of z1(z2) and z2(z1). On the left-
hand side panel, the curves cross only once at ζL . In the middle panel, they cross twice (at
ζL and ζU ). On the right-hand side panel, they never cross. The bold vertical and horizontal
lines represent the producers’ best responses. Take for example the panel on the left-hand
side: the blue curve crosses the y-axis below the top right corner: for any z2 beyond that
point, there exists no z1 such that producer 1 profits can have profits higher than with
z1 = 0. Hence, above this point, the best response is z1 = 0. Consequently, the upper part
of the y-axis at z1 = 0 is thick blue. The possible Nash equilibria follow then from those
best responses. Both in the middle panel and in the left-hand side panel, there are two NE:
one at (z1 = 0, z2 = 1) and one at (z1 = 1, z2 = 0). There are shown on the graphs by large
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Figure 3.4: Diagrams showing different cases of Figure 3.3a. The bold and opaque colored
lines represent the best response functions of both producers. The large black dots represent
the resulting Nash Equilibrium.
black dots.
Remark 2. Assuming that ∃ zj(0) ∈ [0, 1] for j ∈ {1, 2}:
• Case a: there is a unique NE equal to (1, 1) iff ıU ≥ (1, 1)
• Case b: there are two NE equal to (0, 1) and (1, 0) if ıU < (1, 1) or if ıU does not exist.
The assumption that ∃ zj(0) ∈ [0, 1] for j ∈ (1, 2) simply rules out scenarios in which
the profit surfaces can not be positive in any part of the (z1, z2) plane in Figure 3.3. In other
words, we consider cases where, at the very least, producer 1 would profit from innovating
when producer 2 choose not to innovate.
Remark 2 says that the NE is unique and equal to (1, 1) if and only if both producers find
it profitable to innovate at the maximal level z = 1 simultaneously. Otherwise, we have an
anti-coordination game in which one producer innovates maximally and the other innovates
only marginally (z = 0).
To simplify the analysis, we will focus on case a, that is when the NE is unique and equal
to (1, 1). This allows us to focus on a situation where, in the absence of the need for comple-
mentary innovation by the supplier, producers would both wish to innovate maximally. This
approach presents the advantage of isolating the effects of supplier network externalities,
driven by the need for complementary investments.
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Nash Equilibrium in the 3-Player Game
We are now ready to bring in the shared supplier. Recall that sourcing from a supplier
reduces the share of revenue that accrues to producer j (sj < 1). The following remark
establishes how this division of revenue affects the Nash equilibrium and best responses of
the producers.













Consequently, the (z1, z2) region in which both producers innovate with positive profits shrinks
with sj.
Remark 3 indicates that the range of radicalness values z that are profitable for both
innovators shrinks with sj since producers yield a bigger share of revenue to the supplier
9.
Consequently, the range of parameters where z = 1 is a Nash Equilibrium also shrinks.
Recall that the presence of a supplier changes the game in yet another way: the effective
radicalness zˆj equals min{zj, zS}. This means the producer cannot influence zˆj above the
value chosen by the supplier. In what follows, we study how this affects the Nash Equilibrium
of the innovation game.
Remark 4. The Nash Equilibria (z1, z2, zS) of the 3-player innovation game are:




S ) iff L ≤ zmaxS
(0, 0, 0) or (L,L,L) iff zmaxS < L < z¯S
(0, 0, 0) iff z¯S < L or ΠS(zmaxS ) < ΠS(0)
where zmaxS is the radicalness level that maximizes the expected profits of the supplier assuming
it could dictate the level of innovation for other players (E[ΠS(zS, zS, zS)]), and z¯S is the
threshold value above which expected profits of the supplier are negative.
9Note that this is true whether the supplier is exclusive or shared.
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Figure 3.5: Diagram overlaying the supplier’s profit function on the (z1, z2) plane. The order
of the three points L, zmaxS and z¯S determines the Nash Equilibrium of the three-player
game described in Remark 4
Because innovation choices are perfect complements, (0, 0, 0) is always a possible equilib-
rium, even if higher radicalness is profitable. Therefore, the innovation game is a coordina-
tion game. We will come back to this in future work as we introduce more shared suppliers
and analyze risk-dominant play. In what follows, we focus on explaining the equilibria with
positive levels of innovation.
To understand Remark 4, consider Figure 3.5, which illustrates how the choice of the
supplier interacts with that of the producers. As shown before, when producers do not
depend on a supplier, they invest z = 1. Now, with a shared supplier and the assumption that
the effective level of radicalness for producer j is zˆ1 = min{z1, zS}, the optimal radicalness
level for producer j is now zj = zS, as long as zS ≥ L, and 0 otherwise.
Hence, the supplier faces an inequality constrained optimization problem: pick zS such
that profits are higher than with zS = 0 and such that zS ≥ L. If there is no such zS,
then pick zS = 0. Let us focus our attention on the 45 degree line in Figure 3.5. This line
now represents the supplier’s choice set: zS ∈ [0, 1]. Along this line, we plotted E[ΠS], the
supplier’s expected profit function: it first decreases, then increases, reaching a maximum
at zmaxS , and finally decreases turning negative at z¯S. If z
max
S ≥ L, it is feasible and leads




S ) NE. If z
max
S < L < z¯S, then the supplier can choose zS = L.
Finally, if z¯S < L, then the only NE is (0, 0, 0).
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To summarize, in this section, we characterize the Nash equilibrium of the innovation
game. We find that, if any level of radical innovation is profitable for one producer, given the
radicalness of the other producer’s innovation, then this producer innovates at the maximal
level of radicalness. However, the supplier’s choice constrains the producers and eventually
determines the Nash equilibrium in the 3-player setting.
Effects of Miscoordination
We are now ready to state the main results regarding the effects of miscoordination between
producers. We start with the finding that, as the probability of miscoordination θ increases,
the NE level of innovation decreases. We saw in Remark 4 that at equilibrium, all players
choose the same level of radicalness, which is “set” by the shared supplier. To simplify,
denote this equilibrium level of radicalness z∗S.
Result 1. As the probability of miscoordination, θ, increases, z∗S decreases and, by Remark
2, so do the equilibrium radicalness levels of both supply chains.
We interpret θ as the probability that the two producers innovate in different technolog-
ical directions. Under miscoordination, the supplier must produce different types of inputs
for each of the producers. Higher radicalness leads to greater input specificity and thereby
larger losses of scope economies. Consequently, the supplier decreases its ambition in radi-
calness. In the model, the parameter σ captures how sensitive to the risk of miscoordination
the supplier is: in the supplier’s cost function, σ governs how radicalness affects the elasticity
of substitution between the components supplied to the two producers when miscoordina-
tion happens. Figure 3.6 illustrates these dynamics for specific parameter values. We note
that, first, z∗S decreases slowly; then comes a value of θ above which the supplier prefer zero
degree of radicalness. In what follows, we show that Result 1 is sensitive to the importance
of economies of scale in the supplier’s production process.
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Figure 3.6: Change in z∗S as a function of θ, in the 3-player innovation game. The parameters
describing the cost function of the supplier are k = 1, σ = .9
Result 2. As the supplier’s economies of scale increase, the negative impact of miscoordi-




The intuition behind this result is that large economies of scale reduce the importance
of production costs in the supplier’s calculus. Also, because more radical innovation leads
to higher demand and, therefore, greater production and greater economies of scale which
can compensate the loss in economies of scope, or even diseconomies of scope.
Policy-induced innovation
In many cases, policy-makers wish to induce innovation, i.e. increase the quality a of a
product. This could be, for example, to foster climate change mitigation: in this context,
a represents the carbon intensity of a product. In our model, several parameters affecting
whether investing in this innovation is profitable the shared supplier are shaped by policy.
First, there are parameters that govern the demand for the product: the size of the market,
M , and the marginal value of quality a to the customer’s utility, β. M can be changed by
procurement policies, while β can be changed by a carbon tax (which increases the attractive-
ness of low-carbon products). But policies can also influence cost parameters. Fro example,
subsidies can lower the upfront cost RS. We investigate how the risk of miscoordination
affects the ability to induce radical innovation via these various policies.
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Let R¯S be the maximum upfront cost the supplier is willing to incur to innovate (i.e.
such that E[ΠS](z∗S, R¯S) = 0). Similarly, let M be the minimum market size for which the
supplier wishes to innovate (analogously, the market size such that expected profit is exactly
0) and β the minimum marginal utility of quality for the consumer for innovating in quality
to be profitable. In other words, these are the threshold values for key parameters that affect
the parameter space under which innovation is attractive to the supplier.








Result 3 indicates that a higher risk of miscoordination, θ, reduces the parameter space
under which radical innovation is attractive to the supplier. All other things equal, if the
miscoordination probability increases, the upfront cost cannot be as high, the market must
be larger, and the marginal utility to the customer of quality improvements must be higher.
In turn, if subsidies are used to induce innovation by reducing the upfront costs borne by
the firm, these subsidies will need to be higher, while procurement policies to increase the
market size would need to be more vigorous. Similarly, if the marginal utility to customers
of products being green is raised by a carbon tax, then this tax needs to be higher.
The intuition behind these results lies in how θ, RS, β and M affect the maximized
objective function. A movement in θ therefore changes the threshold value of the other three
parameters at which the objective function is positive. However, these three parameters –
and the associated policy instruments that can shape them – have different effects on z∗S, the
chosen level of radicalness in equilibrium. Hence, although in our model they can all induce
a shift from no innovation to some innovation, they are not equally effective in encouraging
a higher level of radicalness:











Remark 5 indicates that changing the upfront cost has no effect on the optimal radicalness
level10. However, increasing the market size raises the level of radicalness, and increasing β
lowers it. Although β needs to exceed some minimum level, raising it further can indeed be
counter-productive. We interpret this as a note of caution regarding the reliance on carbon
taxes to induce innovation, at least within the limited scope conditions of this model. This
result stems from two properties of the model. First, customers compare the products to
the utility obtained from an outside option: as β increases, a lower level of radicalness is
needed to compete successfully with that outside option. Second, the supplier chooses z
unilaterally: beyond the level of quality that successfully draws customers away from the
outside option, the supplier has no more competitive incentive to further increase quality.
Discussion
Our model illuminates a few interesting tensions that arise when there exist technologically
critical suppliers that are shared between competing producers:
1. Although there is competition between producers in price or quantity of the final good,
the presence of a shared supplier can create a monopoly-like position upstream in the
supply network with regards to innovation choices, and this, in fact, can discourage
innovation.
2. If there is a risk that producers will innovate in substantively different ways (miscoordi-
nate their technological direction), shared suppliers will be more reluctant to innovate
and they will innovate less ambitiously, for fear of losing their central position in the
supply network.
3. The probability of miscoordination between producers reduces the size of the parameter
space that supports radical innovation. Consequentially, inducing innovation in the
network requires more ambitious policies (such as procurement, subsidies or taxes)
10This is because changing the upfront cost simply shifts the profit function.
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when this risk of miscoordination is high.
We see that the network structure underlying production matters for understanding the
incentives to engage in radical innovation. Specifically, the model illustrates a case in which
attaining higher levels of innovative ambition requires that producers be able to coordinate
their technological vision so as to align the suppliers they co-depend on for the success of
innovative projects.
We will now examine the implications of the model for green technological transitions,
with a focus on the car manufacturing sector and a discussion of mechanisms to foster
coordination between industrial actors.
3.4 Implication for a Green Technological Transition
Climate Change Mitigation Requires Radical Technologies
The last IPCC report asserted that, if the world wants to limit anthropogenic warming to less
than two degrees Celsius11, greenhouse gases emissions need to decrease to zero net emissions
by 210012 (IPCC 2014). Many argue that revolutionary changes in technology are needed
to achieve such objectives (Hoffert et al. 2002). For example, Barrett (2009) argues that the
needed change looks like a technological “revolution” because it “will require fundamental
change, achieved within a relatively short period of time.” We agree with the statement, but
for different reasons.
We think that the “revolution” consists less in bringing some technologies from paper to
proofs of concept (e.g. nuclear fusion), and more in pushing advanced technologies through
the challenges of mass-scale production and diffusion. In that spirit, Pacala et al. (2004)
have claimed that much could be achieved with what is already known (at least up the
11with more than a 50% chance
12The reports states that emissions shall decrease between 40 to 70% by 2050 relative to 2010 and to zero
net emissions by 2100
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first half of the century). Similarly, the Deep Decarbonization Pathway Project attempts to
demonstrate that, by relying on what we already know, the world can achieve a reduction
between 70% and 100% by 2100 (Deep Decarbonization Pathways Project 2015).
These pathways don’t rely on any R&D breakthrough. But they require fast and massive
scaling-up of production and diffusion of advanced technologies. For example, they project
emissions for passenger transport peaking around 2020, and about 134 million electric ve-
hicles in 203013. Much of this change requires that large networks of firms redirect their
production towards radically different products. We argue in this paper that coordinating
downstream producers is critical for technological transitions to take place. To further our
point, we focus on the car manufacturing sector in the following section.
The Case of the Automotive Industry
The automobile is a complex product for which parts and sub-parts that interact are often
produced by different firms (MacDuffie et al. 2010). It is not surprising then that supplier-
buyer relationships in this industry have received some high degree of scrutiny. For example,
Dyer (1996) attempted to quantitatively study how relationship specialization throughout
the supply chain impacts performance measures such as quality or speed of new product de-
velopment for Japanese and American automakers. For our argument, however, it matters
critically that producers share suppliers. Since this particular aspect of the industrial orga-
nization has not been quantitatively documented, we turn to FactSet Revere14, a database
of supply chain relationships.
We use FactSet Revere relationship database to obtain information on buyer-supplier
relationships for car manufacturers. More information on data collection and cleaning is
available in Appendix 3.6. Table 3.1 displays summary statistics for the buyer-supplier
relationships. First, we note, in an average year, the average car manufacturer 1) works with
13together with 75 million plug-in hybrid electric vehicles, 31 million hydrogen fuel cell vehicles, 27 million
compressed pipeline gas vehicles
14www.factset.com/data/company_data/supply_chain
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics on the number of suppliers in the car manufacturing sector
mean sd min max
Total number of suppliers 85.58 81.12 1.86 262.40
Percent shared 80.84 16.14 30.15 100.00
Percent not shared by any other producer 18.81 16.18 0.00 69.62
Percent shared by 2 to 5 producers 32.37 15.24 12.90 79.17
Percent shared by 6 to 9 producers 18.70 7.13 0.00 26.67
Percent shared by at least 10 producers 30.12 16.67 0.00 59.67
Relationship mean duration (in years) 6.00 1.46 1.80 8.02
Relationship max duration (in years) 12.10 4.17 2.00 15.00
Note: The summary statistics are for a sample of 35 car manufacturers using FactSet relationships
from 2003 to 2017. Variables are first averaged across years to then generate summary statistics
for a cross-section of producers. The “total number of suppliers” for a given producer j is the
yearly average of the number of suppliers working with producer j. The variable “relationship
mean duration” for a given producer j equals the yearly average of the average duration of all
relationships observed in a given year for producer j. Accordingly, the variable “relationship
max duration” for a given producer j equals the yearly average of the maximum duration of all
relationships observed in a given year for producer j.
about 85 different suppliers and, 2) shares about 80% of those suppliers with its competitors.
This indicates that 1) the industry is heavily relying on outsourcing for manufacturing
intermediate parts, and that 2) shared suppliers are the norm rather than the exception. We
should highlight that, on average, about 30% of a car manufacturer’s suppliers are shared
by 10 or more of its competitors. Hence, it appears that some suppliers could be labeled
as “mega-suppliers”, i.e. supplying most of final producers in the sector. The columns
“min” and “max” in Table 3.1, however, are a testimony to significant variation across
manufacturers with respect to their supply-chain organization. Figure 3.7 illustrate this
point by showing that, although a group of ten or so manufacturers seem to share many
suppliers, others in the industry are less connected.
Table 3.1 also provides summary statistics regarding the duration of the relationships
between producers and suppliers. The relationships with suppliers have been going on for
about six years on average (in the average year and for the average producer). The maximal
duration observed for a relationship, however, is as high as about 12 years. This indicates

























































































































































































Figure 3.7: Number of Shared Suppliers
Note: Producers with no declared suppliers were dropped.
would consistent with more asset-specific product development.
This structure, in fact, reflects the wave of outsourcing and “de-verticalization” that
transformed the industry since the mid-80’s (Sturgeon et al. 2008). Driven by a need to
reduce cost in a globalized market, as well as a conviction that they should emulate the
modular structure of the computer industry, producers increasingly outsourced the manu-
facturing of parts. They spun-off some of the subsidiaries producing intermediate parts, and
some suppliers merged giving rise to the “mega-supplier” supplying complex modules to mul-
tiple producers (Jacobides et al. 2016). For example, in the 1990s, Nissan announced it would
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source components from one of Toyota’s supplier, Denso (going against a long-standing norm
that suppliers should not be shared between two rival supply chains or keiretsu). Denso had
lower cost thanks to Toyota’s large market share which provided greater economies of scale.
If, as we argue in this paper, shared suppliers are obstacles to innovation, why do car
manufacturers rely so much on them? It is important to highlight here that the outsourcing
wave took place jointly with a move towards greater standardization of intermediate inputs.
Ahmadjian et al. (2001) describes this phenomenon for the Japanese automotive industry in
the 1990s. A simple answer to our question is that shared suppliers are very efficient when
intermediate inputs have become standardized and innovation is minimal.
Alternatively, Jacobides et al. (2016) use case studies and historical research to argue
that the outsourcing wave was partially a strategic mistake in the U.S. and Europe. Manu-
facturers saw the idea of outsourcing whole modules to capable suppliers as a new strategic
imperative but overlooked contractual risks. Specifically, they put themselves at risk of sur-
rendering power to mega-suppliers becoming strategic bottlenecks. Soon, the limits of the
paradigm became apparent, and manufacturers became wary of shared suppliers. The fol-
lowing quote, from a Fiat executive, highlights that manufacturers believed suppliers lacked
incentives to innovate: “It’s all a question of money – suppliers can’t imagine spending lots
of money. The mega-suppliers want only big volume, they want to stick with processes they
know. Their short-term incentive is to stay focused on components. [...] They are not likely
to offer us their latest technologies if that threatens their existing investments – this can be
a barrier to our innovation.” (quote from ibid.).
The state of affairs described above can be contrasted with somewhat savvier man-
agement of supplier relationships by Japanese auto-makers. As we saw, Nissan broke the
long-standing Japanese keiretsu norm of not sharing key suppliers by starting to source from
Denso, Toyota’s main supplier of electronics. However, when it became clear that electron-
ics were becoming a central and complex component of car technologies (requiring strong
technological coordination), Toyota invested heavily in its internal capacity to manufacture
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electronics in order to lessen its reliance on Denso and to better monitor and control its
dealings with its supplier, who now has split loyalties (Ahmadjian et al. 2001).
These case studies highlight that shared suppliers pose strategic problems in the pro-
cess of innovation and, our data shows that these relationships abound. We ask: What are
the consequences for the low-carbon transition? With the realization that the traditional
combustion-engine-based car is responsible for a significant share of greenhouse gases emis-
sions, the car manufacturing sector is in a period of ferment with many alternative power-
train technologies under testing (Sierzchula et al. 2012)15. Our model suggests that this
multitude of technology directions exacerbates the strategic problems documented above,
as the “mega-suppliers” have neither the incentive nor the capacity to make the requisite
complementary investments, especially given the risk arising from the uncertainty in tech-
nological directions.
Empirically, we see that although most major manufacturers have announced ambitious
plans for new clean products, investments in these new models still seems limited and driven
by compliance with regulatory mandates. For example, Wells et al. (2012) argue that current
electric vehicles tend to be of inferior quality because the architecture of most models has not
been sufficiently adapted to the new requirement of batteries. Critically, the industry has
not scaled up its production and sales to the level hoped for by the Obama administration
when it decided to make sizable investments in the battery supply-chain (Canis 2013). To
our knowledge, there currently exists no rigorous case studies examining different firms’
decisions to innovate in alternative vehicles and how those decisions are shaped by the scope
of the firm, and the contracts and relationships with key partners. Such case studies are
needed to understand progress in the low-carbon transition and our model provides some
hypotheses to be tested in such case studies.
According to our model, we would expect that the players best positioned to make
innovative and successful investments in alternative vehicles would be either firms with long-
15Sierzchula et al. (2012) documents eight different competing technologies.
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term relationships with their main suppliers, capable of co-design via relational contracts,
such as Toyota, or vertically integrated firms. Interestingly, Tesla, which arguably is one
the most innovative and successful producer of electric vehicles, is a new entrant, free from
linkages with the historical network of suppliers. According to Dyer et al. (2015), it is also to
a large extent vertically integrated. In their 2015 Forbes’ article, Dyer et al. explained that
Tesla initially tried to set up a global supply chain to reduce costs, but having manufacturing
so spread out led to ‘massive coordination problems’. The authors highlight that, compared
to other car makers, Tesla manufactures many more components in-house, and they further
argue this was a great advantage for bringing electric cars to the market because the pace
of change was too fast for its suppliers to follow. So far, although Tesla successfully brought
to market electric vehicles, those have yet to reach the status of mass-production. The firm
has announced it would do so with the next model (Model 3), but many hurdles seem to lie
ahead (Economist 2016).
3.5 Discussion
Our model shows that, under the presence of supplier network externalities, a transition to
radical innovations is likely to take place only if producers coordinate in ways that create
economies of scope for their suppliers. In the context of user network externality, the role of
expectations is often highlighted for coordinating actors (Farrell et al. 2007). Naturally we
might wonder: what kind of institutions or policies can effectively affect expectations?
Lately, the fight against climate change has called comparison to JFK’s moonshot, stress-
ing the importance of goal-setting and planning (Sachs 2015). The Sustainable Development
Goals, voted by all countries represented at the United Nations in 2015, can be thought of
as an example of goal-setting, and the Deep Decarbonization pathways, mentioned earlier,
as examples of planning efforts. Such initiatives could, to a certain extent, be interpreted as
“soft” mechanisms for modifying expectations about green transitions. Similarly, although
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the Paris Climate Agreement remains a non-binding set of pledges to reduce greenhouse
gases emissions, it possibly is useful to foster the convergence of expectations of political
and economic actors.
Importantly, the need and challenges of corodinating industrial actors echoe studies of
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) (Fuchs 2010) and discussions
about how to replicate it in the energy sector (Anadon et al. 2014; Bonvillian et al. 2011;
Fuchs 2009; VanAtta 2007). Specifically, Fuchs (2010) shows how DARPA facilitates co-
ordination among competitors and describes DARPA’s technology policy as “embedded
government agents” that re-architect social networks among researchers with the goal of
identifying and influencing new technology directions, neither the invisible hand of the mar-
ket nor picking winners. Although DARPA’s original strategy was focused on researchers,
the agency swithced its focus to industry after 2001. According to Fuchs (ibid.), DARPA
then supported the coordination of technology development across a vertically fragmented
industry in whose direction the military has interest and in which long-term coordination
of technology platforms was particularly challenging. DARPA actions mainly consisted in
bringing together established vendors with academics and start-ups with the goal to support
knowledge-sharing within industry, between competitors.
A quote from an industry participant at a DARPA seminar illuminates the dynamics at
stake: “You just can’t make anything happen in industry (today) on your own, because it’s
completely impossible. You have to find a partner, you have to convince your competition
this is the right thing to do. You’re guiding people [your competitors], ... and they ask, ‘Why
are you helping me with this?,’ and the fact is you give them information so the suppliers
are in the right place to help you.” Here, the industry actor quoted by Fuchs (ibid.) clearly
makes reference to the importance of coordinating supply chains, and in particular shared
suppliers, in the hope of fostering technological change in the industry.
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3.6 Conclusion
To foster green technological change, the economic literature proposes policies rectifying the
market failures well-known to environmental and innovation economics (Hallegatte et al.
2011; Jaffe et al. 2005; Popp 2010b; Popp et al. 2010). On one hand, the negative pollution
externality imposed by greenhouse gases calls for a carbon price either through a tax or
an allowance trading scheme. On the other, as discussed in this paper, various positive
externalities also impede the process of technological change. It is, as a result, commonly
accepted that a carbon tax alone will not be sufficient (Lehmann 2012; Lehmann et al. 2013).
We contribute to this literature by suggesting an additional mechanism, supplier network
externality, for producing sub-optimal technological transitions. Under the presence of such
externalities, a transition to radical innovations is likely to take place only if producers
coordinate in ways that create economies of scope for their suppliers. Finally, we argue
that this case is relevant to car manufacturing sector and highlights connections to the
literature debating the merits of innovation agencies such as DARPA. In the future, we
intend to further investigate the policy implications of our model and extend our theoretical
results. Specifically, we plan to generalize the model by allowing for m producers and n
shared suppliers. With more than one shared supplier, the problem of coordinating on the
equilibrium that features positive levels of innovation becomes salient and interesting for us
to analyze. We can use an intuitive generalization of risk dominance (Morris et al. 1995) to
analyze how an increase in the number of players interacts with the parameter θ to change
the overall likelihood of technological change in the system.
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For most articles, the full text downloaded from ScienceDirect requires many different clean-
ing steps before it can be analyzed. The text is often the imperfect result of the conversion
of images of typed or printed text into machine-encoded text: some words are not well rec-
ognized especially when the article contained mathematical symbols and equations. Words
are also sometimes not properly separated by space. Below are the successive cleaning steps
I undertake. Patent texts require only a few preprocessing steps described below under the
preprocessing section.
Preprocessing. I fix “broken” unicode such as garbled HTML entities, convert non-ascii
characters into their closest ascii equivalents, replace all URL strings with “URL”, replace
all email strings with “EMAIL”, replace all phone number strings with “PHONE”, replace
all currency symbols with their standard 3-letter abbreviations, replace English contractions
with their non-shortened forms, replace all accented characters with unaccented versions.
This is done through the use of the Python package Textacy. I also remove any sequence of
more than 1000 digits. I also remove tokens with more than 50% of characters being digits.
Drop non-English articles. Some articles seem not to be written in English. For this
reason, I use Google’s CLD2 library in Python to detect every document’s language, and
drop those that are detected with large enough confidence as not being English.
Splitting text into sentences. I use the Python package Spacy to parse the text and
detect sentences.
Clean each sentence. I remove any punctuation and tokens of length 1 (i.e. stand-
alone characters). I also drop sentences if their number of non-digit tokens is lower than
5. This helps remove unintelligible sequences of letters and digits that are often found at
the beginning of articles. Finally, I remove the entire sentence if less than 80% of tokens
are recognized by SpaCy’s English dictionary. This provides a rough test for whether the
sentence is written in another language. Indeed articles can sometimes present translations
in other languages within the full text.
Further processing. Number-like strings are replaced with the token “*NUMBER*”. All
words are lowercased.
Meta-Data
Scopus’s meta-data provides the name and geographic localization of the authors’ affiliations.
However, Scopus does not provide information about these organization. In particular,
knowing the share of articles affiliated with public vs. private entities would be interesting.
To that aim, I leverage the Global Research Identifier Database16 (GRID) which provides
16https://www.grid.ac/
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information about a worldwide collection of organizations associated with academic research.
In particular, GRID classifies an entity as one of the following types: education, company,
government, facility, non-profit, health care17. An organization is classified as “education” if
it can grant degrees, as “company” if it is a business entity with the aim of gaining profit, as
“government” if it is operated mainly by a government, and as “health care” if it is a place
that treats patients. Facilities encompass building or facilities researching specific areas and
usually containing specific equipment (e.g., a nuclear plant). Nonprofits include charities
but also non-governmental research institutes18.
Unfortunately, the name of the organizations and its geographical location are often
reported differently in Scopus and GRID. To match as many entities as possible, I first look
for exact matches, then for approximate ones using tools such as fuzzy matching in python.
Still, many remained unmatched. I then manually match any organization appearing, at
least, three times or more in the data. There were about 300 of such organizations.
The bulk UPSTO downloadable data contains patent meta-data. Names and addresses
of the inventors and assignee are therefore more readily available. I use the country of
the assignee, and when the patent has no assignee, I use the country of the inventor. The
USPTO data, however, does not classify assignee concerning the type of the organization
(e.g., company, education or non-profit). The GRID database here is not as useful because
most patents originate from businesses; GRID encompasses some for-profit entities with
major research activities, but many patentees are in fact small companies unlikely to be
listed under GRID. Hence, to match patent assignees to a type, I implement a more basic
strategy. It is useful to notice that the name of an organization tends to contain tokens
informing about the nature of that organization. For example, the “Inc.” abbreviation in
the name Flow Vision, Inc. tells us that this is a for-profit organization. Other such tokens
includes “corp.”, “co.”, “plc”, “llc”, “limited” or “company”, as well as “& cie”19. Similarly,
I identify organizations containing tokens such as “university” or “school” as being of the
“education” type, and those containing tokens such as “govern”, “ministr” or “agency” as
being of the “government” type. The use of these simple rules helps me match about 36529
out of 45820 assignee names. Out of the 7899 remaining, I manually match those that appear
at least ten times in my data (about 200 of them). I leave the rest with no type information.
Topic Modeling
I use topic modeling, a machine learning method for text analysis, to generate covariates that
describe the semantics surrounding molecules and therefore proxying some chemically and
industrial characteristics. Specifically, I use Latent Dirichlet Allocation (LDA), a method of
probabilistic topic modeling for text (Blei 2012; Blei et al. 2006, 2009; Roberts et al. 2014;
Roberts et al. 2016).
17There are two other classifications: “archive” and “other.” For more information, see https://www.
grid.ac/pages/policies
18For example, in the USA, the National Academy of Sciences is classified as a non-profit.
19In other languages, here are a few of the tokens that I found in the data: “kaisha” or “kk” in Japanese,
“spa” in Italian, “gesellschaft” or “gmbh” or “ag” or “kg” in German, “bv” or “nv” in Dutch, “sa” or “sarl”
in French, “ab” in Swedish, “oy” in Finnish, “rt” in Hungarian.
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In this method, the experimenter chooses the number of topics, and after training the
algorithm on a corpus, the model can return the topic distribution for each document. Put
differently, using the words that appear in a given document; the LDA model infers what
proportion of each topic a document contains. Intuitively, the topic proportions describe
quantitatively what an article talks about, and we can, therefore, think of it as a proxy of
the physical, chemical and industrial characteristics of a molecule. I train the algorithm, not
on the entire corpus, but on the subset of documents that contain at least one mention of
a molecule: this represents a total of 382,599 patents and 382,005 articles. The LDA model
is trained choosing five topics. Table A1 displays the top three words in the five topics
generated by the LDA model on the corpus of patents20.
I then aggregate the topic proportions of the documents at the molecule level by calcu-
lating a weighted mean topic proportion with weights proportional to the number of times
an article mentions a molecule. As a result, articles with many mentions of a molecule
contribute more to the aggregated topic proportion. I also test the robustness of my results
to taking a simple non-weighted mean. Figure 1.1 summarizes these various steps with a
simple example of three documents, two molecules, and two topics.
Finally, I use these topic proportions together with the outcome variable (log count) as
covariates in the synthetic control method. Hence, the algorithm will construct a synthetic
control that not only reproduces the path of log count in pretreatment periods but that also
mimics the values of the different topic proportions.
Figure A1 displays the correlation heat map between the topic proportions and counts
in patents and articles. We note that the topic proportions are only weak predictors of
the variable count. Hence, in the SCM optimization, they should have a small contribution
in constructing the synthetic control because the SCM algorithm assigns bigger weights to
variables that are better predictors. Figure 1.8, however, illustrates why topic proportions
are still useful. The graphs display scatter plots of topic proportions and log count. We see
that some HAPs have values of topic proportions that stand out as outliers. This indicates
that those HAPs present a semantic context that is likely very different from the one of CFC
substitutes. Hence topic proportions ensure that such HAPs are not used in constructing a
synthetic control.
20The appendix features the lists of top 20 words for patents and articles.
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Table A1: Top 3 words in topics for patents
Words Probability
crotononitrile 0.0090
Topic 1 remote 0.0063
dialkylhydantoin 0.0047
andreu 0.0141
Topic 2 sulfon 0.0075
phosphatidylinositols 0.0072
neal 0.0323
Topic 3 isopropyltrimethoxysilane 0.0276
inducers 0.0236
topcoatings 0.0071
Topic 4 heterophasic 0.0054
neal 0.0052
trisethyl 0.0157
Topic 5 maker 0.0128
amineprotecting 0.0066
Note: The table presents the three most probably words in the five topics generated by the LDA
algorithm. As a consequence of the nature of the corpora (patents), the words in the topics are




Figure A1: Correlations between topic proportions and counts
Note: We see that topics somehow correlate with log counts. This will ensure that they
contribute to the synthetic control. The whole sample is used.
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SCM theoretical foundations
Here, I briefly summarize the theoretical underpinnings of the SCM. Suppose there are J+1
molecules, J molecules as potential controls and one, denoted with the subscript 1, that is
treated. The treatment effect can be written as αit = Y
T
it − Y Nit , where Y Nit is the number
of document mentioning molecule i in year t if no intervention, and Y Tit the number of
documents mentioning molecule i in year t if intervention. Here the quantity we need to
estimate is Y Nit . Abadie et al. (2010) show that a weighted average of the control units can









jYjt = Y1,t and
∑
w∗jZj = Z1
To understand why this is the case, Equation 7 presents the underlying factor model. δt
is an unknown common factor w constant loadings across units; θt is a vector of unknown
parameters; Zi a vector of observed covariates (not affected by intervention); λt unobserved
common factors; µi a vector of unknown factor loadings and it unobserved transitory shocks
with zero mean. Note that this model generalizes the difference-in-differences model which
imposes that λt be constant for all t. Hence, the unobserved confounders are constant in
time and can be eliminated by taking time difference. Here, the SCM allows the effects of
confounding unobserved characteristics to vary with time; taking time differences would not
get us rid of µi.
Y Nit = δt + θtZi + λtµi + it (7)




jZj = Z1 and
∑
w∗jµj = µ1 would be unbiased
estimator of Y N1t . In other words, fitting Z1 and Y11 ... Y1T0 is a way of indirectly fitting
µ1, the unobserved factor loadings. As a result, it is important to restrict the donor pool
to units with outcomes that are thought to be driven by the same structural process as for
unit representing the case of interest and that were not subject to structural shocks to the
outcome variable during the sample period.
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Supplementary Tables and Figures
Figure A2: Most frequent codes for patents mentioning CFC susbtitutes before and after
1987
Note: The figure illustrates the differences between the most frequent codes for patents before
and after 1987 (year of application is used). The most frequent patent codes before 1987 tend to
be the most frequent after 1987. At the same time, some codes with low to zero frequency before
1987 become important after 1987 (e.g., C08G, C10M, C23G or C11D). Only patents with at
least 3 molecule occurrences are kept in the sample.
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Table A2: List of CFC substitutes







































































Note: The table lists 14 molecules that were considered as potential CFC substitutes in 1988.
The columns PAFT and AFEAS indicate whether the molecule was included in the investigations
carried out by the PAFT and AFEAS. The PAFT (Program for Alternative Fluorocarbon Toxicity
Testing) was created in January 1988 to work on assessing the toxicity of five possible alternatives.
The AFEAS (Alternative Fluorocarbon Environmental Acceptability Study), created in December
1988, investigated the atmospheric dynamics of twelve potential CFC substitutes. I use these twelve
molecules to form the group of CFC substitutes. I also include in this group two other possible
CFC substitutes mentioned in Benedick (2009) and Parson (2003). In the rest of my analysis, I
track the evolution of patents and articles mentioning these 14 molecules.
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Figure A3: Counts in articles and patents for each CFC substitute
Note: These graphs plot the yearly number of articles or patents mentioning the names of given
CFC substitutes. We note a clear increase for most CFC substitutes in the 1990s. For patents,
the graph shows patents that have been granted (as opposed to patent applications) but the years
on the x-axis corresponds to the application date. There is on average a two-year delay between
patent application and grant.
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Figure A4: Country of origin of patent assignees before and after 1987.
Note: The figure illustrates that all countries are associated with an increase number of patents
mentioning CFC substitutes. We note in particular the strong increase for Japan and the UK.
Only patents with at least 3 molecule occurrences are kept in the sample. The year used is the
application year. The period ”Before 1987” includes the year 1987.
Figure A5: Second-level patent codes
Note: We see that CFC substitutes and HAPs also share similar second-level patent codes.
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Note: The tables display summary statistics on the country of origin and types of patent assignees
(left-hand side) and on the country and type of affiliation of the authors of articles (right-hand side).
Data collection for HAPs in articles is still undergoing due to quota limitation on the Elsevier API.
We note that more than 96% of patents are granted to for-profit organizations. The rest is shared
among organizations coming from the educational and governmental sector as well as organizations
that fit the description of ”facility”. The majority of patents are granted to assignee domiciliated
in the United States. European assignees tend to represent around 20 to 30% of patents; Japanese
around 10 to 20%.
For patents, the variables Education, Company, Government, Facility, Nonprofit, and Healthcare are binary variables identifying
the type of patent assignee. For articles, ”Education” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if at least one of the authors is affiliated
with an organization in the higher education sector. ”Company” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if at least one of the authors
is affiliated with a for-profit private organization. ”Government” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if at least one of the authors
is affiliated with a governmental entity. ”Facility” is a dummy variable that equals 1 if at least one of the authors is affiliated
with a facility pursuing research in specialized areas (e.g. nuclear plant, particle accelerators etc...). ”Nonprofit” is a dummy
variable that equals 1 if at least one of the authors is affiliated with a nonprofit research institute. ”Healthcare” is a dummy
variable that equals 1 if at least one of the authors is affiliated with an organization where patients are treated. ”USA”,
”Europe” and ”Japan” are dummy variables that equal 1 if at least one of the authors is affiliated with, respectively, the USA,
a European country and Japan. By European country, I mean any country belonging to the EU in 2016 plus Switzerland,
Norway, Serbia, Ukraine, Moldova and Russia. Organization types were collected from the Global Research Identifier Database.
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Table A4: Summary statistics for CFC substitutes and HAPs
Variables (pre-1986 average) Substitutes HAPs HAPs HAPs HAPs
Mean Min Max Std.Dev.
Count 64.2 71.37 41.8 101.8 21.23
Topic 1 (weighted mean) 0.2 0.2 0.16 0.23 0.02
Topic 2 (weighted mean) 0.1 0.11 0.08 0.12 0.01
Topic 3 (weighted mean) 0.43 0.43 0.39 0.47 0.02
Topic 4 (weighted mean) 0.18 0.19 0.15 0.23 0.02
Topic 5 (weighted mean) 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.02
Topic 1 (unweighted mean) 0.2 0.2 0.17 0.22 0.01
Topic 2 (unweighted mean) 0.1 0.11 0.1 0.12 0.01
Topic 3 (unweighted mean) 0.43 0.43 0.41 0.46 0.01
Topic 4 (unweighted mean) 0.19 0.19 0.17 0.22 0.01
Topic 5 (unweighted mean) 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.1 0.01
Note: The table displays summary statistics for the aggregated CFC substitutes and HAPs for
patents. The SCM imposes that the synthetic control’s weights be non-negative and sum to 1.
This can be problematic in cases where the treated unit lies at the extremes of the distribution of
the donor units. We see, here, that the values for CFC substitutes always fall within the range of
the values for HAPs. This table confirms that we are not in this case. Hence, there should be no
penalty constraining the weights to non-negative and to sum to 1. Note that only HAPs in the
small donor pool are used it. Similar results were obtained for articles.
Table A5: Variable weights used in the construction of the synthetic control
Variable Weight
Topic 1 (weighted mean) 0.04
Topic 2 (weighted mean) 0.04
Topic 3 (weighted mean) 0.02
Topic 4 (weighted mean) 0.03
Topic 5 (weighted mean) 0.02
Log Count 0.86
Note: The table displays the weights assigned to variables in the optimization procedure of the
SCM. These weights are for the case of patents with log counts and weighted means of topic
proportions, using the small pool of HAPs as donor pool. We note that topic proportions contribute
about 15% in constructing the synthetic control.
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Table A6: Means over pre-treatment periods for CFC substitutes
Real S Synthetic S Average HAPs
Count (log) 4.17 4.17 4.22
Topic 1 (weighted mean) 0.20 0.20 0.20
Topic 2 (weighted mean) 0.10 0.10 0.11
Topic 3 (weighted mean) 0.43 0.42 0.43
Topic 4 (weighted mean) 0.18 0.19 0.19
Topic 5 (weighted mean) 0.09 0.09 0.08
Note: The table illustrates how the SCM is able to construct a better comparison unit than
simply using the mean of many control units. The table displays the mean over the years 1970 to
1985 for log patent counts and topic proportions for the group of CFC substitutes (”Real S”), for
the constructed synthetic substitute (”Synthetic S”) and for the average of HAPs. The synthetic
control, here, was constructed based on similarity with the variables ”Log Count” and the weighted
means of the 5 topic proportions. We see that the synthetic control matches the real substitute
group much better than the average of HAPs in terms of log count. This is the core idea motivating
the use of the SCM. The HAPs used in calculating the average are only those from the small pool,
explaining why the topic proportions are very similar.
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Figure A6: Patent counts with application date vs. grant date for CFC substitutes
Note: The graph plots the number of patents mentioning any CFC subtitutes using the
application date of the patent or the granting date. The two curves are very similar, with only
about a two-year delay after 1987. Precisely, there is on average a 22-month delay between
application and granting, with a standard deviation of 12 months. The graph illustrates that we
obtain similar reszults by using the application date for the main analysis.
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Table A7: Robustness checks: SCM with counts as outcome variable (instead of log counts)
(a) Patents
Rule Topic Means Donor Pool Pre RMSPE p-value ATE Year
intermediate unweighted whole sample 3.35 0.006 71.88 1990
intermediate unweighted small pool 3.41 0.000 70.87 1990
intermediate weighted small pool 3.70 0.000 72.28 1990
intermediate weighted whole sample 3.92 0.000 71.24 1990
weak weighted whole sample 8.74 0.000 100.92 1992
weak unweighted whole sample 9.68 0.000 84.52 1992
weak weighted small pool 10.23 0.000 109.23 1990
weak unweighted small pool 10.86 0.000 113.61 1990
(b) Articles
Rule Topic Means Donor Pool Pre RMSPE p-value ATE Year
intermediate weighted small pool 1.54 0.000 35.17 1990
intermediate unweighted small pool 1.78 0.000 35.52 1990
intermediate unweighted whole sample 1.96 0.000 35.04 1992
intermediate weighted whole sample 2.03 0.000 35.39 1992
weak weighted small pool 2.65 0.000 44.08 1990
weak unweighted small pool 2.86 0.000 42.6 1990
weak weighted whole sample 4.44 0.006 45.81 1998
weak unweighted whole sample 5.65 0.006 46.73 1994
Note: The tables display results for when using counts in levels instead of in log as the outcome
variable. The estimated treatment effects for these robustness checks are similar to the effect
estimate with the main methodology. ”Topic Means” indicates the procedure for aggregating the
topic proportions at the molecule level. If ”weighted”, the calculated proportion of topic j for
molecule i is the mean proportion of topic j across all documents mentioning molecule i, weighted
by the number of times the molecule appears in the document. ”Donor Pool” indicates what sample
of HAPs is used in the SCM procedure. For ”small pool”, the sample of HAPs used corresponds to
the twenty HAPs most similar to the treated unit in terms of counts and topic proportions before
1987.
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Figure A7: Yearly counts for CFC substitutes and HAPs with different assignment rules for
patents and articles.
Note: The figures show the number of patents and articles each year for CFC substitutes and
HAPs according to the two different assignment rules. The main results were obtained using the
rule called ”weak”. I test the robustness of these results by using an alternative rule, which I call
”intermediate”. The intermediate rule is a more conservative way of assigning documents to
molecules. When a document mentions several molecules, instead of assigning the document to
each molecule, the document is assigned to only the molecule it mentions the most. We note that,
as a result, the weak rule has a greater number of documents in the case of CFC substitutes. For
HAPs, the graphs show no difference mostly due to the scale of the axis.
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Table A8: Robustness check: SCM with alternative assignment rule.
(a) Patents.
Topic Means Donor Pool Pre RMSPE p-value ATE Year
unweighted small pool 0.37 0 1.77 1990
weighted small pool 0.40 0 2.06 1990
unweighted whole sample 0.40 – 1.73 1990
weighted whole sample 0.46 0.03 1.64 1990
(b) Articles.
Topic Means Donor Pool Pre RMSPE p-value ATE Year
weighted small pool 0.27 0.0 1.34 1990
unweighted small pool 0.28 0.0 1.35 1990
weighted whole sample 0.28 0.0 1.39 1990
unweighted whole sample 0.28 0.0 1.31 1990
Note: In this robustness check, I use an alternative rule to assign documents to molecule. The
estimated treatment effects for these robustness checks are all higher than the effect estimated
with the main methodology. ”Topic Means” indicates the procedure for aggregating the topic
proportions at the molecule level. If ”weighted”, the calculated proportion of topic j for molecule
i is the mean proportion of topic j across all documents mentioning molecule i, weighted by the
number of times the molecule appears in the document. ”Donor Pool” indicates what sample of
HAPs is used in the SCM procedure. For ”small pool”, the sample of HAPs used corresponds to
the twenty HAPs most similar to the treated unit in terms of counts and topic proportions before
1987.
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Table A9: Robustness check: SCM with ten topics.
(a) Patents.
Rule Topic Means Donor Pool Pre RMSPE p-value ATE Year
weak weighted small pool 0.17 0 1.16 1990
weak unweighted small pool 0.17 0 1.17 1990
weak unweighted whole sample 0.17 0.035 0.62 1991
weak weighted whole sample 0.19 – 0.71 1990
intermediate unweighted small pool 0.52 0 2.0 1990
intermediate unweighted whole sample 0.52 0.041 1.86 1989
intermediate weighted whole sample 0.59 0.053 1.77 1989
intermediate weighted small pool 0.67 0 2.01 1990
(b) Articles.
Rule Topic Means Donor Pool Pre RMSPE p-value ATE Year
weak unweighted whole sample 0.25 0.000 1.01 1990
intermediate weighted small pool 0.26 0.000 1.16 1990
weak weighted whole sample 0.27 0.018 1.05 1990
intermediate unweighted small pool 0.29 0.000 1.25 1990
weak weighted small pool 0.30 0.000 1.45 1990
weak unweighted small pool 0.32 0.000 1.02 1992
intermediate weighted whole sample 0.42 0.000 1.67 1989
intermediate unweighted whole sample 0.42 0.000 1.68 1989
Note: In this robustness check, I increase the number of topics generated by the LDA topic model
from five to ten. I, therefore, use ten different topic proportions as covariates in the SCM procedure.
”Topic Means” indicates the procedure for aggregating the topic proportions at the molecule level.
If ”weighted”, the calculated proportion of topic j for molecule i is the mean proportion of topic j
across all documents mentioning molecule i, weighted by the number of times the molecule appears
in the document. ”Donor Pool” indicates what sample of HAPs is used in the SCM procedure.
For ”small pool”, the sample of HAPs used corresponds to the twenty HAPs most similar to the
treated unit in terms of counts and topic proportions before 1987.
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(a) Annex A: Patents


































(b) Annex A: Articles




































(c) Annex B: Patents





































(d) Annex B: Articles
Figure A8: Counts in articles and patents for each molecule of Annex A and Annex B.
Note: These graphs plot the yearly number of articles or patents mentioning the names of given
molecules included in Annex A and B. We note that most trends are flat, except maybe for Annex
A in articles which seem to increase and then decrease.
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Table A10: First differences for Annex A and B compounds








Molecule FE Yes Yes
R-squared 0.932 0.933
Observations 184 184
Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent variable: Log count of patents
Years are relative to 1987.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01








Molecule FE Yes Yes
R-squared 0.838 0.843
Observations 240 240
Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent variable: Log count of articles
Years are relative to 1987.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01












Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent variable: Log count of patents
Years are relative to 1990.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01












Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent variable: Log count of articles
Years are relative to 1990.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The regressions indicate statistically significant mean shift between before and after 1987,
except for Annex B in patents; however these are small in magnitude.
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Table A11: Difference-in-differences for Annex A and B compounds.
(a) Annex A - Patents
(1) (2)
Post 1987 x Annex A 0.024
(0.055)
Post 1987 x Annex A x Years -0.009
(0.017)




Year FE Yes No
Molecule FE Yes Yes
R-squared 0.987 0.985
Observations 736 736
Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent variable: Log count of patents
Years are relative to 1987.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(b) Annex A - Articles
(1) (2)
Post 1987 x Annex A 0.069
(0.073)
Post 1987 x Annex A x Years -0.008
(0.017)




Year FE Yes No
Molecule FE Yes Yes
R-squared 0.966 0.964
Observations 960 960
Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent variable: Log count of articles
Years are relative to 1987.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(c) Annex B - Patents
(1) (2)
Post 1990 x Annex B 0.080
(0.063)
Post 1990 x Annex B x Years 0.020
(0.018)




Year FE Yes No




Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent variable: Log count of patents
Years are relative to 1990.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
(d) Annex B - Articles
(1) (2)
Post 1990 x Annex B -0.251∗∗∗
(0.065)
Post 1990 x Annex B x Years -0.040∗∗
(0.017)




Year FE Yes No




Standard errors in parentheses
Dependent variable: Log count of articles
Years are relative to 1990.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
Note: The difference-in-differences specifications indicate that a positive and statistically significant
treatment effect for Annex in patents and a negative one for Annex B in articles. The magnitudes
however are small.
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Table A12: SCM for Annex A and B compounds
(a) Annex A - Patents
Topic Means Donor Pool Pre RMSPE p-value ATE Year
unweighted whole sample 0.08 0.06 -0.01 –
weighted whole sample 0.09 0.14 -0.0 –
unweighted small pool 0.13 0.90 -0.09 –
weighted small pool 0.14 0.60 -0.03 –
(b) Annex A - Articles
Topic Means Donor Pool Pre RMSPE p-value ATE Year
unweighted small pool 0.15 0.250 -0.12 –
unweighted whole sample 0.15 0.471 0.08 –
weighted whole sample 0.16 0.296 0.18 –
weighted small pool 0.25 0.400 0.33 1990
(c) Annex B - Patents
Topic Means Donor Pool Pre RMSPE p-value ATE Year
weighted whole sample 0.07 0.09 -0.18 –
unweighted whole sample 0.07 0.10 -0.16 –
unweighted small pool 0.09 0.20 -0.23 –
weighted small pool 0.12 0.30 -0.28 –
(d) Annex B - Articles
Topic Means Donor Pool Pre RMSPE p-value ATE Year
unweighted whole sample 0.15 0.036 -0.32 –
weighted whole sample 0.16 0.112 -0.28 –
weighted small pool 0.38 0.200 -0.86 –
unweighted small pool 0.40 0.300 -0.86 –
Note: All tables refer to SCM implementation using log count as outcome variable and using
the weak rule of assigning documents. Almost none of the procedures yield treatment effects
that are statistically significant. Most p-values are greater than 0.10. These results indicate that
Montreal did not trigger a large decrease nor a large increase in the number of patetns and articles
mentioning Annex A and B compounds. ”Topic Means” indicates the procedure for aggregating
the topic proportions at the molecule level. If ”weighted”, the calculated proportion of topic j for
molecule i is the mean proportion of topic j across all documents mentioning molecule i, weighted
by the number of times the molecule appears in the document. ”Donor Pool” indicates what sample
of HAPs is used in the SCM procedure. For ”small pool”, the sample of HAPs used corresponds to
the twenty HAPs most similar to the treated unit in terms of counts and topic proportions before
1987.
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(a) Patents: raw effect (left) and placebo tests (right)
(b) Articles: raw effect (left) and placebo tests (right)
Figure A9: SCM for Annex A compounds
Note: Figures A9a and A9b display the results of the synthetic control method for Annex A
compounds for patents and articles. There is no significant increase or decrease in the number of
patents and articles mentioning Annex A compounds. In all cases, the method is implemented using
the topic proportions of a LDA model with 5 topics and the weak rule for assigning documents to
molecule groups. Weighted means of topic proportions are used for patent and unweighted means
for articles because these are the specifications that yielded lowest pre-RMPSE. The graphs on the
left-hand side represent the raw effect, that is the observed time series of the treated group along
with the time series of the constructed control. On the right-hand sides are shown the placebo
tests, the non-parametric tests to evaluate the significance of the results; black lines show the effect
on the treated group relative to the control group, while each gray line is a placebo test performed
on an unit drawn from the donor pool.
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(a) Patents: raw effect (left) and placebo tests (right)
(b) Articles: raw effect (left) and placebo tests (right)
Figure A10: SCM for Annex B compounds
Note: Figures A10a and A10b display the results of the synthetic control method for Annex B
compounds for articles and patents. We note that in this case the synthetic control offers a poor
fit to the observed data. Hence we cannot infer whether there is anincrease or a decrease. In all
cases, the method is implemented using the topic proportions of a LDA model with 5 topics and the
weak rule for assigning documents to molecule groups. Weighted means of topic proportions are
used for patent and unweighted means for articles because these are the specifications that yielded
lowest pre-RMPSE. The graphs on the left-hand side represent the raw effect, that is the observed
time series of the treated group along with the time series of the constructed control. On the
right-hand sides are shown the placebo tests, the non-parametric tests to evaluate the significance
of the results; black lines show the effect on the treated group relative to the control group, while
each gray line is a placebo test performed on an unit drawn from the donor pool.
176
























Figure B1: Boxplot plot of amount of savings in Rupees per treatment group.
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Figure B2: Hexabin plot of WTP and amount of savings in Rupees.
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Question Answer type Label used in table
Have you seen a solar lantern before? Yes or no. Seen lantern before
Do you know someone with a solar lantern? Yes or no. Know someone with
lantern
Do you think a solar lantern can function
properly without many maintenance prob-
lems?
Yes or no. Can function
How much would you say this solar lantern
costs?
Amount in Rupees. Cost estimate
Do you think that the solar lantern is an in-
novative product?




Would you say that a solar lantern is a supe-
rior product compared to a kerosene lamp?





Do you think you will recommend others
to use a solar lantern instead of a kerosene
lamp?





Would you feel safer if there was more light? Definitely not, Not re-
ally, Neutral, Some-
what, Definitely.
Would feel safer if
more light
Have you ever been victim of a kerosene fire? Yes = 1, No = 0 Was victim of
kerosene fire
Do you know someone who has been victim
of a kerosene fire?
Yes = 1, No = 0 Knows a victim of a
kerosene fire
Table B1: Description of questions used in Table 2.10.
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Question Answer type Label used in table
Do your children use lighting for study-
ing
Yes or No. Children use lighting for
studying
Do you believe your current lighting so-
lution is bad for your eyesight?
Definitely not = 1,
Not really = 2, Neu-
tral = 3, Somewhat =
4, Definitely = 5.
Current lighting bad for
eyesight
Who in your household do you think
will/would mostly be using the solar
lantern?
Myself, My spouse,
My children, No one,
Others
Mostly be using: myself and
Mostly be using: my spouse
Do you and your spouse talk about
what to spend money on?
Never = 0, Sometimes
= 1, Often = 2
Talk about how to spend
money
Do you think more women should work
outside of the household or own a busi-
ness?
Definitely not = 1,
Not really = 2, Neu-
tral = 3, Somewhat =
4, Definitely = 5
More women should work
outside
How often did you participate in village
meetings during the past six months?
Almost all of them =
2, Some of them = 1,
None of them = 0
Participation in village
meetings
How often did you participate in farm-
ers’ cooperative meetings during the
past six months?
Almost all of them =
2, Some of them = 1,
None of them = 0
Participation in farmers’ co-
operative meetings
How often did you participate in reli-
gious group events during the past six
months?
Almost all of them =
2, Some of them = 1,
None of them = 0
Participation in religious
group events
How often did you participate in polit-
ical events during the past six months?
Almost all of them =
2, Some of them = 1,
None of them = 0
Participation in political
events
Do you trust other villagers? Definitely not = 1,
Not really = 2, Neu-
tral = 3, Somewhat =
4, Definitely = 5
Trust other villagers
In your spare time, do you mostly
spend time with your friends or stay
home?
Spend time with
friends = 1, Stay
home = 0
Spend time with friends
(dummy)
How many friends do you have in this
village?
number of friends Number of friends
Table B2: Description of questions used it Table 2.12 and 2.13.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
Proofs
We first establish two intermediate results, Remark C.1 and C.2 below, which will be useful
to establish other results.








= 0⇔ sjqj + (sjpj − c)∂qj
∂pj
= 0












− pj = F (pj, zˆj, p−j, zˆ−j) = 0















































M − qj + qj =
β
M
qj > 0 (C.1)
Remark C.2. ∀zˆj, dqjdzˆj |zˆ−j> 0












































































M − q−j − qj
M − q−j ) ≥ 0
Proof of Remark 1







q∗j (zj, z−j)−Rjzj (C.2)










Hence, we can rewrite Eq. C.2 as:




j(zj, z−j)− cj − µsj
ä−Rjzj





qj > 0 from Eq. C.1






−Rj = βsjqj −Rj. (C.3)
We know that qj monotonically increases with zˆj (Remark C.2). qj therefore takes values
between a minimum, call it q0j , when zj = 0, and up to M when zj goes to infinity
21. If
βsjM < Rj, then
dΠ∗j (zj ,z−j)
dzj
is always negative and the highest possible profits will always






is always positive and highest profits are reached for zj = 1. In the
last case, when βsjq
0
j < Rj < βsjM , there exists a value z˜j(z−j) > 0 above which
dΠ∗j (zj ,z−j)
dzj
is positive, meaning profits increase monotonically. This means that the profit function of
each producer increases monotonically with zj beyond some threshold value z˜j, and becomes
higher than the value at zj = 0 after another threshold zj. This threshold value zj does
in fact depend on z−j the innovation level of the other player. We can therefore define the
function z1(z2) denoting the minimum level of innovation for firm 1 so that profits become
larger than under z1 = 0, given z2 the value chosen by firm 2. In the same way, we can
define z2(z1). Thus, either zj(z−j) ∈ [0, 1], or Π∗j(zj, z−j) < Π∗j(0, z−j) for zj ∈ [0, 1].
21There will be a different q0j for every z−j . The smallest q
0
j will be for z−j = 1
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Proof of Remark 2
Proof. By Remark 1, we know that the best response of firm 1 to the value z2 is the maximum
value z1 = 1 if z1(z2) < 1. If z1(z2) > 1, then the best response of firm 1 to the value z2 is
0. (This is also true replacing subscripts 1 with 2, and recirpocally.)
In the first case above, ıU > (1, 1) implies that z1(z2) < 1 for all z2, including for z2 = 1, and
z2(z1) < 1 including for z1 = 1. Hence, the best response of firm 1 is z1 = 1 and similarly
for firm 2, yielding the Nash Equilibrium (1, 1).
In the second case above, if ıU < (1, 1) or if U does not exist, this means that z2(1) > 1
so the best response of firm 1 to z2 = 1 is z1 = 0. The same is true for firm 2, yielding two
equilibria (0, 1) and (1, 0).
Proof of Remark 3
Proof. Consider a small decrease in the share of revenue for producer j: s′j = sj−δ. Equation
C.3 tells us that for any level z−j, the derivative of profit with respect to zj takes a smaller
value under s′j than sj. As a consequence, the threshold z˜j at which the derivative becomes
positive and the threshold zj at which the profit becomes positive are both shifted up. This
means that we have zj(z−j)|s′j > zj(z−j)|sj. It follows that the lower point of intersection ζL
is shifted upwards and the higher point of intersection ζU is shifted downwards.
Proof of Remark 4
Proof. Suppose the supplier can impose its chosen level of radicalness to both producers, i.e.
z1 = z2 = zS. Both producers would then produce the same quantity (qj) at the same price
(pj) determined by level of innovation zS. The supplier’s expected profits are:
E[ΠS] = 2sjpjqj −RSzS − θCS(.|ρ = ρ0 − σzS)− (1− θ)CS(.|ρ = ρ0) (C.4)
In what follows, we use Cm to denote the cost function under miscoordination (that is
CS(.|ρ = ρ0−σzS)), and Cc to denote the cost function under coordination (that is CS(.|ρ =






























Since we have a finite market of size M , there is a point at which the market becomes
saturated, i.e. an increase in the level of innovation of the products does not lead to more
demand. Hence, in the symmetric case, both p∗(zS) and q∗(zS) reach a plateau for some
value of zS . The derivative in equation C.5 becomes −RS − θ ∂Cm∂ρ dρdzS , which is negative.
Thus, if the parameters are such that there is a value of zS at which profits are maximized
and positive, then there is a larger value of zS at which point profits fall under ΠS(0). Denote
it z¯S. Additionally, since at zS = 0, profits originally fall with increasing zS, there is also a
value zS under which profits are less than ΠS(0).
Hence either E[ΠS(zS)] < ΠS(0) for all zS ∈ ]0, 1] or there exists zS and z¯S such that
0 < zS < z
max
S < z¯S. Given this, the possible NE follow from Remark 2. Indeed, if
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zmaxS ≥ zj(zmaxS ), then producers will be willing to invest zmaxS as well. If on the other hand
zmaxS < zj(z
max
S ), then the supplier will choose z
c






S is the minimum
level that ensures that producers will innovate too (each choosing zcS by Remark 2). At z
c
S,
the supplier does not make optimal profits but, if zcS < z¯S, it still makes higher profits than
if zS = 0. Finally, if instead z¯S < z
c
S, or if we are in the case in which E[ΠS(zS)] < ΠS(0)
for all zS ∈ ]0, 1], then there will be no innovative investments, i.e. zS = 0.
Proof of Result 1







creases with θ. Then we will show that as θ increases, the equilibrium can shift to (0, 0, 0).





−∂2E[Π]S/∂zS∂zS , where the derivatives are estimated at z
∗
S.
Since at z∗S the denominator is positive, the sign is determined by the sign of the cross-
derivative.
Since we focus on the symmetric case, both producers produce the same quantity at the
same price, determined by the radicalness level zS (Remark 4). Denote them q
∗(zS) and
































































S) − 2k)kqk−1 > 0.




S) solution holds (z
∗
S ≥ zj and EΠ(z∗S) > Π(0)), we
therefore have that z∗S decreases with θ. But θ also changes the size of that region. First, since
z∗S decreases as the chance of miscoordination increases, it could fall under zj (which does






. This is −Cc(z∗S) +Cm(z∗S) > 0 since costs under miscoordination are
higher than under coordination. Hence, the profits decrease as the chance of miscoordination
increases. In particular, the profits can drop under Πi(0), switching the NE to (0, 0, 0). These
possible discrete changes in the NE lead to the same conclusion that an increase in the chance
of miscoordination decreases the equilibrium value of the innovation.























































A = q−1+k(2k − 2k/(1−zσ) + k(2k + 2
k/1−zσ
−1 + zσ log(2)) + (2




k/ρqk[ρ+ klog(2) + klog(qρ)]
ρ3
< 0















































Proof of Result 3
Proof. Consider a generic function f(x, y). Define x(y) such that f(x, y) = 0. Then:
















Hence, to establish the result, it suffices to establish the monotonicity and sign of the deriva-
tives of the supplier’s value function E[Π∗S](θ,M, β,RS) with respect to those four paramters.
















= −1 < 0 (C.8)
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Denote M c the value of M at which this derivative is equal to 0. We show that at M c,
E[Π∗S] reaches a minimum and is negative, such that E[Π
∗
S] is monotonically increasing as
M increases beyond M c.
At M c, sp∗ = ∂E[C]
∂q




q∗ − E[C](q∗)−RSz∗S ≈ −RSz∗S < 0 (C.10)
Hence, Equation C.9 reaches a minimum at a value M c above which it increases mono-
tonically. Hence in the vicinity of M, the derivative is positive. Combining this fact with
Equation C.7 establishes the second part of the result.
















This derivative is equal to 0 at two points: when sp∗ = ∂E[C]
∂q
(happening at βc1 and when
∂q
∂β
= 0 (happening at point βc2 . Beyond βc2 , the demand function q saturates, having






. In contrast, at βc1 , the profit function reaches a minimum. By the
same reasoning as in Equation C.10, the profit function is negative at that point. Suppose
E[Π∗S] is positive for β
c2 (whether this is true or not depends on parameters governing the
relative importance of costs and revenues, such as cs, M , u0 etc...). Then by the intermediate





0. The combination of that statement and Equation C.7 establishes the third part of the
result.

























⇒ = 2sMβP 2(z) + 2sMp∗(z)βP (z)(1− P (z))2 −Rs−
kβ(1− P (z))2
Ç











= 2sβP 2(z) + 2sMp∗(z)βP (z)(1− P (z))2− (C.14)
k2
M
β(1− P (z))2 (θCm(MP (z)) + (1− θ)Cc(MP (z))) (C.15)
Since (θCm(MP (z)) + (1− θ)Cc(MP (z))) ≤ 2sp∗(z)MP (z) when producing is profitable
(cost must be smaller than revenue), we have:
∂2E[ΠS]
∂M∂z
≥ 2sβP 2(z) + 2sMp∗(z)βP (z)(1− P (z))2 − 2k2β(1− P (z))2sp∗(z)P (z) (C.16)
⇒ ≥ 2sβP 2(z) + 2sp∗(z)βP (z)(1− P (z))2(1− k2) ≥ 0 (C.17)
This is positive because P (z) being a probability is ∈ [0, 1] and k is also ∈ [0, 1] (parameter
governing economies of scale, we assume there are no diseconomies of scale here). This es-
tablishes the result with respect to changes in M .
Data Description
We use the FactSet Relationship database to obtain information about suppliers, customers
and competitors. FactSet contains the most comprehensive relationship database currently
available. It covers relationships for a large number of public and private firms between 2003
and 2017. The database includes information publicly reported by firms22, and complements
this information using firms’ SEC filings, press releases, public announcements, investor
presentations, and firms’ websites. Importantly, the database analysts update relationships
on an annual basis. The unit of observation in the FactSet Relationship database is a
relationship between two firms. The relationship can be labeled as ‘supplier’, ‘customer’, or
‘competitor’23. The database also indicates the beginning and end dates for each relationship.
Firms are identified by a FactSet id, and firms’ name are also available.
We choose to focus on the car manufacturing sector. To this end, we first collected
names of firms listed under the NAICS code 33611, that is “automobile and light duty
motor vehicle manufacturing”. We obtain a list of 48 companies (examples include Ford,
Toyota, Tesla...). We then use FactSet Revere to obtain information about those firms’
relationships. Unfortunately firm FactSet ids do match standardized ids, such as ISINs, we
identify firms by matching on names. Furthermore, we only keep in our sample firms that
are labeled as being competing against each other. Hence, we obtain a list of 27 companies,
and use the FactSet Relationship database to obtain data on supplier relationships between
2003 and 2017. We construct a panel dataset where the observations are at the producer-
year level. For example, we observe the number of suppliers each producer work with in a
given year, as well as the duration of such relationships.
22In particular, Regulation SFAS No. 131 requires firms to report customers representing more than 10
percent of the firm’s sales.
23Other types of relationship, such as partnerships, are also indicated.
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